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ABSTRACT
Blum, Michael. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. May 2014. “An Island of Peace in a
Sea of Racial Strife:” The Civil Rights Movement in Knoxville, Tennessee. Major Professor:
Aram Goudsouzian, Ph.D.
This study examines the civil rights movement in Knoxville, Tennessee. It argues that
the city’s history of race relations, economy, and regional circumstances led to a different type of
civil rights movement. It was conducted by a variety of groups: student activists, established
activists, local businessmen, and elected officials. They had a complicated relationship, which
changed frequently as groups responded to the actions of others. This dynamic led to a relatively
peaceful movement, which created a degree of racial progress, but failed to remedy the structural
problems that plagued Knoxville’s Black community, such as poverty and unemployment.
In early 1960, student activists made plans to begin sitting-in at local department stores.
Their plan brought an immediate response from local businessmen and elected officials who
sought to begin negotiations with segregated merchants and offered demonstrators police
protection. These first demonstrations led to the desegregation of public, and many private,
spaces. Going forward, activists used different means to attack the remaining structural
problems. The biggest threat to disturb these circumstances came from the Highlander Research
and Education Center, a well-known activist training center, which refused to work with elected
officials and had a reputation as a communist organization. As a result it drew harassment from
politicians, local whites, and the Ku Klux Klan, deterring local activists from working with
Highlander. For the remainder of the civil rights movement, local activists took different
approaches to their activism, including War on Poverty programs and participation in local
politics.
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This dissertation builds on the first and second waves of civil rights historiography. It
combines their bottom up and top down approaches by including grassroots activists, powerful
officials, and a number of other groups to highlight how their frequently-shifting relationships
drove the civil rights movement.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES
On June 16, 1960, Reverend William Crutcher worried for his safety.1 Crutcher was one
of the leaders of the Associated Council for Full Citizenship, the local, interracial civil rights
organization that spearheaded a direct action movement in Knoxville, Tennessee. Luckily, the
police offered protection. That day, Cruther received three separate calls with threats to bomb
his home. At night a suspicious looking car slowly drove by his house several times. In
response, he called the police. The investigating officer handed Crutcher a gun for protection.
Crutcher replied, “I’m just a preacher—I wouldn’t know what to do with this! Supposing you
stay with the gun.”2 Despite the lack of weaponry, the Reverend’s home went unharmed.
This snippet reveals a lot about the civil rights movement in Knoxville. Crutcher, a
middle aged clergymen with a slow southern drawl, had become one of the leaders of the city’s
sit-in movement. In most other cities, college students conducted sit-ins. However, in
Knoxville, the sit-in occurred during the summer of 1960, after most college students had left for
the summer recess. He assumed leadership to uphold a promise he had previously made to the
student activists, who wanted to start sit-ins earlier. In return for holding off demonstrations
during negotiations with segregated merchants, Crutcher vowed to join demonstrations if the
talks failed. When discussions ended, Crutcher and other established activists held true to their
word. As demonstrations progressed, tensions arose between activists and segregationist whites.

1

The dissertation’s title comes from a Knoxville News Sentinel article discussing the results of direct
action. The metaphor describes most residents’ view of the city’s civil rights activism. Powell Lindsay, “‘Open
City’ Was Year’s Biggest Step,” Knoxville News Sentinel, December 29, 1963.
2

Proudfoot, Diary, 41.
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However, the demonstrations remained peaceful, in part because of the actions of elected
officials.
In contrast to some other southern cities, elected officials used the police force to protect
civil rights activists. They did so because they worried about the consequences of
demonstrations. They feared that race-related violence would deter outside businesses from
settling in Knoxville. They also feared ruining the city’s myth of good race relations. “We were
fortunate here in Knoxville that the Mayor was with us,” recalled Crutcher. “He requested that
we call him each day before we went uptown (for sit-ins) so he could get police protection for
us.”3 This protection prevented large-scale violence.
This relationship between powerful whites and activists evolved over the course of the
1960s, based on the circumstances. Throughout the civil rights movement, powerful whites,
such as elected officials and leading businessmen, sought to increase and maintain the city’s
economic growth. Meanwhile, civil rights activists undertook a number of efforts to create
structural change. Both groups tried a number of strategies, tactics, and philosophies to serve
their own ends, shaping the character of Knoxville’s civil rights movement.
In Knoxville racial change occurred through the complex, shifting relationship among
student activists, established activists, elected officials, and other groups. Stories such as
Knoxville’s might lack the drama, national media spotlight, and large-scale violence of more
well-known movement sites. But the civil rights movement took many forms. Telling the
Knoxville story-- with a focus on local politics, the decisions of grassroots activists, and the
interaction between activists and the multi-faceted white community-- helps to understand the
civil rights movement as a number of smaller, local movements.

3

Roger Ricker, “25 Years Later, Battle Goes on,” Knoxville Journal, July 1, 1989.

2

Knoxville’s location in the Appalachian Mountains partially explains its particular
history. They city’s racial climate differed from that of many other southern cities. Often
residents of Appalachia are often stereotyped as backward and impoverished. Local historian
Betsey Creekmore described antebellum residents: “their literature was limited, their language
outdated, their taste in music equally old fashioned,” because they rarely interacted with the nonAppalachian world.4 This stereotype obscures a more nuanced understanding. A sizable
percentage of Appalachian whites adhered to a conservativism shaped by their historical
experience. This Appalachian conservatism combined a skeptical approach toward change with
a strong belief in individual autonomy and fiscal responsibility.5 These characteristics shaped a
moderate political climate, compared to many other southern locales. For example, the
desegregation of the University of Tennessee and the city’s public schools occurred through a
series of lawsuits and court rulings, which, when implemented, attracted little fanfare. However,
it did not lead to an influx of Black students. The first wave of Black students experienced harsh
treatment from white students and faculty.
The Appalachian context and the city’s history of race relations, detailed in chapter one,
created a relationship between elite African Americans and elected officials based on a
complicated paradox. The groups sometimes cooperated, while simultaneously seeking to
advance their own interests. This framework carried over into the 1960s. When direct action
protests began, student activists, established African Americans, elected officials, businessmen,
and middle class whites continued this relationship, setting the tone for a relatively peaceful civil
rights movement. These groups understood that negotiation, rather than violent confrontation,
4

Betsey Beeler Creekmore, Knoxville (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1958), 208.

5

Barbara Asbury, “The Way We Are: Conservative Knoxvillians Like to Set Their Own Pace,” Knoxville
News Sentinel, September 4, 1977.
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was the most effective vehicle for creating change. These parameters shifted the primary site of
civil rights struggle from street level demonstrations to jockeying for position at the negotiating
table. However, it did not preclude demonstrations, which effectively forced segregated
merchants to negotiate.
At the same time, elected officials and powerful businessmen worked to bring about
economic growth. Since the city never truly recovered from the Great Depression and missed
the post World War II economic boom, these groups actively courted outside industries and
sought to modernize the city. They succeeded. To do so, they took an active part in the civil
rights movement, helping to bring about desegregation while discouraging large-scale structural
change.
Throughout the civil rights movement, African American activists worked to obtain a
voice in the city’s political conversation. They used a variety of tactics, ranging from protest to
electoral politics. Many of these tactics proved to be fairly successful at gaining access to
segregated facilities and positions of power. They were not enough, however, to overcome the
structural problems that plagued the Black community, including poverty and residential
segregation. As the 1960s progressed, the struggle to combat these institutional problems led
African American activists to adjust their tactics and strategies.
Black activists’ effort to create change began with the desegregation of commercial
establishments in the early 1960s. As chapter two shows, during the first phase of the direct
action campaign, city officials and businessmen sought to stop Knoxville College student
activists from demonstrating. Instead, city leaders and established African Americans initiated
negotiations with segregated merchants. When these talks stalled, student and established Black
activists resumed protests. They effectively pressured the segregated merchants back to the

4

negotiating table, where a handful of large downtown merchants agreed to desegregate. During
the second direct action phase, as described in chapter three, student activists took the lead.
They attempted to negotiate with segregated institutions, including movie theaters, restaurants,
and hospitals. When these segregated institutions refused, student activists demonstrated. In the
end, their efforts led to an agreement that desegregated many of the city’s large establishments,
including hospitals and hotels, before the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Chapter four describes the
experience of the Highlander Research and Education Center, which came to Knoxville in 1961.
As Highlander reveals, Knoxville’s power brokers were not totally tolerant of civil rights
activism. Because of Highlander’s reputation as a “communist” organization that refused to
negotiate with city officials, it faced harassment throughout its time in the city. City leaders
tolerated, and even worked with, local activists, who operated within mutually understood
parameters. However, Highlander’s uncompromising stance and the accompanying negative
publicity made the Center an unacceptable threat. As a result, local activists had little interaction
with Highlander. Urban renewal forced the Center out of Knoxville in 1971.
During the 1960s, different groups of interracial activists used different methods to attack
these structural inequalities, such as high rates of Black poverty and underemployment. As
chapter five demonstrates, the philosophy and tactics of Black Power never gained much
traction, through it found a small pocket of support at Knoxville College (KC), where some
students adopted the ideology in an attempt to force change on the conservative campus. Their
efforts never gained wide spread support, however, and ended soon after the mysterious murder
of a white cab driver, which Knoxvillians portrayed as a potential danger of Black Power.
Meanwhile, at the University of Tennessee, Black students fought for greater inclusion into the
campus community. They sometimes joined forces with liberal white students, who sought more
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student power and demonstrated against the Vietnam War. Even though elected officials mostly
ignored the student activists they proved successful in obtaining a voice in campus affairs, a
dramatic change at both UT and KC
Chapters six and seven detail how liberal activists successfully used a variety of tactics,
from demonstrations to participation in local politics, to obtain a voice in city government. Their
success led more African Americans to turn to electoral politics at the end of the 1960s. African
Americans were elected or appointed to offices and positions throughout the city government, a
trend which continued well into the 1970s. This turn to electoral politics offered Black elected
officials some say over the city’s resources, while grassroots political activists continued to push
for civil rights reforms, a key legacy of the 1960s.
**********
The last twenty five years have seen the proliferation of civil rights studies in two waves.
The first wave examines the Civil Rights Movement mostly from the top down, focusing on high
politics and national leaders. These studies feature well known leaders, such as Martin Luther
King, Jr. or John F. Kennedy, and spotlight the federal government’s interaction with the Civil
Rights Movement and the Movement’s efforts to obtain federal civil rights legislation.6 They
6

For more biographies of King: Lerone Bennett, Jr., What Manner a Man: A Biography of Martin Luther
King, Jr. (Pittsburgh: Johnson Publishing Company, 2000) originally published in 1968; David L. Lewis, King: A
Biography (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978); Lawrence Reddick, Crusader without Violence: A Biography
of Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York: Harper, 1959); Stephen Oates, Let the Trumpet Sound: The Life of Martin
Luther King, Jr. (New York: Harper Perennial, 1982); Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King
Years 1954-1963 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988); Pillar of Fire: America in the King Years, 1963-1965 (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), At Caanan’s Edge: America in the King Years, 1965-1968 (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2007); More recently Michael Honey, Going Down Jericho Road: The Memphis Strike, Martin Luther
King’s Last Campaign (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007) argues the sanitation strike provided King the opportunity
to combine civil rights and labor activism to obtain economic justice, which demonstrates his changing strategies,
goals, and increasing radicalism, especially after 1965. It combines a local study with a more balanced assessment
of King. For more on Brown see: Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts (New York: Twelve Table Press, 2004);
Genna Rae McNeil, Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle for Civil Rights (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984); Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of
Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality (New York: Vintage,1975), James Patterson, Brown v. Board
of Education: A Civil Rights Milestone and its Troubled Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

6

feature a series of high profile flash points, such as the 1956 clash at Little Rock’s Central High
School. Works from this first wave tend to start the Movement in the 1950s and focus on
southern cities. The media’s constant coverage of Martin Luther King, Jr. and segregationist
violence influenced historians’ interpretation of these national events. In addition, many studies
appeared of civil rights organizations, including the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC), Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC), and the NAACP.7 These works
examine organizations’ internal dynamics, achievements, and relations between organizations.
This period also saw the first, groundbreaking local studies by historians such as William Chafe
and Robert Norrell.8

7

These organizational studies uncovered the organizations’ narratives, internal dynamics, and relations
between groups. For studies on the NAACP please see: Patricia Sullivan, Lift Every Voice: The NAACP and the
Making of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Free Press, 2009). For more on specific aspects of the NAACP:
Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts (New York: Twelve Table Press, 2004); Genna Rae McNeil, Groundwork:
Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle for Civil Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984);
Charles Flint Kellogg, NAACP: A History of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
1909-1920 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967); Roy Wilkins, Standing Fast (New York: DeCapo
Press, 1982); Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board Education and Black America’s
Struggle for Equality (New York: Vintage,1975); Kenneth Robert Janken, White: The Biography of Walter White,
Mr. NAACP (New York: New Press, 2003). For SCLC: Adam Fairclough, “The Southern Christian Leadership
Conference and the Second Reconstruction, 1957-1973,” in David J. Garrow, ed. We Shall Overcome: Martin
Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement, 3 vols. (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1989); Thomas Peake, Keeping the Dream
Alive: A History of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference from King to the Nineteen Eighties (New York:
Peter Lang Publishers, 1987). For SNCC please see: Barbara Ransby, Ella Baker and the Black Freedom
Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Clayborne
Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981);
Emily Stoper, “The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Rise and Fall of a Redemptive Organization, in
David Garrow, ed. We Shall Overcome: Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement, 3 vols. (Brooklyn:
Carlson, 1989) For more on the conflict between Black and white members during the summer of 1964 please see:
Nicolaus Mills, Like a Holy Crusade: Mississippi 1964- the Turning of the Civil Rights Movement in America
(Chicago: Dee, 1992);Wesley Hogan, Many Minds, One Heart: SNCC’s Dream for a New America (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina, 2007); Sara Evans, Personal Politics: The Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil
Rights Movement and New Left (Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1979). On CORE please see: August Meier and Elliot
Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973).
8

These local studies focus on Southern cities perpetuating the Movement as a Southern phenomenon, but
challenge the King-centered view of the story. Instead, they use social history to evaluate the Movement on a local
level. The most important of these is William Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina and
the Black Struggle for Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) because it started the trend. For others
please see: Robert Norrell, Reaping the Whirlwind: The Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee (New York: Alfred
Knopf, 1985); David Colburn, Radical Change and Community in Crisis: St. Augustine, Florida, 1877-1980 (New
York: Columbia University, 1985) and John Salter, Jackson, Mississippi: An American Chronicle of the Struggle
and Schism (New York: Bison Books, 2011) originally published 1979; J. Mills Thornton, Dividing Lines:
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By 1995, a second wave of civil rights historiography was emerging, led by historians
John Dittmer and Charles Payne. 9 It examines the movement from the bottom up, or through
the grassroots, which emphasizes previously understudied groups, such as women and local
people. It shows how in some instances, all socioeconomic classes participated in the
Movement, while in other cases, classes divided or refused to participate for a number of
reasons, including self-interest or fear of retaliation. The bottom-up view demonstrates the
impact of national events, such as the 1954 Brown decision, on a local level. However, these
works sometimes fail to address cooperation between activists and local elected officials. They
also focus primarily on the African American perspective, shortchanging the significance of the
strategies and viewpoints of white officials.
This study of Knoxville builds on the previous waves of scholarship, providing an
inclusive view by examining the constantly shifting relationship among elected officials, student
activists, established activists, business leaders, and other groups to reveal the changing
circumstances under which Knoxville’s civil rights movement unfolded, shifted, and evolved.
Knoxville was not, of course, the only southern city to see itself as progressive. William
Chafe’s skillful study of Greensboro, North Carolina, was the first to tackle the dynamics of a
self- proclaimed progressive southern city. More than a decade later, Benjamin Houston’s
treatment of Nashville, Tennessee, followed suit. Both local studies show how the cities used

Municipal Politics and the Struggle for Civil Rights in Montgomery, Birmingham, and Selma (Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 2002); David Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Voting Rights
Act of the 1965 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978); Charles Fager, Selma 1965: The March that Changed a
Nation (New York: Charles Schriber, 1974); Frye Gaillard, The Dream Long Deferred: The Landmark Struggle for
Desegregation in Charlotte, North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Richard Pride
and J. David Woodward, The Burden of Busing: The Politics of Desegregation in Nashville, Tennessee (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1985).
9

John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Champaign: University of
Illinois Press, 1995), Charles M. Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the
Mississippi Freedom Struggle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
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progressive rhetoric to impede civil rights. Chafe argues that Greensboro “represented a
paradox: it combined a reputation for enlightenment and a social reality that was reactionary.”10
According to Houston, the idea of racial moderation “had no internal cohesion in steering
between two powerful poles of racial thinking: avoiding the vituperative racism of hard core
segregationists, but often equally skeptical about southern racial progressives.”11 To the white
power structure, any breach of moderation justified tactics that reinforced the status quo. As
Kevin Kruse demonstrates, Atlanta billed itself as “the city too busy to hate,” as it was governed
by a coalition of elite citizens, politicians, and businessmen who agreed that racial strife served
as an impediment to economic progress, which damaged the city as a whole. As incidents of
racial discord occurred, members of the ruling group, including long time mayor William
Hartsfield and African American leaders, met to facilitate a compromise between African
Americans and upper class whites, sparing Atlanta negative media attention. However, these
compromises, which often entailed token efforts at desegregation, failed to please the majority of
Black or white residents.12
Twentieth century United States history further accepts the standard interpretation of the
universality of the post war economic boom.13 Yet, Knoxville suffered from an economic stasis;

10

William Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for
Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 5.
11

Benjamin Houston, The Nashville Way: Racial Etiquette and the Struggle for Social Justice in a
Southern City (Athens: University of Georgia, 2012), 4.
12

Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005).
13

For examples, please see: Eric Foner, Give me Liberty: An American History, volume two, edition three
(New York: Norton & Co., 2012), 916-924, Gary Nash, Julie Roy Jeffery, eds. , The American People: Creating a
Nation, sixth edition (New York: Pearson and Longman, 2004), 890-902. In Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and
Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) Thomas Sugrue demonstrates how the
lack of post War boom shaped the decline of Detroit.
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as the civil rights movement unfolded, local officials and business leaders had to consider how
demonstrations would harm their ongoing efforts to create economic growth.
This study also adds a dimension to Appalachian historiography, which primarily focuses
on the region’s continuing economic problems or folk culture. Coverage of the civil rights
movement has been limited to the Highlander Folk School, anti-poverty activism, and, more
recently, environmental issues, such as strip mining and mountain top removal. Several
important works analyze the interracial labor activism in mining camps throughout Appalachia.14
Yet very little has been written about African Americans in Appalachia. In perhaps the most
pertinent work, an edited collection by Edward Cabbell and William Turner, Cabbell contends,
“Appalachia can no longer afford to sit back and do nothing about the fact that the civil rights
movement of the 50s and 60s by-passed the mountains.”15 As this project details, the civil rights
movement occurred in Appalachia, and the Appalachian context influenced the outcome.
The civil rights movement in Knoxville has received little attention thus far. The most
recent history of the city dedicates five pages to the movement.16 Both Cynthia Griggs Fleming
and Lisa Zagumny have written articles about the sit-in portion of the movement, but a fulllength treatment of its movement does not exist.17 The following work documents the civil
14

Stephen Fisher, ed. Fighting Back in Appalachia: Traditions of Resistance and Change (Philadelphia:
Temple University, 1993), Ronald Eller, Uneven Ground: Appalachia Since 1945 (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 2008), John Alexander Williams, Appalachia: A History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2002). For more on African Americans: Thomas E. Wagner and Phillip Obermiller, African American
Miners and Migrants: The Eastern Kentucky Social Club (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004).
15

William Turner and Edward Cabbell, eds., Blacks in Appalachia (Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press, 1985), 9.
16

William Wheeler, Knoxville, Tennessee: Continuity and Change in an Appalachian City (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 2005).
17

Cynthia Griggs Fleming, “White Lunch Counters and Black Consciousness the Story of the Knoxville
Sit-ins” in Trial and Triumph: Essays in Tennessee’s African American History, edited by Carroll Van West, 366389. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2002. Lisa L. Zagumny, “Sit ins in Knoxville, Tennessee: A Case
Study of Political Rhetoric” The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 86, No. 1 (Winter, 2001), pp. 45-54.
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rights struggle, examines all the groups involved, and details the struggles of the Highlander
Research and Education Center during its time in Knoxville, and considers the movement’s
legacy.
In Knoxville, activism occurred without much conflict or violence, perhaps making it a
less attractive subject for scholars. Yet the Knoxville story emphasizes that to understand the
civil rights movement, we must appreciate that there were multiple civil rights movements.

11

CHAPTER TWO
“KNOXVILLE NEGROES HAVE BEEN VERY PATIENT:” HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND
In early March 1871, the Knoxville Daily Press and Herald published a story about the
construction of a new building at the corner of Market Square and Union Street, a prime location
in the city’s commercial district. The reporter asked the owner, a wholesale and retail dealer
named Peter Kern, to describe what the building would look like upon completion. Kern
reported that the retail department, located on the first floor, “will be elegantly fitted up in the
most approved style with counters, shelving, and the various etceteras desirable for the judicious
showing of stock and the convenience of lady and other customers.” The second floor would
have several rooms, including an ice cream parlor and space for private parties. To reach the
second floor, Black Knoxvillians were to use a separate stairway, located under the main
stairway, which “will be appreciated by many colored residents of Knoxville, who, like the rest
of mankind enjoy such things with an equal zest.” The Independent Order of Odd Fellows, an
African American civic club, rented a room on the third floor.1
This story can serve as a metaphor for Knoxville’s longer history of race relations.
Kern’s building included a paternalistic design element, a second stairwell, that, he thought,
should be appreciated by Black Knoxvillans because it offered them access to space in the
building. This type of “benevolence” constituted racial progressivism because it did not exclude
Blacks. African American patrons presumably went along with this arrangement because they
desired a space in the city’s growing commercial and cultural center. However, it can safely be
assumed that they also resented this treatment and wished to change it.
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Knoxville’s race relations developed based on a number of factors, such as
demographics, economics, type of slavery, geography, and political climate. They combined to
create a relationship that differed from that of many other southern cities. From its founding,
slaves played a part in the city’s growth into a major commercial hub, creating a level of
familiarity between the races unseen in many other southern cities. After the Civil War, Blacks
gained the right to vote making them a player in the political realm. The franchise combined
with a burgeoning Black community to ensure Black Knoxvillians’ continued civic participation.
However, their situation worsened as a result of the Great Depression, from which the city never
recovered. By the 1960s, the difficult conditions facing the Black community fueled the civil
rights movement.
The city’s history included a working relationship among elected officials, businessmen,
and elite African Americans. City leaders worked with Black leaders to allow minor social
changes to prevent drastic changes. Black leadership took advantage of this circumstance to
obtain civil rights in increments. City leaders kept control, while African Americans
encountered a less hostile environment than that in other southern cities. Courting the Black vote
forced elected officials to interact with Black leaders. While voting did not bring about racial
equality, it offered African Americans an avenue to fight for civil rights.
From the end of the Civil War to the dawn of the civil rights movement, African
Americans struggled for racial progress through a variety of means, from protests to local
politics. Throughout these years, city leaders maintained this functional relationship with elite
African Americans as necessary. Based on this history, when the civil rights movement came to
Knoxville, both elite African Americans and city leaders had a pre-established framework
through which social change could occur. The creation of this framework began during slavery.
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*********
Slavery in Knoxville differed from that in many other southern cities. Older scholarship
attributes this difference to the political leanings of the area’s original settlers. Carter G.
Woodson argues that during the eighteenth century, East Tennessee was settled by Germans,
Scotch Irish, Huguenots, Quakers, and poor whites who left the east coast to escape the rapidly
growing power of slave owning aristocrats. They headed westward for freedom, independence,
and the opportunity to make their own fortunes. These circumstances created a different
political culture and philosophy, which favored a true representative government and individual
rights. Given these values, early settlers “therefore hated the institution [of slavery] and
endeavored more than ever to keep their section open to free labor. They hated the slave as such,
not as a man. On an early Southern frontier there was more prejudice against the slave holder
than against the Negro.” This sentiment made eastern Tennessee a hotbed for abolitionist
activity.2
While there may be some credence to this older view, several other factors played a
major part in the development of slavery in Knoxville. The rocky Appalachian terrain could not
sustain the cotton crop. Local historian Robert Booker argues that “because of the lack of
comparatively good farming land in Knoxville, slavery was more a luxury than an investment in
a labor supply.”3 In fact, about twenty percent of households in East Tennessee owned slaves.
Just before the Civil War, only ten percent of the city’s households owned slaves, who primarily
worked in agriculture, domestic service, and crafts. Slave owning families usually owned fewer
than twenty slaves. Many had five or less. William Wheeler concludes that Knoxville’s
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“climate and terrain seemed to have made it inhospitable for the rise of large plantations and of
slavery.”4
The census of 1800 provides further detail. Less than a decade after Knoxville’s
founding, Knox County had a total population of just over 12,000 residents; 1,122 (or 10.6%)
were enslaved. As a point of comparison, Davidson County, home to the emerging city of
Nashville, had a total population of 9,620, of which 2,936, or 30.5%, were listed as slaves.5
Further south, the Mississippi Territory recorded a population of 8,850; of these 3,489 were
slaves (about 25.3%) with a dramatic expansion coming over the next several decades.6 This
relatively small slave population, combined with soil that could not grow cotton, shaped the
peculiar institution in East Tennessee. Without the plantation system that spread across much of
the South, Knoxville grew into a commercial hub that used slave was not entirely dependent on
them.
Knoxville, along with the surrounding area, emerged as an important part of the national
economy. It exported two basic types of items: foodstuffs, such as flour or meal, and raw
materials used for industry, including minerals, timber, and wool. These items served as a key
component in the manufacturing industry found in the Northeastern states and across the globe.7
In addition, the city frequently served as a distribution point for northern-based manufactured
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goods to other parts of the South. The successful exporting made Knoxville one of the most
prosperous cities in the South from the Civil War to the Great Depression.8
Rather than being confined to plantations, Appalachian slaves provided the labor needed
to maintain the city’s economic growth. Sociologist Wilma Dunaway estimates “that nearly one
third of the region’s slaves may have been employed full time in commerce and industry, and
another twelve percent were shifted between agricultural and nonagricultural tasks.” As a point
of comparison, roughly 25% of slaves across the entire South labored outside of agriculture.9 In
Knoxville, they worked in most facets of commerce, from domestic service to the retail and
wholesale trades. Some slaveholders rented their slaves to the city to help build infrastructure.
Other slaveholders sent slaves on tasks that took them out of the county. For example, trusted
slaves sometimes manned cattle drives or brought surplus food items to market.10 Slaves became
a regular fixture in the city. This created a dynamic where all classes of whites and slaves
regularly interacted, creating a familiarity unseen in many other areas of the South. However,
these interactions did not lessen the horrible conditions of slavery or white supremacy’s
dominance. Instead, they made slaves a part of the city’s fabric, rather than a foreign group to be
feared. For example, Joseph Leondias Star remembered that his father Henry Dunbar traveled
around East Tennessee working as a “carpenter, blacksmith, shoe maker and knowed [sic] a lot
more trades. His master was broadhearted, and good to his slaves, and he let’em work at
anything they want to, when they was done their part of white folks chore work.” Dunbar used
his profits to buy his freedom. He later purchased his wife’s freedom. The pair then moved to
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Knoxville, where they “had a great big shoe shop out there where Governor Brownlow lived.”11
Slaves who remained on the slaveholder’s property usually worked as domestics or on a small
farm with their owner, both of which led to a great deal of interaction between slaves and
masters.12 These conditions led to a range of interactions, from violent treatment to businessrelated exchanges.
Slave trading also occurred in Knoxville. The city served as a prime location for the
trade because of its status as a commercial hub. The slave trade further connected Knoxville to
the national economy and brought slaves in and out of the city frequently. The city became a
stopping point along two routes frequently used by interstate slave traders. The first began in
western Maryland or Northern Virginia and led to Wheeling, West Virginia, where the Ohio
River and its tributaries provided access to points further south. The second route left from
Richmond and took users southwest by land into the Tennessee Valley. Local slave traders also
roamed the area. Dunaway notes, “local and itinerant traders went from farm to farm buying
slaves; the speculator paid a cash deposit and signed a note to complete payment when resold
them to cotton planters in Alabama or Mississippi.13 Slave trading frequently brought slaves into
the city, making them less foreign to white residents.
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Although these interactions led to a range of interactions between slaves and owners,
slavery remained a system backed by violence. Beatings, abuse, and violence were common.
Martha Cunningham remembered her parents “treated our slaves good. They ate what we ate,
and they stayed with us a long time after the war.” However, maltreatment occurred. “I
remember though all of the slave owners weren’t good to their slaves. I have seen’em take those
fine looking negroes, put them in a pen when they got ready to whip them, strip them and lay
them face down, and beat them until white whelps arouse on their bodies” said Harrison. She
also recalled babies taken from their enslaved mothers and sold “just like you would cattle.”14
Dan Newborn remembered that his grandmother was treated badly by the Waltons, the family
that owned her. They “beat her on the head and that was part of her death. Every spring her
head would run. She said they didn’t get much of somethin’ to eat.”15 The deplorable conditions
of slavery gave slaves the motivation to end the institution.
During the Civil War, Knoxville was a divided city in a Confederate state. A small group
of elites, merchants, large land owners, physicians, and lawyers led the secessionist charge.
While this group owned few slaves, they had “economic ties with Virginia, South Carolina,
Georgia, and other southern states… clearly marked the town’s commercial economy as southern
oriented.”16 This connection led the elite secessionists to support the Democratic Party. They
favored secession because they felt an overriding loyalty to the South, rather than to the federal
government, which they viewed as agent of tyranny. They also supported slavery and therefore
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desired to maintain white supremacy. A referendum in April 1860 showed that only 10 percent
of Knoxvillians favored secession. However, it became less popular once the war began,
because of Lincoln’s call for volunteers. From that point, the city was equally divided over the
Civil War.17
Middle and working class whites supported the Union out of patriotism and fear of the
unknown fate that awaited them as a member of the Confederacy. Their fundamental loyalty
was to the nation rather than the states of the Deep South. Besides, their own politicians were
not pushing for abolition. Unionist whites also worried that they would end up fighting a war to
advance the interest of the elite. They feared that elite whites would buy their way out of fighting
and maintain political power because their wealth would allow them to set the terms of the
Confederate government. Robert McKenzie argues that Unionist whites worried that politicians
from the Deep South would limit voting to the wealthy or slave holders and ignore working class
and poor whites.18 The split created a relatively moderate political climate that prevented the
Democratic Party from dominating city politics.
The Civil War provided the opportunity for enslaved people to end slavery. In 1863,
shortly after the arrival of the Union Army, in East Tennessee, Mrs. Sophronia Strong worried
about her slaves, who had shed their deferential attitudes and become more aggressive. The
following week, a male slave threatened to shoot her. Around the same time, the coachman of
Dr. J.G.M Ramsey, a city leader, continued his duties, but openly sympathized with the Union
Army. Anthony Humes, a slave preacher, remembered slaves had “secret meetings and prayed
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for the Union Army and Lincoln himself.” With the arrival of the Union Army, the number of
slave runaways increased dramatically.19
Republicans controlled city politics for the next fifty years by uniting former Unionists
and Confederates. Some of the reconciliation can be attributed to kinship ties, religious
affiliations, and commercial interests. It should also be credited to the local Republican Party’s
moderate philosophy. Rather than side with Radical Republicans, who fought for racial equality,
party officials quickly learned “whites would go over to the Democrats--the party of disunionbefore they would support a political party that apparently pandered to Black voters.”
Knoxville’s Republican Party thus distanced itself from the national party’s efforts at racial
equality.20 However, it complied with the Constitution. Republican officials enfranchised Black
men in 1867 and, unlike in many other parts of the South, ensured that they maintained the right
to vote thereafter, creating a valuable group of potential supporters. The franchise opened the
door to participation in the city’s political sphere.
Given the political climate, some liberal whites helped the newly freed slaves. These
institutions or groups created schools and cared for the displaced. In February 1864, the East
Tennessee Relief Association formed to raise money for thousands of Black and white refugees
“who had trudged into Knoxville from East Tennessee farms starving and almost naked…since
the armies had consumed the food of the surrounding country.”21 The Knoxville office of the
Freedman’s Bureau opened in 1866. It quickly founded church-based schools for African
Americans. This was followed by several Black public schools in 1870, thanks to the
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fundraising efforts of philanthropist and educator Emily Austin. While these institutions did not
guarantee racial equality, they helped ensure that African Americans would able to participate in
civic affairs. Education opened the door to participation in city politics, civil rights activism, and
the emergence of a Black business community.
After the Civil War, Knoxville became one of the fastest growing cities in the New
South.22 Much of this growth can be credited to the area’s abundant natural resources. The land
produced a variety of agricultural products, including wheat, white potatoes, sweet potatoes,
corn, tobacco, and several types of fruit. It also held desirable minerals, such as coal, iron, zinc,
and marble. Knox County had a number of quarries, coal mines, and lumber exporting
companies. The city housed a number of wholesalers, including dry goods, boot and shoe
makers. Groceries quickly opened thought out the city. By 1885, the city had become the fourth
largest wholesale center in the South (behind Atlanta, New Orleans, and Nashville).23
The availability of transportation and natural resources led to the growth of industry.
These businesses converted locally available natural resources into finished goods to be shipped
nationally. Historian William Wheeler notes, “between 1880 and 1887 alone, ninety seven new
factories were built. In addition to iron mills and machine shops that processed iron into a
multitude of finished products, cloth mills and furniture factories sprang up and prospered. And
once cloth mills came to Knoxville, it was only natural that a thriving apparel industry would
follow.”24 In combination, the commercial and manufacturing sectors ensured Knoxville had
continued economic growth until the Great Depression.
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The expansion of the city’s industrial and commercial sectors led to a large increase in
the African American population. By 1880, the city’s Black population reached over thirty two
percent. Recently arrived African Americans found work with railroad lines, the Knoxville Car
Wheel Company, the Knoxville Iron Company, and Burr and Terry’s Saw mill.25 Others chose
skilled trades, such as barbering, brick masonry, and carpentry. These vocations provided the
stable income and leisure time that became the foundation of the Black community.
These conditions led to African Americans to create “a complete class structure parallel
to that of the white population.” 26 The Black community formed as it did because of African
Americans’ continued access to education and participation in local politics. Many elite Black
men held white collar jobs, which required professional degrees. For example William Yardley
became the city’s first Black lawyer, while Drs. G.W. Harmon, J.B. Young, and Alonzo Fielding
arrived in Knoxville between 1869 and 1883. This small group of elites used their status,
education, and independence to lead the Black community.27
The Black community supported many social and fraternal organizations, which served
recreational and other needs. The social organizations, such as the Free Mason lodge and Order
of the Odd Fellows, allowed members to congregate for political, social, and religious purposes.
Other organizations had charitable functions. For example, the Daughters of Zion, incorporated
in 1882, worked to “take care of each other, and all who shall or may become members of the
society in case of sickness bury their dead, look after the destitute and orphan children of color.”
These organizations were supplemented by public lectures, theaters, parades, sporting events,
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and the publication of four Black-owned newspapers, all of which combined to make
Knoxville’s Black community one of the most vibrant in the South.28
During the often tumultuous era of Jim Crow, the Black community’s leadership
remained active in local politics. As self-appointed representatives of the Black community,
they used the Black vote as leverage to press local politicians to appoint African Americans to
civil service jobs. This tactic proved especially effective because the local Democratic and
Republican parties had approximately equal white support, making African Americans key
swing voters. As a result, African Americans served as police officers, sheriff, firemen, and post
office employees before the turn of the twentieth century.29 This dynamic also led to the election
of nine Black aldermen between 1871 and 1888. In 1872, Dr. J.B Young undertook a failed
candidacy for mayor. African Americans served on the Board of Alderman until 1912.30
Elected offices and civic positions provided African Americans with a voice in city government.
However, they could not get elected without support from powerful white officials.
From these circumstances, a relationship emerged, where Blacks maintained some rights,
such as the franchise and participation in local politics, in exchange for complicity with the status
quo. This dynamic can be seen at a meeting of the colored citizens of East Knoxville who issued
a resolution thanking Colonel John Fleming, a white city council member, for putting forth an
amendment to the city charter that allowed all registered voters to participate in municipal
elections, preventing the exclusion of African Americans. The group offered “we, as a poor
people, three fourths of whom own no property, and have not other claim than that of justice in
Colonel Fleming, feel it be our duty to thus publicly tender him the thanks of the colored
28
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working people of Knoxville…he has convinced us that he is in truth a friend to the colored
people.”31 Maintaining this political relationship allowed Republicans to stay in power and
African Americans to fare better than their counterparts in other southern cities, who suffered
disenfranchisement and racial violence.
African Americans’ political participation also challenged the status quo. Several of the
city’s elite African Americans participated in the Colored Citizens of Tennessee, an early civil
rights group, which repeatedly petitioned the State legislature to reinstate the franchise for
African American men. In 1868, the legislature passed a bill providing African Americans the
right to sit on juries and hold office. As a result, in 1876, African American activist William
Yardley ran for Governor. While he had little chance of winning, Yardley’s campaign attracted
media attention, providing him a platform to rail against segregation and discriminatory labor
laws. African Americans also participated in politics in other ways. After the passage of a law
segregating street cars, “local Blacks organized a boycott against the Knoxville Traction
Company…There were two days of confrontation and altercation before the boycott fizzled.”32
Yet Black Knoxvillians faced much of the same discrimination and violence that
occurred throughout the South. These conditions buttressed whites’ control. During the Red
Summer of 1919, the oppression led to a race riot. Unrest began after Maurice Mayes, an
African American former sheriff and café owner who was rumored to have had relationships
with several white women, was arrested for murdering a white woman, a crime that threatened
both white supremacy and highlighted white men’s inability to “protect” white women.33 As
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word of the crime spread, a mob formed and the sheriff quickly had Mayes transported to
Nashville for his safety. When the angry white mob arrived at the city jail to hang Mayes, chaos
followed. Mob members drank all the confiscated whiskey, released prisoners, and caused
$50,000 worth of damage. The mob then headed down Gay Street toward the city’s Black area,
seeking revenge. While on the move, the white mob encountered a group of National
Guardsmen and armed members of the Black community.34 Shots were exchanged among the
three factions, ending the riot. Mayes was eventually convicted of the murder. His failed appeal
was handled by a newly formed chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP).35
Yet, for the most part, Jim Crow was maintained largely by custom, rather than law or
force. African Americans remained in the Black areas of town, avoided segregated
establishments, and generally failed to offer any meaningful threat to Jim Crow. Some Black
Knoxvillians understood they lived under less oppressive conditions than African Americans in
other Southern cities, accepted the status quo, or feared the backlash sure to come from
challenging segregation. This dynamic created a less openly hostile relationship between the
Black and white communities. The 1920s also witnessed the formation of several interracial civil
rights organizations. These groups aimed to improve conditions for African Americans. The
Student Inter-racial Commission, composed of five students from the University of Tennessee,
Knoxville College, and nearby Maryville College, served as a forum for students to meet and
assess the city’s racial problems and work towards solutions. The Inter-racial Commission,
primarily composed of adults, undertook a similar mission. The city’s Ministerial Alliance
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brought together clergy from different denominations to confer about religious matters as well as
civic, economic, educational, and social issues.36 Into the 1960s, the Ministerial Alliance
became one of the city’s leading civil rights organizations. It integrated well before the civil
rights movement and its members regularly shaped the city’s civil rights discussion.
In most other southern cities, slavery and Jim Crow drew a definitive line between Black
and white residents, creating a relationship based on hostility, violence, mistrust, and repression.
In Knoxville, the period took on a different tenor. While certainly oppressive, the period created
a relationship where dialogue could, and did, occur. Political participation and this ongoing
dialogue created a framework that was well understood by civil rights activists, elected officials,
and powerful businessmen at the start of the civil rights movement.
************
The Great Depression ended the city’s prosperity. As the economy began its rapid
downward plunge, wholesalers left Knoxville. Local historian William McArthur explains that
wholesaling “declined in importance, as the larger regional cities usurped trade and as the retail
merchants in smaller towns made their own connections with manufacturing in the North and
East.”37 The city’s railroad connections, once a substantial advantage over other cities, had been
rendered obsolete by the emerging highway system, which ensured goods could be easily
transported nationwide. Compounding the problems, by 1932, most of the city’s major banks
had failed because of poor banking practices and sudden withdrawals. 38
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These conditions paralyzed the economy. Local industries and construction firms laid off
workers. Unemployment increased rapidly. For example, in 1930, the city recorded 2,284 out of
work citizens. By 1937, it had 7,534. Even after several federal projects, including the
Tennessee Valley Administration, began, 4332 remained unemployed. It also brought down the
wages of those who remained employed. African Americans were hard hit by unemployment
because they were often the first fired from low skilled jobs. In addition, racial discrimination
excluded them from many New Deal programs.39
As nearly half of the city’s African Americans succumb to unemployment, crime rose
dramatically. Many Black children dropped out of school to help their families. These
conditions, combined with employment discrimination, led to a large decline in the city’s Black
population. Over a thousand residents left from 1930 to 1940. Knoxville no longer had one of
the most thriving Black communities in the South. Instead, historian William Wheeler notes,
“the promise of American life seemed to lie elsewhere, and the New Deal only continued
accommodations to old ways of white survival at the expense of Black degradation.”40 The
Black community never returned to its previous vibrancy. Instead, these conditions ensured their
second class citizenship would continue.
The Great Depression proved to be a turning point for the city. It never fully recovered.
Failed businesses never reopened and industries headed to other cities with a more hospitable
business climate. No longer could elected officials tout the city’s growth. Instead, they spent the
next sixty years trying to recover. A large part of this recovery effort entailed enticing business
back into the city.
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As a whole, southern Appalachians suffered from poverty. According to a 1935 report
from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, poverty occurred because of a reliance on jobs in
extractive industries, such as coal mining, which provided an inconsistent source of employment.
Also, the area’s farms proved to be unable to support its population, even with many residents
taking additional part-time industrial work.41
The Great Depression had ramifications for elected officials and Black activists. Elected
officials and powerful businessmen had to concentrate on modernizing the city and improving
the economy. In the Black community, student activists, who came of age in the rapidly
changing post war world, the difficult conditions faced by Black Knoxvillans needed to be
rectified. Previous activism proved ineffective or worked at a glacial pace.
***********
Despite the Black community’s difficulties during the decade, elite African Americans
continued their drive for civil rights. Local Black activists undertook a long campaign to
desegregate the University of Tennessee. In 1939, as poverty, unemployment, crime, and
substandard housing plagued the African American community attorney Carl Cowan, in
conjunction with the NAACP, petitioned the University to admit six local African American
men. They were denied because of their race.42 The desegregation campaign connected
Knoxville activists to a larger national challenge to Jim Crow.
Cowan’s action was part of the NAACP’s national campaign to desegregate higher
education. The organization’s legal fund launched a series of lawsuits that claimed segregated
facilities on campuses across the upper South were not equal. They targeted graduate or
41

United States Department of Agriculture, Economic and Social Problems and Conditions of the Southern
Appalachians, Miscellaneous Publication 205, January 1935, 2-3.
42

“These Negroes Refused Entrance By U-T,” Knoxville News Sentinel, September 27, 1939, “Negroes
Seek to Gain Equal Facilities in Education,” Knoxville Journal, September 28, 1939.

28

professional schools, which did not have a segregated counterpart. The attempt to desegregate
UT came on the heels of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, a Supreme Court decision handed
down in December 1938. The Court ruled that the plaintiff Lloyd Gaines be admitted to the
Missouri State University Law School because the state provided no comparable facility for
Blacks, violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The success of Gaines made the court system a
vehicle for challenging Jim Crow in higher education. Given Knoxville’s relatively moderate
race relations, UT became a prime target for the NAACP. Cowan’s attempt in 1939 cleared a
procedural hurdle for a lawsuit in the early 1950s.
Challenging segregation through the courts offered African American activists a viable
approach to desegregate UT. Using the legal process would not greatly upset relations between
city leaders and middle class Black activists. If the court ruled in favor of desegregation, the
university would be legally bound to do so. Given city leaders’ previous compliance with the
federal government, they seemed likely to follow a court order. This strategy also allowed local
attorneys to join forces with the NAACP’s legal campaign providing much needed funding and
resources. Given all these benefits, Cowan proceeded with desegregation efforts.
The process of ending segregation at UT continued in 1950. Using the court system
ensured a calm and peaceful outcome. In September 1950, four African Americans (Gene
Mitchell Gray, Jack Alexander, Lincoln Anderson Blackney and Joseph Hatch Patterson) applied
to the Law and Graduate schools. They were denied admission. The applicants, with the help of
Cowan and NAACP attorneys Avon Williams, Z. Alexander Looby, Thurgood Marshall, and
Robert Carter, filed suit in federal court. As the trial began, UT lawyers based their defense on
the state’s segregation law, which put the school at risk for further legal trouble if they accepted
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Black students.43 After some legal maneuvering, Federal Judge Robert Taylor ruled that the four
students should be admitted. However, he used narrow legal grounds; the decision did not admit
all African Americans, only those who could not find a comparable opportunity at a segregated
institution.44 The four students appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, hoping to receive a
verdict that would desegregate the entire campus.
In January 1952, Gene Gray enrolled in graduate school at UT. An editorial in The
Chattanooga Press commented that the University acted wisely in admitting the four students
because they no longer had legal grounds to maintain segregation. While integration was new to
students, “members of both races should, therefore carefully meet their responsibility of
conducting themselves in such a way that the decision which has been made will be carried out
with as little misunderstanding, difficulty, and friction as possible.”45 Around the same time, the
Supreme Court declined to hear the case, now called Gray et al. v. Board of Trustees of
University of Tennessee, because the four students had been admitted to graduate school.46
University officials complied with the law, but did not support complete integration.
The May 1954 Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education forced the
integration of the University of Tennessee. However, integration occurred slowly. In June, the
Board of Trustees denied admission to an African American student who applied for graduate
school at UT’s Memphis campus. Trustees feared admission would violate the Tennessee State
Constitution’s prohibition on interracial education. This logic held until October 1956 when, in
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Roy v. Brittain, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided that the Brown decision overruled the
state constitution, forcing the University of Tennessee to integrate completely. Rather than resist
Brown outright, UT officials complied when all legal remedies had been exhausted.
Even after the legal hurdles for integration had been cleared, the first Black
undergraduate did not arrive on campus until 1961. During the summer of 1960 Theotis
Robinson, Jr., a recent graduate of all-Black Austin High School, applied for admission to the
University of Tennessee. His application letter avoided mentioning his race or high school.
Robinson received a rejection letter that explained he would not be admitted because of his race.
The school lacked a policy governing the admission of African American undergraduates.
Shortly after, Robinson and his parents met with President Andy Holt and several other highlevel university officials. Holt felt that Robinson’s admission was a matter for the Board of
Trustees, which he would address at the Trustees’ next meeting. The Robinsons indicated that
they planned to file a lawsuit if Theotis was not admitted. In November 1960, after realizing that
the University would lose the potential lawsuit, the Board of Trustees voted to admit Black
undergraduates.47 The University finally stood in compliance with the Brown decision.48
For most white UT students, integration occurred without much fanfare. They
experienced integration as a peaceful process, devoid of large scale violence. Former UT student
Jim Hall remembered, “President Holt, the administration, and the governor were very active in
trying to ensure that the university and the state complied with the law of the land regarding
segregation and did so in a peaceful fashion.”49 The university newspaper, The Orange and
White, reported that the first two days of integration occurred smoothly, commended the student
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body, and pointed out the days stood in “marked contrast to similar situations in certain other
Southern universities.”50 In May 1961, Ann White wrote to the Orange and White praising her
fellow students’ handling of integration. She postulated that it occurred smoothly because of the
state’s geography. “While being a southern state, Tennessee is not a part of the ‘deep South.’ It
might be better classified as mid-eastern… [sparing it] the deep seeded prejudices of more
southern states.” She also credited other students’ “sophisticated nonchalance,” as well as their
realization that integration was a “moral necessity.”51 White UT students saw the smooth process
of integration as a point of pride.
African American students experienced integration differently. Racism was common on
campus. Jimmie Baxter, who enrolled in fall 1961, remembered, “At that time it was very
hostile on campus, extremely hostile. Not only other students, but most of the faculty, I would
say, at that time were very hostile to the few Black students that were there. They made it
known in class that they didn’t want you there. For the most part, other students would not sit
anywhere close to you.”52 Avon Rollins remembers that during the process of trying out for the
university basketball team he was approached by athletic director Robert Neyland before
practice. Neyland “came in, was very profane, very boisterous, and cursed me. He called me out
at [sic] my name and that was very devastating for a young person.” Rollins was then cut from
the team.53 Harriet Whitman, who enrolled in 1965, remembered “I had an English professor
who told me on the first day of class that he didn’t like colored people. I was real upset, but I
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turned it off and realized it was a problem I was going to have.” She dropped out after one
year.54 Black UT students endured racism from fellow students, staff, and faculty, leading to a
low graduation rate.
The integration of the University of Tennessee taught established Black activists several
important lessons. First, powerful whites would abide by court rulings. This made the legal
system an avenue for creating change, which did not garner white backlash or ruin the
relationship with powerful whites. However, a court ruling could not create complete
integration. Instead, members of the Black community had to undertake purposeful steps to
ensure their equality and success in these newly integrated institutions.
As the process of integration at the University of Tennessee unfolded, Knoxville’s
NAACP chapter and local activists desegregated city schools. It proved to be a drawn out affair.
In the end, the school board’s stalling eventually gave way to a slow measured process of
integration, thanks to several federal court rulings and the persistence of local Black activists. Its
peaceful nature suited both sides. For establish Black activists, it created change, maintained
their relationship with powerful whites, and came with the federal government’s enforcement
powers. The process also showed established Black activists that the combination of grassroots
pressure and lawsuits could create sustainable social change.
At first, local Black activists negotiated to push the city school board to desegregate.
Two months after the Brown decision, Knoxville’s NAACP chapter began meetings to discuss
school desegregation. Word of the meetings spread quickly. Several days later an editorial in
the Knoxville News Sentinel called the idea of immediate desegregation unwise, impetuous, and
premature. The author argued, “Here in Tennessee and other Southern states the mixing of races
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in the public schools is still against the law. Before the Knoxville School Board or any other
local board can establish a new policy on school attendance, the State Legislature must act and
possibly the State Constitution must be amended.” In addition, the Supreme Court had yet to
rule on the procedure for desegregation.55 Despite the unfavorable response, at the school board
meeting on July 12, Chairman Wallace Frazier reported that the local NAACP chapter, led by
Reverend Frank Gordon, had requested a meeting with the full school board to begin discussing
school desegregation. The school board held a private meeting with seven Black families who
demanded “immediate steps to reorganize the public schools.”56 After the meeting, the school
board offered no desegregation plan.
In 1955, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision on the implementation of school
desegregation, often called Brown II, the discussion resumed. The school board offered
procedural excuses for their inaction. In May, the Board issued a statement declaring that for the
previous year a committee of principals, administrators, and school board members had been
conducting a study of the best means to desegregate the public schools. The committee reported
that it had “not reached the point where any plan for the desegregation of schools during 1956
would succeed to the degree that would maintain the excellent race relations which have existed
in Knoxville for many years and which we earnestly hope will continue….it is our belief that any
plan of desegregation should not be inaugurated until the present school building program is
further advanced.” At later school board meeting, superintendent Andrew Johnson stated that
“believing that respect for and compliance with the laws of our country as interpreted by the
legally constituted authorities is fundamentally to the American way of life, we will act in ‘good
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faith and will proceed in an orderly manner to make a prompt and reasonable start’ in
desegregating the public schools of the city of Knoxville.”57 Despite the verbose statements, no
plan emerged.
The lack of progress agitated Black parents and activists. They sought a legal remedy.
After five months, Superintendent Johnson acknowledged, “Knoxville Negroes have been very
patient. In the long run you will be glad you did. While it may seem a little slow you will be
fully satisfied with the results in the end.”58 Johnson misread Knoxville’s Black community;
their patience had run out. In September, Knoxville’s NAACP chapter issued a public statement
to the school board. It thanked officials for the careful consideration, but argued the city had
reached the time for desegregation. In addition, “we, as citizens and taxpayers of Knoxville,
Tennessee wish to emphasis that if at any time it becomes necessary to secure so-called outside
legal aid, it will be furnished only when we local citizens specifically request it. We further wish
to emphasize that we are willing to negotiate and exhaust every honorable means within a
reasonable time to secure relief before resorting to the Courts.”59 Still, no plan emerged.
The NAACP filed suit in January 1957, beginning a lengthy legal process. The NAACP
offered the full support of its legal division. Thurgood Marshall, Z. Alexander Looby, Avon
Williams, along with local attorney Carl Cowan, handled the case. Over the next several years,
the team of NAACP attorneys had their case dismissed several times on technical and procedural
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grounds. Each time they re-filed the suit, maintaining the pressure on the Knoxville School
Board.60
As the lawsuit worked its way through the courts, local activists continued to press their
demands. At school board meetings during July, August, and September 1959, a group of Black
parents publicly appealed to begin the process of desegregation. Their pleas fell on deaf ears.
Still, no plan emerged.
In early January 1960, members of the city’s school board began discussing the best
means to begin desegregation. The Knoxville News Sentinel reported that City Law Director T.
Mack Blackburn favored “present[ing] the court an integration plan rather than to fight the
Negroes’ lawsuit to the limit.” They favored a plan that integrated a grade per year beginning
with the first grade, commonly called the grade-a-year plan.61 The final version of the grade-ayear-plan was created by a committee of 100 citizens, both Black and white, who worked to
ensure that desegregation would occur smoothly.62 In late March, the Board made desegregation
official. School board chairman Dr. Burkhart announced, “effective with the beginning of the
1960-1961 school year racial segregation in grade one of the Knoxville public schools is
discontinued…Effective for the 1961-62 school year racial segregation shall be discontinued in
grade two and thereafter in the next higher grade at the beginning of each successive school year
until the desegregation plan is effected in all twelve grades.”63 The plan drew support from the
Knoxville News Sentinel. An editorial argued, “Knoxvillians are, on the whole, law abiding
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citizens; we believe they are prepared to accept any reasonable progressive integration program.
If the School Board follows any other course, it will merely beg for trouble.”64 Federal Judge
Robert Taylor approved the grade-a-year plan.65
The grade-a-year plan fit well in Knoxville; it led to slow racial progress without
attacking the status quo. It was not met with universal acclaim. The NAACP petitioned the court
to reject the school board’s plan. Their lawyers objected: it failed to act with “all deliberate
speed,” and it failed to address race-based transfers.66 The Knoxville News Sentinel criticized the
NAACP in an editorial titled “Petulant Objectors,” which stated “we believe the Negro group is
contributing toward community dissension by such petulance.”67 In 1962, a federal court ruled
in favor of the NAACP’s appeal, beginning a prolonged legal battle. By 1972, the court finally
ruled that Knoxville’s public school had been desegregated.
Many other urban areas also undertook a lengthy process of school desegregation. In
Memphis, it continued into the 1980s. By that point, the student population had become
predominately African American a complete reversal of the original problem.68 Activists in
Greensboro, North Carolina quest for racially equal schools ended in 1971 thanks to court
ordered busing.69 In Louisville, legal desegregation occurred in 1975, but white backlash
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continued several years.70 In these cities, conservative whites used the courts as a means to resist
Brown. The efforts to desegregate schools in Knoxville aligned it with other Southern cities.
As the legal wrangling continued, school integration began in late August 1960. It
occurred without incident. Twenty nine Black students registered at predominately white
schools, while no white students registered at Black schools. The Knoxville Police Department
stationed a single officer at the newly integrated schools. Chief Kimsey ordered the officers: “I
want the ‘move on’ or unlawful assembly law enforced to the limit.”71 NAACP attorney Carl
Cowan remembered desegregation occurred smoothly because “we had the support of the Negro
ministers in Knoxville. In the beginning several ministers every day would lead the small
children to and from schools, when their parent or parents could not, which were being
desegregated and where it was feared trouble might ensue.”72
The peaceful process of desegregation resulted from fear of the events that had occurred
at nearby Clinton High School. In 1950, the parents of five Black students in Anderson County
who were bused about twenty miles to Knoxville’s Austin High School, sued to desegregate
Clinton High School. Their initial lawsuit was dismissed. The parents’ attorney appealed.
During the appeals process, the Supreme Court released its Brown decision. The order came in
January 1956, making Clinton High School one of the first in the United States to attempt
desegregation.
The process of desegregation met with immediate white backlash. It was led by out-ofstate rabble rousers. With desegregation scheduled to begin in late August, Anderson County
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quickly became a hotbed of white supremacy. The looming events attracted segregationist
firebrands, including John Kasper, a twenty six year old New Jersey native, and Asa (Ace)
Carter, a well-known segregationist from Birmingham. These men quickly joined with local
segregationists to begin the fight against integration at Clinton High School.
In late August 1956, segregationists took over the town. On August 27, twelve Black
students registered to attend Clinton High School. The event garnered a brief, peaceful protest
from local whites. However, Kasper used the registration of Black students to whip local
segregationists into a frenzy. Over the next several days, he made inflammatory speeches, which
drew media attention and increased local support. These words soon turned to action. On the
evening of August 30, “Clinton police and Anderson County deputies stood by while the mob [of
about 1500 whites] wrecked almost every car bearing black passengers that passed through
town.”73 In response, Clinton’s mayor created a “home guard,” a group of thirty local men who
were deputized to help police maintain calm.
The home guard did not deter the segregationists. Local officials had lost control of the
situation. On September 1, a riot broke out. Angry whites terrorized local African Americans
who drove down the town’s main road. The home guard launched tear gas into the mob. It had
little effect. The angry mob ominously turned its attention toward the officers. Then, “in what
could only be described as miraculous timing, nearly 100 Tennessee State Troopers rolled into
town.” The Troopers along with the National Guard, who arrived the following day, restored
order.74
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Well into November, white supremacists continued their efforts. Kasper officially set up
a White Citizens Council, a segregationist organization that used economic reprisals to prevent
integration. The first meeting attracted twenty five members. Kasper reported that interest in the
White Citizens Council was “extremely high” from local whites.75 However, his efforts quickly
came to an end when he was arrested for inciting a riot. During the trial, which spanned several
months, community members and high school faculty who supported integration had crosses
burned on their lawn, and several had their homes bombed.76
The final act of violence came in 1958. It ended the struggle to desegregate Clinton High
School. Late on the night of October 5, “Clinton was rocked awake by an explosion that brought
the community to its knees. Clinton High School suffered extensive damage…the bombing
galvanized public opinion against further violence.” With the school in shambles, Clinton’s
students continued their school year at nearby Oak Ridge High School.77
The events at Clinton High School loomed large over the process of integration in
Knoxville. The NAACP, school board, and concerned Black parents all stressed calm. Most of
the process occurred in the courtroom of federal judge Robert Taylor, whose rulings offered a
compromise. Using the legal system seemed to be the best means to prevent violent
demonstrations.
In the end, the desegregation of the University of Tennessee and the city schools proved
to a successful precursor to the civil rights movement. Its peaceful nature, combined with
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negotiations, lawsuits, and pressure from the Black community to create sustainable change.
Their victory proved to be revelatory for established Black leaders who discovered that they
could use different strategies, such as law suits to pressure powerful whites without shutting
down their ongoing dialogue. The ability to balance activism and negotiation proved to be one
of the key facets of their drive for civil rights going forward.
School desegregation in Knoxville had mixed results. The long court fight to desegregate
public schools aligned it with a number of other Southern cities. However, the peaceful
desegregation of UT stands in stark contrast to the hostility at the University of Mississippi and
University of Alabama. These mixed results occurred because of the local circumstances and
Knoxville’s history of race relations.
The continuing right to vote, small Black population, geography, and political climate
played a major part in forging Knoxville’s slightly unique race relations. The right to vote
provided Black Knoxvillians with a voice in city politics and the hope that social change could
occur. The city also had a large number of moderate whites, a brand of Appalachian
conservatism, and a relatively small Black population, which eliminated the perception of Black
rule.78 So the Black community was largely left to fend for itself. This history reinforces the
importance of the Appalachian context, which made Knoxville both similar to and different from
other Southern cities. Local circumstances played a key role in shaping how the civil rights
movement unfolded.
*****************************
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The postwar boom missed Knoxville. Instead, local industry failed to evolve with the
national economy. William Wheeler argues, “the primary cause of Knoxville’s sagging postwar
economy was the decline of industries upon which the city depended. Less competitive in the
evolving global economy were textile and apparel mills, which could not escape the national
slump in those areas. The iron industry and railroads also experienced severe postwar troubles.
Thus changing markets and transportation networks, new product development, and new
technologies combined to make Knoxville’s older industries less competitive.”79 These
industries had no jobs for soldiers, recent high school graduates, or immigrants from the
surrounding areas.
As the older industries left, Knoxville became home to three major federal funded
projects: the Oak Ridge power plant, the expansion of the University of Tennessee, and the
headquarters of the Tennessee Valley Administration. While these agencies brought additional
jobs, they could not revive the city’s economy. The Oak Ridge facility (located about 15 miles
from downtown) spurred the growth of Oak Ridge, which brought a number of the city’s
educated middle class to the city’s Westside or the suburbs. These projects proved to be
emblematic of the city’s shifting economy. Without factory or wholesale jobs, Knoxville’s
economy began to change.
By the late 1950s, Knoxville had become a dreary place. The economy had undergone a
fundamental shift from production to service. As the goods- producing jobs left, low paying and
low skill service jobs remained.80 The city’s major employers failed to produce enough jobs to
reduce unemployment. Oak Ridge hired 4,000 workers in manufacturing but cut 7,500 jobs in
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construction and non-manufacturing roles. The University of Tennessee expanded its workforce
by 80% while Alcoa, a major aluminum manufacturer located in nearby Maryville, lessened its
work force by a third. The Tennessee Valley Administration (TVA) also experienced a small
loss of jobs. Outside of the area’s four main employers, Knoxville lost jobs in both
manufacturing and goods- producing jobs. The largest loss (4,200 jobs) was seen in the
manufacturing of durable goods. The city had an unemployment rate of 6.5%, while the nation
averaged 4.7%.81
Knoxville’s economy fared poorly when compared to the rest of the state, the
Southeastern region as a whole, and the national average in terms of jobs gained. In goodsproducing industries Knoxville lost 5.3% of its jobs, while Tennessee gained 11.9%, the
Southeast region gained 9.8%, and the United States experienced a 2.1% increase. In service
industries jobs in Knoxville grew 10.1% while Tennessee, the Southeast, and the United States
all experienced a gain around 20%. Perhaps most telling was the city’s miniscule growth in all
non-farm industries, only 2.6%. This compares poorly to the rest of the state, which experienced
a 16.8% increase in the same category; the Southeast region saw a 17.2% gain in non-farm jobs,
and the United States as a whole had a 13.6% gain.82
The city also experienced a large decline in population during the 1950s. In 1950, the
city had a population of 124,769; by 1960 the population declined to 111,827. Some of those
who left landed in the suburbs and others ended up in surrounding rural areas, such as Blount
County.83 A report for the Metropolitan Planning Commission noted “between 1950 and 1960
there was an out-migration from the metropolitan area of 30,600 persons. During the past
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decade, not only was the economy unable to provide jobs as inducements for people to move into
the area from outside—as it did between 1940 and 1950—but it was unable to keep pace with the
area’s natural population growth.”84 This inability to provide jobs changed the profile of
Knoxville’s citizenry. From 1950 to 1960, the population of those under eighteen years old rose
14.6% and those over 65 saw a 42.5% gain. This compares to a 2.5% gain in residents 18-64
years old during the same period. This shift proved to be significant because it altered the nature
of the labor force. The increase in the young (18 years and younger) and the old (65 years and
older) combined with the decrease in the middle age range to create a population which had not
yet entered or passed their prime working years. Members of these groups often depended on
those in the middle age range (18-64 years) as well as government programs to cover their cost
of living.85
During the 1950s, the city’s politics also became stuck in a rut. Throughout the decade,
various city officials failed to reach agreement over ways to improve the city. Several mayors
promoted plans to help modernize the city, including the consolidation of the city and county
governments and later schools and liquor sales. The main opposition for these ideas came from
the city’s most powerful councilmen, Caswell “Cas” Walker, a successful grocer turned
politician. Walker served on the City Council for several decades based on his class-based
appeal, which cast many issues as an attack on the poor. This rhetoric appealed to the city’s
Black population, as well as many working class and poor whites. For example, Walker and his
supporters, often a sizeable number of Councilmen, voted against any tax increase intended to
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update the city. They believed that the poor would bear the cost while the rich would reap the
benefits.86
The city’s downtown shopping area desperately needed updating. The four- block area
contained a number of popular retail and department stores, including Miller’s and S.H George’s
Department stores, but had not been reconstructed to accommodate the widespread use of
automobiles. It remained crowded, congested, and devoid of necessary parking. In addition,
downtown was dirty. In 1950, the News-Sentinel reported that the previous year had experienced
the fall of 143.3 tons of dust and soot per square mile, making it one of the most polluted cities in
the United States.87 The debate over how to revive downtown occupied much of the city’s
political debate.
Throughout the decade, local business owners and elected officials tried to breathe new
life into downtown. They implemented a number of cosmetic renovations. Late in the decade,
the newly formed Downtown Knoxville Association (DKA), an organization of concerned
businessmen, turned unused commercial properties into parking lots. It successfully built (with
private money) a new promenade in 1960. The promenade, according to the DKA “made
possible more than 500-feet of new store fronts and display windows on the rear of buildings on
Knoxville’s main street. A moving sidewalk ramp, benches for shoppers, shrubbery, and a
modern porch-like promenade have replaced old warehouses and an unsightly alley full of fire
escapes and garbage cans.”88 The most ambitious project was the downtown loop, a four lane
highway directly connecting the outlying suburbs to downtown. The idea met with immediate
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resistance from Mayor Dempster, who refused to put forth any city money. Despite his
objections, the plan was finalized in 1957. The first phase of the project, connecting east
Knoxville and downtown, opened in the late 1960s.89 These events signaled a shift in the city’s
political tenor. The City Council now supported efforts to improve the city and realized the
importance of attracting new businesses.
In the late 1940s, John Gunther, a well known travel reporter, journalist, and author,
visited Knoxville as part of his travels for his book, Inside U.S.A. His observations offered
insight into the city’s social scene. Gunther wrote, “Knoxville is the ugliest city I ever saw in
America, with the possible exception of some mill towns in New England. Its main street is
called Gay Street; this seemed to me to be a misnomer. An extremely Puritanical town it serves
no alcohol stronger than 3.6 percent beer, and its more dignified taprooms close at 9:30 pm;
Sunday movies are forbidden, and there is no Sunday baseball. Perhaps as a result, it is one of
the least orderly cities in the South—Knoxville leads every other town in Tennessee in
automobile thefts, larceny, and homicides.”90 In 1952, Fortune offered a similar evaluation,
“Gay Street, the shopping center, is old, narrow, and crowded, and the side streets fall away in
further drabness; the whole is smudged with soot from locally mined soft coal.”91
Entering the 1960s, these conditions left elected officials and powerful businessmen in a
difficult position. The city suffered from financial instability, and the resulting disagreements
among city councilmen and the mayor greatly slowed any means of making improvements. City
officials and businessmen wanted progress, but did not know exactly how to define or obtain it.
What would improve the city? How should such projects be carried out? Who would pay for
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them? As the civil rights movement began, these difficult questions and the drive for progress
influenced their response. Both groups knew that race-related violence, as seen in Little Rock,
would use up the city’s already scarce resources, shift their focus away from improving the city,
and most importantly, deter outside businesses from coming to Knoxville. These outside
investments seemed the best way to create progress.
The shifting economy and changing demographics did not provide any improvements for
the city’s Black population. Discrimination impeded African American’s socioeconomic
mobility. A 1958 report on the Black community noted that some African Americans had
become teachers or found employment in technical or clerical jobs. They proved to be the
exception. According to the report, “In general, however, Negros are employed in heavy,
hazardous or menial work, or work where conditions do not invite white competition for jobs.
The great bulk are in domestic or service [sector] employment. They are pretty generally
excluded from clerical, supervisory, retail, and textiles—this last despite government contracts
requiring no racial discrimination.” In fact, the local federal agencies (TVA and Oak Ridge)
hired few Black employees. Relegation to menial jobs meant the average Black Knoxvillian
made about $1,400 per year while their white counterpart made about $22,000. This low income
had a negative impact on other areas, including home ownership, credit rating and savings. In all
these categories Black Knoxvillians fared worse than the average white Knoxvillian. In addition,
they had a higher rate of unemployment: 12-15% for whites and 15-20% for African
Americans.92
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Racism permeated throughout Black people’s lives. African Americans faced housing
discrimination from local whites who resented when a Black family moved into their
neighborhood. Real estate agents engaged in block busting. Banks often hesitated to offer
African Americans loans. In education, predominately Black high schools failed to offer the
same vocational classes as white schools. Black high school graduates demonstrated a two-year
education disparity from their white classmates.93
Despite this bleak picture, the report found several bright spots. One was that the
Knoxville Ministerial Association had been integrated fifteen years ago. Many other religious
groups had also been integrated, including Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians,
and Knox Council of Church Women. It concluded the Ministerial Association “seem[s] an
excellent channel of inter-group communication.”94
By the dawn of the 1960s, the Black community found itself in a paradoxical position, in
terms of the city’s race relations. On one hand, elite African Americans had maintained he
political rights denied to African Americans in many other southern cities. In addition,
segregation was maintained by custom rather than law. On the other hand, racial discrimination
made Black Knoxvillians second-class citizens. Besides the humiliation of Jim Crow, they
suffered from large disparities in a number of areas, including education and employment. As
the civil rights movement began, this paradox left African American activists in a difficult
position: if they became too militant they would scare off city officials and businessmen whose
cooperation they needed to create change; if activists remained passive, change would not take
place.
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CHAPTER THREE
“A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON SERVILITY AND BENIGN COMPLIANCE:”
DIRECT ACTION PROTESTS, 1960
In early May 1960, frustrated with local segregated businesses’ stalling, Mayor John
Duncan, members of the Chamber of Commerce, and student leaders Robert Booker and Marian
Smith flew to New York to meet with officials at F.W. Woolworth, McLellan Stores, S.H. Kress
& Co., and W.T. Grant Co, all of whom owned segregated stores in Knoxville. The trip proved
futile. National officials refused to negotiate with students, fearing it would open the door to
meeting with students nationwide.1 The failure of the trip solidified student activists’ resolve to
begin sit-in demonstrations.
The trip typified Knoxville’s first wave of direct action protests. Elected officials and
businessmen took the lead in negotiations with segregated merchants, mainly drug and
department stores with lunch counters. Initially, student activists played a minor role in the
discussion. Once negotiations stalled, student activists pushed elected officials and businessmen
to end segregation. Their decision left older activists divided. Some wanted to continue
negotiations, while others protested. These circumstances forced segregated merchants to resume
negotiations, eventually leading to the desegregation of several large downtown stores. The
interplay between city leaders and activists became a central component of Knoxville’s civil
rights movement.
In January 1960, sparked by the sit-in movement in Greensboro, North Carolina, student
activists at Knoxville College sought to undertake a similar campaign to open eating areas,
mainly lunch counters, at large downtown chain stores, including Rich’s and Sears. Their zeal
for demonstrations was dampened by both Black and white members of the city’s middle class,
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who worried about the economic ramifications of demonstrations. Instead, the mayor, elected
officials, the members of the Chamber of Commerce, clergymen, and local educators stepped in
and attempted to negotiate with the segregated merchants. This round of negotiations failed. As
the necessity of demonstrations became clear, the school year ended, sending potential student
activists from Knoxville College and the University of Tennessee back to their hometowns. In
their stead, older activists, including clergy members, conducted the direct action movement.
While demonstrations occurred, segregated merchants and protesters frequently changed
strategies and tactics while responding to each other. Meanwhile, Mayor Duncan provided
demonstrators with police protection to prevent unrest that would bring about unwanted,
negative media attention and deter new businesses from settling in the city. Protests forced the
segregated merchants back to the negotiating table, where seven of the ten targeted merchants
agreed to desegregate.
The mayor, elected officials, local businessmen, and middle class activists cooperated in
negotiations with segregated merchants, based on the idea that talks could prevent potentially
violent demonstrations. Civil unrest would ruin the city’s “history of good race relations” and
deter outside investors.2 Forced by the threat of direct action protests, city leaders had to accept
some degree of social change. Their tenuous cooperation with a range of Black activists set the
tone for events going forward.
*********************
The nationwide sit-in movement of the early 1960s met with different responses and
outcomes based on local circumstances. These local iterations followed the lead of student
2
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activists in Greensboro, North Carolina, who undertook the first sit-in on February 1, 1960. The
use of sit-ins spread rapidly across the country. In Louisville, the sit-ins served as part of a
multipronged attack on segregation. They combined with marches, picket lines, blocking voting,
and the shadow of the Birmingham to effectively pressure city officials to ending segregation.
They did so in May 1963.3 Memphis had a widespread sit-in movement that involved high
school and college students along with attorneys from the local NAACP. It led to desegregation
of many public spaces, including libraries, buses, and restaurants, by 1962. This success proved
to be a big blow to the plantation mentality that plagued the African American community. 4 In
Nashville, the sit-in participants experienced white backlash, violence, and police brutality
before winning the desegregation of lunch counters and other public facilities. As these
movements unfolded, a small group of Knoxville College students formulated their plans to sitin.
As the 1960s began, some members of the Black community tired of their circumstances
in Knoxville. Thanks to the Great Depression, Knoxvillians suffered from high unemployment
rates, poverty, and pollution. These conditions hit Knoxville’s Black population particularly
hard. These combined with under education, residential segregation, and employment
discrimination, to create a difficult state of being. In response, student activists and some
established activists began their challenge to the status quo, which did nothing to ameliorate
these conditions. Starting civil rights activism proved to be a big gamble. If demonstrations
alienated powerful whites, their peaceful relationship would be ruined. If activists did not take
the gamble, they would remain second class citizens.
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Knoxville College’s administration, led by President John Colston, acted to deter their
activism. By February 3, 1960, two days after the Greensboro sit-ins started, officials at
Knoxville College (KC), the city’s historically Black college, prepared for similar actions by
their students. Colston met with other administrators and determined to take a “progressive and
constructive approach” to desegregation through negotiations with segregated merchants.5 This
approach also meant channeling the students’ energy into talks and delaying demonstrations for
as long as possible.
Colston had attended Morehouse College and received a Ph.D from New York
University. After several administrative positions at historically Black colleges in the South, he
served as president of Bethune-Cookman College from 1942-1946 and Georgia State College
from 1947-1949. Inaugurated at KC in 1951, Colston was a racial moderate. He feared a
backlash from demonstrations, but he believed in equality. He saw new opportunities dawning,
as he advised students: “no longer can students lean on racial handicaps as an excuse for
slackness in study and other personal performance. For their generation the opportunities will be
there-but they must have discipline and creative imagination…with the shackles finally lifted the
American Negro will be a new man.”6
Colston sought equality through negotiation, which would deter violence, prevent harsh
backlash, and ensure the maintenance of a middle class status. It would also maintain good
relations with elite whites, who held power over many Knoxville institutions. For Colston, elite
whites could either be potential donors to Knoxville College or a deterrent to funding. While
many whites expected him to maintain control of the students, in reality he had little ability to do
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so. Colston agreed with the students’ desire for equality, and he may have realized the sit-ins
provided the noninstitutionalized disruption needed to obtain the upper hand in negotiations. His
fellow middle class African Americans also supported the movement in less conspicuous means,
such as providing bail for incarcerated activists. But Colston could not openly endorse the sit-ins.
He faced a dilemma similar to that of many other Black college presidents who walked a delicate
line between appeasing elite whites to maintain funding and supporting student demonstrations.7
As KC administrators assembled their plans, a small group of Knoxville College students
began asking businesses, mainly drug stores with lunch counters, about their willingness to
desegregate. All the stores declined. The student activists then met on February 15 to plan their
next move. They decided to begin sitting-in on February 17. The next day student activists met
with President Colston, who urged them to postpone the sit-ins and join him in talks with
segregated businesses and the Chamber of Commerce. The students accepted Colston’s offer.
The initial meeting proved uneventful. The segregated merchants reported that they were not a
position to desegregate. Afterward Mayor Duncan told the press, “We’re trying to prevent what
happened in Chattanooga, Nashville and some other Southern cities.”8 Duncan referenced to the
race-related violence that rocked the nearby cities as examples of what he sought to prevent.
The threat of the sit-ins put Mayor Duncan in a tenuous position. He wanted to maintain
Knoxville’s progressive image, eschew violence, and garner continued electoral support. His
decision to intervene in negotiations and offer police protection to protesters was based on a fear
of the unrest in other cities. Duncan remembered “I made up my mind that I didn’t want that in
Knoxville. That, a lot of people said, well, you’re going to politically cut your throat… I said I
7
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don’t care if I do.”9 Duncan realized that a majority of Knoxvillians desired a peaceful
settlement. His actions must have also been influenced by the city’s continued economic
problems. The city council and Chamber of Commerce devoted considerable effort to attracting
new business.10 These circumstances spurred Duncan to become heavily involved in the civil
rights movement. However, his participation did not speed up negotiations.
The results of the first meeting led Mayor John Duncan to establish a formal committee,
taking control of negotiations. On March 1, the negotiating committee, officially known as the
Mayor’s Committee, met to further discussions. It was chaired by Duncan and composed of
Chamber of Commerce members, elected officials, educators, clergymen, and several students,
including Robert Booker, Marian Smith, and James Clay, and Mrs. T. G. Perry, a housewife.11
Members agreed “that the solution lies in the direction of desegregation and that desegregation
can be accomplished in Knoxville through negotiation.” Afterward President Colston told the
press that “some agreeable steps were worked out.”12 Despite the Committee’s formation, the
segregated merchants refused to meet again. 13
Meanwhile, student activists took action. Their tactics received support from some older
Black activists. On March 7, they conducted file-through demonstrations, walking through
9
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segregated dining rooms and lunch counters, including Grant’s department store, Woolworth’s,
and McLellan’s. They did so “to express their feeling that merchants’ meeting is being
unnecessarily delayed.”14 The group traversed downtown escorted by city police, ensuring order
and bringing media attention.15 “We’ll sit down next time” promised one bearded protester
while exiting Kress’s lunch counter. Afterward, O.T. Hogue, principal of Austin, the city’s only
Black high school, voiced his approval of the protestors’ efforts to end discrimination. Dr.
Colston told the press that he would counsel the students if they engaged in harmful behavior.16
For established Black activists, including O.T. Hogue, demonstrations served as the next
logical step in their fight for civil rights. This group had grown tired of waiting for powerful
whites to create social change. After 100 years of patience, they desired action. However, they
remained aware that cooperation with whites would make the process of creating change easier.
This position forced them to both work with and seek to control student activists who they feared
may became too radical, bringing about massive white backlash. These established Black
activists walked a precarious tight rope. One misstep in any direction could send the city into a
free fall.
The segregated merchants used the file-through demonstrations to their advantage. They
sought to drive a wedge between Mayor Duncan and the student activists. After the
demonstration, segregated merchants reported that they had planned to meet on March 7 to
discuss desegregation, but could not because of the demonstrations.17 By using demonstrations
as an excuse not to meet, it placed blame on activists and brought disapproval upon them from
14
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older Black and white leaders. After returning to campus, Robert Booker received word that
Mayor Duncan wanted to see him. He remembers:
I jumped into my little 1953 Ford and drove right to his office. The mayor wanted to
know why we would start our demonstration while the downtown merchants were
meeting in good faith to integrate the lunch counters. I told him that we did not believe
the merchants were acting in good faith-they used every excuse in the book to delay and
delay. I also informed him that if it meant going to jail for our rights we were prepared to
do so. 18
The student activists’ willingness to demonstrate served as a major turning point in the
city’s history. Previously older, more cautious Black leaders had led a slow quest for civil rights.
Using the threat of protests, student activists became the vanguard. They pushed the older
generation of Black leaders, elected officials, and powerful businessmen for immediate change.
Their aggressive strategy forced city officials to put forth a decisive response.
As March wore on, negotiations reached a standstill. The segregated merchants blamed
others for their unwillingness to desegregate. During a meeting on the 14th, several merchants
reported that they would not desegregate for fear of encouraging the national sit-in movement’s
growth. Segregated merchants then rejected a joint proposal with Nashville and Chattanooga to
desegregate using a hostess to control the number and placement of African American
customers. After adding a provision for a sixty-day trial period, the merchants tentatively
accepted the plan, pending the approval of their national offices. 19 Several days later,
representatives for the segregated merchants informed Mayor Duncan that their national offices
felt “that too much pressure is being exerted upon them by the national situation and that more
locally owned stores should share in the responsibility.” The students at Knoxville College
remained informed of developments through President Colston and their student representatives.
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Segregated merchants found themselves in a difficult position. They had to balance their
duties as part of a national chain, garner a profit, and responsibilities as a part of the community.
These roles often conflicted. For example, local merchants may have wanted to desegregate, but
worried about defying local customs. All the while, the merchants had to protect the bottom line.
However, merchants did not know the best way to do so. Would desegregation scare off white
customers? Would it attract more customers because its racially progressive response?
Balancing these concerns led merchants to a number of responses.
At meeting between segregated merchants and the Mayor’s Committee on March 30,
Chamber of Commerce President William Arnett offered a new proposal that took the onus off
the segregated merchants. Arnett’s plan had five parts: obtaining support from important
community groups, involving more local stores to strike a balance with chain stores, controlling
seating, having the Mayor’s Committee obtain approval from community groups and locally
owned stores, and undertaking a publicity campaign that cast the move as a community effort.
The proposal garnered support from many of Knoxville’s civic organizations, including the
Knoxville Ministerial Association, Central Labor Council, and Association of Women’s Clubs.
The Knoxville Human Relations Council and Presbyterian Church also put forth resolutions
supporting desegregation.20
Student activists quickly lost patience with the ineffective negotiations. Their desire for
direct action drew support from some older activists. On April 6, the student submitted a letter to
the Mayor’s Committee asking to begin boycotting segregated businesses. Several middle class
activists convinced students “to join them in a request to merchants and Mayor’s Committee for
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definite action by April 13.” The students’ desire to begin demonstrations, along with repeated
stalling by merchants, shifted the opinions of some of the older Black activists, who no longer
believed in the ability of negotiations to bring about desegregation. Activist B.A. Ward said, “If
this means disturbing the ‘good relationship’ that exists in many communities (a relationship
based on servility and benign compliance), then let the ‘good relationship’ be hanged. The
Negro wants good relationships, yes, but he does not want them if it means occupying a position
of half slavery in the greatest democracy of all time.”21
The segregated merchants rejected the latest plan. This time they offered an economic
defense of segregation. On April 18, store managers told the Committee that they feared being
the first to desegregate would cut into profits. Therefore they would not do so without an
agreement from at least three downtown drugstores.22 In response, Mayor Duncan, Chamber of
Commerce officials, and several students headed to New York for meetings with the segregated
merchants’ national offices. When it became clear that New York trip had been fruitless, student
activists broke from the Mayor’s Committee.
On May 12, Knoxville College students finally began sit-ins. They started with targeted
efforts. As the Mayor insisted desegregation would occur in the next several days, the students
briefly sat in at two Cole’s drug stores and returned to campus. Colston reported that the
students had “accomplished their limited objective.” This success led them to sit-in again the
following day. These first sit-ins effectively swayed the opinion of the African Americans on the
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Mayor’s Committee, who were primarily educators and clergy members. They endorsed the sitins. Demonstrations were blacked out by the local media who feared coverage would lead to
violence.23
Established activists’ willingness to support demonstrations proved to be an important
movement in the struggle for civil rights. The merger of these two groups made creating
immediate social change a real possibility. The established activists brought creditability and
level headedness while the student activists offered moral certainty, energy, and bravery, to the
relationship. When these groups combined, it offered members a strong voice in the political
realms. It also proved to be prescient—while no one knew it at the time, the established activists
would soon lead the first wave of direct action protests.
The sit-ins complicated negotiations. Segregated merchants used them as an excuse to
postpone talks. On May 13, a student informed President Colston that they planned to sit-in at
3:00 pm. Colston replied that store managers intended to meet that afternoon to discuss
desegregation. The student replied, “They have said that so often. We don’t believe that
anymore.” Demonstrations began at 3:30 pm, when student activists surmised that the store
managers remained in their stores. But the Chamber of Commerce confirmed that the business
owners were scheduled to meet at 4:00. When the meeting did not occur, merchants blamed the
sit-ins.24
These first sit-ins softened the segregated merchants’ position. In response, they reported
“in view of the events occurring last Friday, the merchants want a ‘cooling off’ period…. At the
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end of the ten days the merchants will consider implementing a plan similar to Nashville’s.25
This last phrase caused confusion. The Mayor’s Committee agreed to the cooling off period and
responded that they understood “a plan similar to the Nashville plan will be put into effect at the
close of the ten day period.” With this assumption, several members of the Mayor’s Committee,
including former Mayor George Dempster and Reverend R.E. James, met with Knoxville
College student activists to discuss the cooling off period. The group assured the students that at
the end of the ten days desegregation would begin. The students asked that the cooling off
period be limited to five days because the school year ended in ten days. Mrs. Perry of the
Mayor’s Committee took the students request to the segregated merchants, who agreed to
comply if more local stores would desegregate. Nothing came of this plan despite the efforts of
President Colston, who attempted to broker an agreement between the downtown and other local
segregated merchants. The back and forth added to the chaos of the cooling off period.
During the flurry of activity, the segregated merchants informed the Mayor that they had
not committed to the Nashville plan; instead, they only agreed to consider it. After the ten days,
five of the segregated merchants reported they would desegregate if two other stores followed
suit.26 However, none of the stores took any action towards desegregation or offered a firm
commitment. The status quo remained. Harry Weirsema, Jr. remembered that the merchants
believed they had successfully tricked the college students, who could not resume
demonstrations until September.27 This most recent failure convinced some older activists of the
need to demonstrate.
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Shortly after the cooling off period ended, the activists received encouragement from Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., who spoke at Knoxville College’s graduation on May 30. Before a
crowd of 2,500, he told the forty three graduates they were entering a new era of history, where
the old forms of oppression, including slavery and colonialism, were dying thanks to African
American protests. The students must put the concerns of humanity above their own, live as
brothers, and strive towards excellence in their field of employment.28 King’s visit provided the
direct action movement with the momentum needed to proceed.
The 1960 summer recess did not stop the sit-in movement. Instead, the African American
members of the Mayors Committee formed the Associated Council for Full Citizenship (ACFC),
led by Reverends R.E. James and William T. Crutcher. They upheld their promise “that if and
when all hope vanished for reaching a solution, they would join the students in demonstrations”
in exchange for the students’ compliance with the cooling off period. The group hoped that sitins would be unnecessary based on the successful desegregation in Nashville, as well as cities in
Texas, North Carolina, and Virginia, where merchants went unharmed by the changes.29
Reverend Crutcher remembered that after finding out that no agreement had been reached, “we
went out to Knoxville College, Reverend James and myself, we got Dr. Harvey, the president,
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and one of the other professors together. We discussed the matter. We decided that since we had
pledged ourselves to the students that we had no alternative we just had to go on and sit-in
ourselves.”30 With most college students out of town for the summer recess, the sit-ins were
conducted by middle class African Americans and whites though the ACFC. Direct action
protests began by targeting downtown drug and department stores.
Reverend William T. Crutcher quickly became of the most important figure in
Knoxville’s civil rights movement. A tireless advocate for civil rights, he combined the wisdom
of a clergyman with the persistence of a student activist. Born in Stevenson, Alabama in 1907,
the oldest of eight children, Crutcher spent his youth traveling between the small towns where
his father preached. After completing his studies at A&M College in Normal, Alabama, he
attended seminary in Nashville. He then came to Knoxville in 1932 and took over Mt. Olive
Baptist Church in 1935.
Crutcher believed that civil rights were a concern for the church and a problem for all of
humanity. During his fifty years at Mt. Olive, he worked on both the local and national civil
rights movements. In Knoxville, he participated in a number of organizations, including the
Knoxville Roundtable of Christians and Jews and Mayor’s Committee on Human Relations,
where he pushed for racial equality. Through his work with the Baptist Church, he became a
founding member of the Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC), the civil rights
organization most associated with Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.31 Upon his death in 1989,
Congressman John Duncan, Jr. opined, “Reverend Crutcher played a key role in the civil rights
movement in Knoxville. Largely due to the efforts of Reverend Crutcher, the integration of
30
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Knoxville came about peaceably.”32 His slow, southern drawl emerged as a leading voice in
Knoxville’s civil rights movement.
ACFC members engaged in an additional trial run. They sought to determine if the
targeted stores remained segregated. The day before the sit-ins restarted, members paired off and
attempted to eat in the segregated downtown stores, such as Rich’s and Woolworth’s. The pairs
were denied service in all but one of the stores. It was later learned that the store which served
the activists did so by accident.33 With segregation firmly in place, ACFC members resumed
protests the following day.
On June 9, the direct action campaign began in full with a combination of pickets and sitins. Activists’ set up a picket line in front of Rich’s Department Store, manned by approximately
100 black and white demonstrators, who carried signs and sang to voice their displeasure with
the segregated lunch counters. The demonstration attracted taunting and harassment from white
onlookers. While most of the harassment was limited to name calling, one man snatched and
destroyed three placards from protesters. A thirteen year old was arrested for splashing water on
the activists. Much anger seemed to be directed towards the white demonstrators. The Knoxville
Journal recorded “several eggs were thrown, and one hit a pretty blonde U-T coed in the back of
the head. The girl said nothing, wiped the egg from her hair and clothing, pursed her lips and
kept marching, sign in hand.”34 Around noon, Officer Herman Sloan ended the slurs by telling
the crowd, “I don’t want to hear that again. There will be no cursing and no calling niggers. If
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you don’t believe it try me.” However, once Officer Sloan went off duty around 1:30 pm, the
name calling resumed and police presence slowly increased until 5:30, when the picket ended.35
Dispatching the police to protect demonstrators proved to be a key facet of Mayor
Duncan’s response to the civil rights movement. It stood in stark contrast to other cities where
local officials used the police to end demonstrations, often violently. Instead, the police ensured
that violence would not occur, forestalling Black outrage but also encouraging continued
demonstrations. This pragmatic approach proved to be effective.
These pickets coincided with sit-ins at large department stores, including Rich’s, Grant’s,
and Sears. The reactions from patrons and employees ranged from indifference to support to
aggressive verbal responses.36 For example, at Rich’s Department store, management erected a
barricade to deny protesters access to the lunch counter. Activists responded by forming a line in
front of the barricade to block the path of white patrons. The targeted businesses, including
Rich’s, closed their lunch counters, depriving them of revenue but preventing conflict.37 These
closures allowed demonstrators to move on to other businesses, such as Todd & Armstead drug
stores. As demonstrations wound down, ACFC members attempted to negotiate.
Negotiating proved fruitless. At the end of the day, Proudfoot, Robert Howell, an
Entomology Professor at the University of Tennessee, and Lee Butler, a UT student, met with
Byrl Logan, Rich’s assistant manager, to discuss desegregation. During the civil discussion,
Logan offered a number of reasons against changing Rich’s policy. He cited southern customs,
fear of economic hardship, unwillingness to be the first, and Rich’s contributions to African
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American charities.38 As the ACFC prepared for a prolonged direct action campaign, the
organization worked to obtain public support and increased pressure on segregated merchants.
During the evening of June 9, the Associated Council released a statement rehashing the
efforts of the Mayor’s Committee and casting the sit-ins as a last resort. It appropriated
Knoxville’s history of “good race relations” as a means of shaming merchants, whose stalling
and steadfast position endangered the city’s pleasant racial climate. The statement read in part:
“We have arrived at the decision with a deep sense of regret for we have been led to believe that
Knoxville was different from most cities in the South. This feeling was shared by some of the
finest people of Knoxville of both races.” The statement also reminded readers that the sit-ins
sought an outcome that was both morally and economically correct.39
The statement also kicked off a “Trade with your Friends Movement.” It applied
economic pressure to segregated merchants. The movement encouraged Knoxvillians to avoid
shopping at Rich’s, Sears, Grant’s, Cole’s, Kress, Walgreen’s, Todd & Armistead, McLellan’s,
Woolworth’s, and Miller’s because they falsely promised to desegregate by May 28. 40 The
selective shopping campaign provided a new line of attack on segregation reinforcing the moral
argument put forth by sit-ins with economic pressure. Cutting into merchants’ profits made their
fear of lost revenue a reason to end segregation.
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On June 12, the first mass meeting occurred.41 It revealed the Black community’s
support for protests. At Mt. Olive Baptist Church, the unofficial headquarters, a large interracial
crowd gathered to plan the upcoming movement. To start the meeting Reverend R.E. James, of
Mt. Zion Baptist Church, briefly recounted the events of the last couple weeks that led up to the
sit-ins. Merrill Proudfoot observed, “This was all the explanation needed since most of the
Negroes felt demonstrations had already been too long delayed, and some had been highly
critical of President Colston and other Negro leaders for holding the students in check.”42
After his summary, James turned the floor over to Dr. William Crutcher, who explained
the “Trade with your Friends” campaign. This plan offered a cleverly worded means of cutting
into segregated merchants’ profits. Crutcher told the crowd, “now we don’t use the word
‘boycott,’ that’s a dirty word.” Instead, he suggested attendees should patronize businesses that
treated African Americans as first class citizens. Crutcher then read a list of downtown
merchants who discriminated, without any additional comments. The ACFC chose selective
buying campaign, rather than a boycott, “to avoid running afoul of the state laws against
conspiring to interfere with the lawful conduct of businesses.” Minister Robert West then
encouraged the crowd to become more financially responsible by canceling charge accounts at
the city’s large department stores (he alluded to, but did not mention, Rich’s, Miller’s, and Sears,
all of which remained segregated).43
Minister West’s plan garnered results. Canceling charge accounts effectively pressured
the merchants. Several days after the mass meeting, Reverend Merrill Proudfoot returned his
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charge-a-plates (store credit cards) to Rich’s and Miller’s through the mail. He also enclosed a
letter explaining, “that I cannot in good conscience continue to support with my dollars their
practices of discrimination which hurt my friends.” A number of protesters and sympathizers
followed suit. Some were spurred by a telephone campaign that encouraged recipients to return
charge plates, undertaken by the female members of Knoxville’s Fellowship House, an
ecumenical religious organization. In response, the Rich’s credit manager told a fellow
employee, “we’ve got to do something soon-we are losing so many accounts.”44
The use of economic pressure put activists in a difficult position. They had to balance its
effectiveness with the possible harm. Economic pressure carried the danger of damaging
activists’ relationship with members of the Chamber of Commerce who sought to revitalize the
downtown shopping area. In addition, it flirted with breaking a state ordinance outlawing
interfering with commerce. These possibilities combined with the possibility that the strategy
might not work, making it risky.
Each day’s protests differed. Therefore, activists constantly adjusted their strategies and
tactics. The morning after the initial mass meeting, several ACFC members met to plan the
day’s protests. They wrestled with the best means to handle Rich’s. Since the start of
negotiations, Rich’s management seemed to be the most sympathetic towards desegregation.
However, once demonstrations began their lunch counter remained open. To force the counter’s
closure, Proudfoot suggested forming a picket line, composed of African American
demonstrators, in the lunch room. Reverend Robert West proposed blocking off the lunch
counter, subjecting demonstrators to the threat of arrest. After some discussion, Proudfoot’s idea
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won out.45 However, the following day demonstrators again changed plans. Upon arriving at
Rich’s they blocked access to the lunch counter. When they did so, the store’s guards called the
police. A half hour later, two police officers arrived and asked the demonstrators to move. They
did and in the meantime the counter had been closed.46
As demonstrations continued, it became clear to ACFC members that new tactics were
needed. However, the best way to proceed remained unclear. At an ACFC executive council
meeting, Reverend West suggested a “Stay Away from Downtown” movement, which would
encourage participants to shop at stores other than the large segregated downtown merchants.
Reverend James Reese quickly volunteered to lead a committee to begin the movement. Other
members had different ideas. Galen Martin, a recent graduate of Berea College, Reverend
Crutcher, and Reverend Carroll Felton of Logan Temple A.M.E Zion Church suggested reuniting
the Mayor’s Committee to restart negotiations.47 This plan was eventually carried out.
Segregated merchants searched for the correct response to protests. At first, they sought
the advice of city leaders. Less than a week after the demonstrations began, a representative for
the segregated merchants placed a call to former mayor and successful businessman George
Dempster. Excusing himself from a police-community relations meeting, Dempster took the
call. He told the representative to “let them eat,” and returned to the meeting.48 City leaders’
lack of support forced segregated merchants to respond differently to the protests.
Sears management used a preventative approach. On June 15, as demonstrators arrived
in the parking lot, Mrs. Harshaw, a red haired housewife in her late thirties, noticed a large man
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standing outside the store. She explained, “They have a spy watching for us,” recognizing the
man as a store employee. Instead of rushing into Sears, the demonstrators took their time,
hoping to elude, or at least confuse, the store’s spy. Upon entry they found the lunch counter
closed. The demonstrators stood outside of lunch counter for several hours to make sure it did
not reopen after they left.49 The use of an employee spy effectively deterred demonstrations. It
also led to the lunch counter’s closure, deterring profits.
Segregated merchants changed tactics frequently. On June 23, Reverend Matthew Jones,
Sr. and Reverend Carroll Felton attempted to enter Miller’s department store’s dining room.
They were denied access by an off duty detective hired by the store. While discussing the
matter, several Miller’s officials posted a sign announcing that the lunch room was for
employees, family, and friends. This led to a discussion among Jones, Felton, and store officials.
A store official promised Miller’s would desegregate as soon as Rich’s ended discrimination.
However, the promise proved to be worthless because Rich’s closed its eating facility.50 This
strategy allowed one segregated merchant to blame another, prolonging demonstrations.
Segregationists sought to maintain the status quo. Their viewpoint relied on tradition and
the illusion of good race relations. For them, the racial status quo in Knoxville suited both sides
well. Throughout the city’s history, Black Knoxvillians received better treatment than African
Americans in other cities. After all, they had maintained the franchise since Reconstruction.
Desegregation would disrupt tradition and violated individual rights. Segregationists came from
all classes and offered a variety of reasons for defending segregation, ranging from fear of
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communism to African American biologically-based inferiority.51 Their reaction to
demonstrations reminded elected officials, businessmen, activists, and segregated merchants of
the looming threat of violence.
On the morning of June 17, Merrill Proudfoot, along with a racially mixed group of
activists, arrived at Todd & Armstead’s lunch counter. Shortly after Proudfoot was approached
by a well dressed twenty year old white male who promptly took a seat next to him. After a
friendly hello, the man asked Proudfoot, “Say, mister, you’re a queer, aren’t you? Are you a
queer, mister?” Proudfoot’s less than enthusiastic response received an invitation from the young
man to fight in the alley outside of the store. When Proudfoot failed to respond, his antagonist
loudly retorted “You damned nigger you, you dirty sonofabitch! You’re just as black as the rest
of them niggers-your face is black, your arms are black, your belly is black.”52 This sent
Proudfoot into immediate silent prayer. Before leaving, the young man responded by calling
Proudfoot a communist. Proudfoot’s harasser left shortly after.
Around 1:00 pm a short white man, around sixty years old, entered the dining room and
seated himself at a table with Father Matthew Jones, Sr. and two younger African American
demonstrators. After identifying himself as a lawyer, he began interrogating the group. He
accused Father Jones of being a communist and pressed for the name of the person who sent the
group. Jones calmly replied “God sent me,” incensing the lawyer, who continued his cross
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examination at a louder volume, attracting enough bystanders to fill the dining room. A rowdy
group of young whites ominously encircled the table. The lawyer continued arguing that if
African Americans wanted to make progress they should clean up the Black areas of the city.
However, the lawyer asserted “The truth is that your own places are dirty and full of disease
because your people are too lazy to take care of them, and that’s why you want to come up here
in places that the white man keeps clean.” Proudfoot looked around nervously, hoping someone
would call the police. As the crowd’s energy increased, the lawyer grew more confident. He
blamed the protesters for causing division between himself and his Black friends. He was cut
short by the arrival of two policemen. Standing to leave, the lawyer remarked “Well, pastor, it’s
been nice to talk to you and the boys.” Sensing his chance to escape danger, Proudfoot quickly
departed. He was followed and threatened by several of the rowdy young whites while walking
to his car.
As the demonstrations continued white backlash intensified. On June 27, an interracial
group of about 100 picketed Rich’s Department Store. In response, thirty “young white men
massed at a big boat standing on a trailer on Rich’s Henley Terrance.” Police quickly moved
into to prevent them from launching the boat into the demonstrators. Around noon, seventy five
white youths dressed in t-shirts, sport shirts, and jeans gathered to call demonstrators names
before being chased away by police. Not all demonstrators took the harassment passively. As
the Knoxville Journal reported, an African American woman struck a preteen aged white child
who taunted her and held an insulting sign.53 These events did not dissuade Reverend W.T.
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Crutcher, who announced plans to expand the pickets to other stores and reaffirmed that African
Americans would not cross picket lines.54
Segregated merchants used the legal system to stop demonstrations, adding a new
dimension to the ongoing back and forth between segregated merchants and activists. The
events of June 30 at Todd & Armistead occurred after operator Judson K. Schults successfully
obtained to an injunction against Reverends William Crutcher, Nathan Jones, and William
Patterson, all ACFC members. The injunction claimed protests created “crowds of curiosity
seekers milling about his place of business, amusing themselves at the wrongful acts of sittersin.” However, the ministers left before they could be served the injunction.55 Other participants
used more confrontational tactics to combat white backlash.
Rather than waiting for police protection, young African Americans fought back. On
July 1, eleven black youths ranging in age from sixteen to twenty two year old were arrested as
they hassled and then offered to fight whites outside of Walgreen’s while a sit-in occurred. They
were not members of any civil rights or sit-in organization. Their actions occurred just a day
after ACFC received word of an imminent settlement.56 Over the month, the sit-ins successfully
cut into the segregated merchants business. Rich’s, Todd & Armistead, Sears, and Millers all
close their lunch counter for the time being due to “repairs” or “vacation.”57
The protests did not draw praise from the News Sentinel. It offered a legal defense for
private segregated institutions. An editorial argued demonstrators maintained an “indefensible
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position” because drug stores, restaurants, and other retail establishments were private
institutions similar to homes. Owners reserved the right to discriminate. The piece criticized
local citizens, both white and black, who supported demonstrations because they disrupted the
process of racial equality. It also noted that the News Sentinel fully supported the desegregation
of public institutions.58 As the debate over direct action raged, the segregated merchants
returned to the negotiating table.
By the beginning of July, negotiations over desegregation resumed between segregated
merchants, ACFC, and Mayor Duncan. The demonstrations successfully forced the merchants’
hand. In response, the ACFC stopped protests for several days to show good faith and allow
merchants time to plan for desegregation. However, they continued to boycott downtown
businesses.59 Members also distributed 2,500 hand bills at the University of Tennessee
explaining the need for desegregation.60 The groups first met on July 7. The segregated
merchants announced they had progress on an agreement to desegregate.
By July 9, the ACFC, segregated merchants, elected officials, and businessmen planned
the process of desegregation. To start, the Mayor and Chamber of Commerce created a “Good
Will Committee,” composed of the fifteen prominent white citizens, who had remained
uninvolved in demonstrations. The Good Will Committee then sent a prepared statement to the
segregated merchants asking them to desegregate. The merchants accepted. Both the
Committee’s statement and the reply were then published in the local newspapers. The
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Committee withheld the names of its members from the local press. However, they were sent to
national offices of chain stores to show that influential Knoxvillians and local people desired
desegregation. These plans remained a secret “because, if it were known that the merchants had
any hand in calling the Good Will Committee together, the influence of the Committee on the
local populace and on the stores’ home offices would be undercut.” In addition, the segregated
merchants no longer waited for approval from national offices to desegregate.61
The negotiations led to partial desegregation. By July 12, the Mayor’s Good Will
Committee publicly announced a desegregation plan.62 It allowed for a ten-day transition period
in which a limited number of African Americans could simultaneously patronize a restaurant,
while businesses prepared for full desegregation. The first day of desegregated lunch counters
occurred without incident. The white patrons took little notice of Black diners.63 On July 24, the
ACFC held its final mass meeting at Tabernacle Baptist Church. Attendees reported no
resistance and two additional stores voluntarily desegregated.64
This initial phase of the direct action protests set the tone for the rest of Knoxville’s civil
rights movement. City leaders and activists worked together to create change. They often
agreed on the goal, but disagreed over the best way to obtain it. For the most part, student
activists favored demonstrations, while city leaders and the middle class preferred negotiations.
This cooperation remained tenuous as the groups involved worked to increase their own voice
during negotiations.
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Given the city’s history, the first wave of direct action proved to be an important
moment. It permanently altered race relations. No longer would African American activists wait
patiently for civil rights. Instead, they used direct action tactics to cause immediate
desegregation. It was also the first time the city’s youth became involved in the political
discussion of race relations. Going forward, activists searched for new strategies to sustain their
momentum.
When the college students returned to Knoxville in September 1960, local activists had
experience and a template for protests. The students saw an opportunity to work for
desegregation of movie theaters and restaurants around the UT campus. However, these
expanded goals demanded larger demonstrations, calling into question Knoxville’s ability to
maintain its peaceful race relations.
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CHAPTER FOUR
“WHAT ARE WE WAITING FOR?:” THE SECOND WAVE OF DIRECT ACTION,
1960-1964
In late April 1963, Look Magazine published its annual list of All-America Cities. The
year’s list included Knoxville, which left most citizens beaming with pride. The accompanying
article lauded the city for its peaceful and organized lifting of Prohibition, several successful
downtown remodeling projects, most notably Market Square, and the new coliseum. It omitted
any mention of Knoxville’s race relations.1 For the interracial activists who participated in the
first phase of direct action, the article highlighted the city’s hypocrisy. How could Knoxville be
an All-America City while it remained segregated? For many conservative and moderate whites,
the article might have validated the city’s response to activism, as the Chamber of Commerce,
mayor, and city council took an active role in resolving civil rights issues, ensuring they
maintained institutional control, and managed conflicts before they rose to the attention of the
national media. In addition, the designation validated the idea that modernization should be the
city’s primary concern.
During the first half of the 1960s, the pro-business policies of Mayor John Duncan and
his successor Leonard Rogers combined with the small but determined business community to
bring about a number of improvements to the city. In 1965, the Downtown Knoxville
Association, an organization formed to promote business growth, crowed about “Knoxville’s
rapidly changing skyline, its increased business activities, new construction, new industries, new
expressways, and its remarkable growth, have focused nation-wide attention on this leading
Southern city…” Downtown had witnessed a number of improvements, including a new
$5,500,000 civic coliseum, an overhaul of the city’s Market Square area, and a project to
1
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rejuvenate the shops on Gay Street, downtown’s main thoroughfare. These combined with the
continued progress of the Downtown Loop garnered Knoxville several major civic awards: Look
magazine’s All American City Award and the State of Tennessee’s Community Progress
Award.1 These accomplishments occurred, in part, thanks to the minimal disturbance caused by
civil rights activism. Yet, there was a second wave of direct action protests.
During this period of development, Knoxville experienced a second wave of direct action
protests. The first wave relied on negotiations among the mayor, Chamber of Commerce,
middle-class African Americans, and managers of segregated drug and department stores.
During the first wave, Black protests had remained peaceful and had little representation from
student activists. The second wave of protests built on the success of the first wave’s
desegregation of select retail chains, but activists and white officials each employed new tactics.
Student activists no longer waited for existing Black and white leaders to initiate negotiations;
they began the process themselves by approaching local merchants and asking them to
desegregate. They also created a number of civil rights groups. When they received an
unfavorable response, they demonstrated. Eventually, these demonstrations led merchants of
segregated facilities to seek out negotiations with the mayor and the Chamber of Commerce in
hopes of winning their support. To the merchants’ chagrin, white city leaders supported legal
desegregation. As Knoxville city leaders sought to maintain the city’s reputation for racial peace
and prosperity, they failed to offer protection to segregated businesses and instead set the
parameters for limited desegregation.
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The pattern of negotiations and protests worked for some advantage for all the concerned
parties. Student activists used a number of different means to press for desegregation, forcing
elected officials, powerful businessmen, and segregated merchants to react to their demands.
Political and business leaders, however, used their authority with both merchants and activists to
co-opt and control both protests and their intended results. Knoxville underwent significant
racial progress in this era as activists achieved the enormous victory over legal segregation. But,
to the boon of city officials, it did so while avoiding the rioting and civil unrest that developed in
many other southern cities.
This process ended legal segregation and set the terms for activism going forward. On
the one hand, it showed activists that they could create change through negotiation and
cooperation with city officials and local businessmen. On the other hand, city officials and local
businessmen learned activism could be controlled through negotiation and cooperation. This
process presented real limitations to racial progress in the long term. City officials who were
intent on managing desegregation were generally not interested in confronting the larger
structural barriers that impeded Black equality, including employment discrimination and
poverty. Even as activists and officials worked together, they also encountered growing
challenges and disagreements that would shape the future of race relations in Knoxville.2
**************
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In September 1960, the second wave of direct-action protests began when the city’s
college students returned from their summer recess. Even after the first phase, a number of large,
downtown retail stores refused to desegregate. These merchants had different responses to the
initial sit-ins. The Knoxville Area Human Relations Council (HRC), an interracial civil rights
organization comprised mainly of middle-class members, reported that the lunch counters in
Sears’ and Rich’s Department Stores remained closed. The Miller’s Department Store counter
reopened but refused to serve African Americans. Rich’s management considered desegregating,
“but this decision has since been either reversed or postponed by the Atlanta headquarters
because of demonstrations in that city.” Sears planned to close its restaurant pursuant to the
chain’s national policy. The stores’ different circumstances led student activists to respond with
different strategies.
The continued segregation led to continued demonstrations, but student activists chose
their targets strategically, bypassing stores where they thought negotiation would be fruitful.
During mid-November 1960, demonstrations resumed at Rich’s after student activists from the
University of Tennessee (UT) and Knoxville College (KC) were denied access to its restaurant.
Demonstrations did not occur at Miller’s Department Store because student activists and HRC
felt optimistic that the ongoing negotiations would lead to desegregation.3 This strategy
permitted student activists to reward negotiating merchants by freeing them from the hassle of
protests. It also allowed student activists to judiciously distribute their energy by targeting the
most recalcitrant stores.
By February 1961, the activists’ strategy had led to positive results. The selective
negotiations convinced Miller’s officials to end segregation. During the month, Rich’s
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Department Store was purchased by Miller’s Department Store. Miller’s ownership immediately
desegregated the store’s lunch counter and restaurant. This served as a major victory for activists
because “Rich’s, the largest store in the city, had been the leading holdout against lunch counter
desegregation. Since its home offices were in Atlanta, prospects had been dim for any change
until the sale of the store.” The change at Rich’s meant that seven of the ten stores targeted in the
first wave of direct action had desegregated. This success proved to activists that strategic
negotiation and protests could bring about change.4 Student activists applied this lesson to their
theater desegregation campaign.
The beginning of the theater campaign offered an important passing-of-the-torch
moment. Student activists had become the leaders of Knoxville’s civil rights movement. No
longer would the slow pace of change be accepted. Instead, student activists used more
aggressive tactics, conducted negotiations themselves, and expanded the scope of activism.
Their leadership also relegated established Black leaders to supporting roles. Student activists
could not be too radical because they still had to cooperate with business leaders and local
officials, who might be scared off by militancy.
During March 1961, preparations to challenge segregation in movie theaters began.
Theater managers offered the financial defense of segregation. Initially, two separate student
groups, one comprised of high school students and the other of Knoxville College students,
attempted to negotiate with the manager of the Tennessee and Bijou theaters (both of which were
owned by Paramount). The unnamed manager refused because segregation did not impede his
profits. He reported, “I have no problem.” The Human Relations Council’s efforts to negotiate
received the same response. However, one theater manager expressed interest in negotiating but
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would not be the only one to do so. He worried that desegregation would drive away white
customers. The theater managers’ refusal to negotiate led to demonstrations.
At 5:00 pm on October 9, approximately fifty Knoxville College students gathered at the
city’s downtown theaters—the Tennessee, Riviera, and Bijou—all of which remained
segregated.2 These protests earned many student activists their first trip to jail. As protests began,
activists circled ticket windows chanting “ticket, please” while offering money, reinforcing their
potential role as patrons. The protests, according to one officer on the scene, “were attracting
more and more spectators and white boys just itching to start something.” Fearing the worst,
police ordered the protesters to disperse. The activists refused, leading to arrests. Their
incarceration brought about unexpected results.
Police custody did not sour the activists’ morale. In fact, it showed their dedication to
ending segregation and assumption of leadership. They sang spirituals and patriotic songs,
including “America” and “The Star Spangled Banner,” and planned the next protests. Nor did it
scare them into obedience. One protester, eventually charged as Mary Todd, age twenty, told
police she was a Knoxville College student but refused to disclose her race. Jail did not worry
Robert Booker: “We’re having a ball and I don’t have to go to school tomorrow,” he said.7 The
fifty protesters refused bond from Reverend W.T. Crutcher of the Associated Council for Full
Citizenship. He reported, “We’ve done this several times before, but this is the first time anyone
has been arrested . . . . We’ve been trying to negotiate with the theaters for the past five or six
months.” After visiting the incarcerated students, Knoxville College President James Colston
offered his support: “They are young people trying to secure their rights and they went about it
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the way they felt would be best.”8 These first theater demonstrations signified a change in
leadership. For the remainder of the direct-action phase, students led while their elders played
supporting roles.
The next night, October 10, theater protests continued. Demonstrators benefited from
their relationship with city officials, which prevented the violence that would have deterred many
supporters. As fifty-to-sixty Knoxville College students circled the ticket booths, whites gathered
to watch. However, this evening the onlookers ended up on the wrong side of the law. The
demonstrations led to the arrest of four white spectators for disorderly conduct, most notably
Julian Headerick, who yelled “damn niggers” from his passing car. The police prevented white
onlookers from using violence. Protests resumed on October 12 with similar results.9
In February 1962, the fifty Knoxville College students arrested during the October 9
theater demonstration received their day in court. City officials worked in tandem with student
activists to minimize the consequences for protest-related arrests. The students’ attorney
reminded City Court Judge C.G. Kelly that on that October night, the students marched in an
orderly fashion to minimize the public disturbance. The city attorney argued that the city’s
history of good race relations made further prosecution unnecessary. Doing so would only stir up
racial tensions and inconvenience the students. The judge, “seemingly glad to get rid of the
whole matter, disregarded the police captain’s protests, and dismissed the whole standing case,”
bringing students a great deal of relief.10 Since student activists did not have to worry about the
legal ramifications of demonstrations, they continued to demonstrate.
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The following year, Knoxville College students and staff resumed theater protests. In
response to the success of previous demonstrations, theater employees, in combination with local
whites, responded aggressively. At 1:30 p.m. on March 23, a group of over fifty, including
members of Americans for Liberty and Equal Racial Treatment (ALERT), a local civil rights
organization from UT and KC, entered the lobbies of the Tennessean and Bijou theaters. At the
Tennesseean, the scene turned violent as white ushers forcefully expelled activists. Harry
Wagner was attacked by several white bystanders, and a police officer shoved Maile Wilson to
the ground. The protests ended with fifty-three arrests for disorderly conduct and conspiring to
interfere with commerce. The Reverends W.T. Crutcher and R.C. James, Knoxville College
Dean Dr. L. Campbell, and guidance director Ralph Martin arranged bail. Shortly after, KC
released a statement declaring that it did not sponsor the demonstrations but agreed with their
aims. The students vowed to continue demonstrations, which they did everyday for the next
week, singing freedom songs and carrying placards.11 On March 25, white counterdemonstrators
greeted theater picketers, holding signs that read “White is Right” and “We reserve the right to
remain white.”12 The demonstrations on March 30 led to twelve arrests and revealed the theater
owners’ changing tactics. An usher told police that he was instructed to keep the demonstrators
out. So when the demonstrators pushed him in an attempt to enter the lobby, the usher pushed
back.13 Theater managers responded with increased hostility because they received little support
from the legal system. The threat of arrest failed to deter student activists because they did not
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have to worry about prosecution. With no other remedy, theater managers used increased force to
end demonstrations.
On May 9, theater protests resumed with a more hostile tone after the Knoxville Civic
Improvement Committee (KCIC), a community based civil rights organization, ALERT, and
Students for Equal Treatment (SET), a civil rights organization composed of University of
Tennessee students, called off demonstrations in early April in hopes of negotiating with theater
owners. Protesters used nonviolent tactics to respond to theater employees’ increased force.
Around 6:30 protesters from UT, Knoxville College, and Austin High School arrived at the
Tennessee Theater. They sang and carried placards stating, “Theaters segregated in the AllAmerican City.”
To the students, the Look Magazine award highlighted the city’s hypocrisy. They refused
to move when ordered by police, forcing officers to lift the sixty-six arrested demonstrators into
police wagons. Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) Field Secretary Ruby
Doris Smith stated the students were “dragged, choked, and literally thrown through the air.”
Twenty-nine demonstrators refused to give their names to police.14 In an ironic twist,
demonstrators sought admission to To Kill a Mockingbird, a film about race relations in a
southern town.15 Demonstrations continued on the evening of the 10th, leading to the arrest of
thirty interracial demonstrators, some of whom sat and laid in front of the theater to block
commerce.16
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In October 1961, UT student organizations kicked off a campaign to desegregate
restaurants around the University of Tennessee campus. They were led by SET, an interracial,
student-activist group with about thirty members, half of them graduate students. Marion Barry,
Phil Bacon, and Harry Wiersema Jr. held leadership positions, while Gerri Williams and Mary
Ann Wade pushed other members to participate in demonstrations and undertook the needed
legwork. The group did not garner the school’s approval. “They knew we were troublemakers,”
remembered Birt Waite, a psychology graduate student. This reputation got them banned from
campus, forcing the group to hold meetings at the Presbyterian Student Center.17
Initially, members of SET met with managers of seven restaurants close to the UT
campus to discuss desegregation. They received mixed responses.18 Several desegregated
immediately. Others agreed but would not be the first. Two, Byerley’s Cafeteria and a diner
called the Tennessean, refused. In March 1962, the campaign to desegregate restaurants resumed.
This time SET members solicited the help of campus ministers. The initial meeting received a
cold reception. At first, the campus ministers invited twelve owners of segregated restaurants to
begin discussions. Only one appeared. The ensuing discussions with business owners led five
restaurants to desegregate by April.19 These successful negations spurred student activists to
begin demonstrating at Byerley’s and the Tennessean.
Several months later, restaurant protest began. On October 23, Avon Rollins and The
Reverend Matthew Jones of St. Luke’s Episcopal Church were arrested when they refused to
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leave Byerley’s.20 At the ensuing trial, the judge used the legal justification for segregation, and
Rollins responded with a new tactic. Owner Luther Byerley testified that Rollins’s refusal to
leave caused a disturbance, while Rollins blamed the disturbance on Byerley’s reaction. Jones’s
case was dismissed while Rollins’s conviction led to a $25 fine. In protest, Rollins refused to
pay, landing him in jail. Judge Charles Kelley convicted Rollins because restaurant operators
“had the right to refuse service to the two Negroes.”21 He was taken to the Knox County penal
farm. However, Harry Wiersema Jr. and Phil Bacon, a white UT student, quickly paid Rollins’
bail.22 Rollins’s willingness to go to jail drew attention to Kelley’s unjust decision.
Avon Rollins became a major figure when he assumed leadership of the Knoxville Civic
Improvement Committee (KCIC), a civil rights organization made up of students and community
members. Rollins, a Knoxville native who grew up on Church Street, possessed a political
consciousness from an early age. Shortly after Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat in
Montgomery, Rollins penned his first critique of American democracy for his junior high civics
class in a paper entitled “America, Are you Really America to Me?” In 1960, while still a
student at Austin High School, Rollins joined the local sit-in movement. His parents offered
tacit support. When police officials warned Rollins’ stepfather about Avon’s participation, he
replied “Well, you know how young people are. They’re just hard to control.” His parents also
offered young Avon financial and moral support. Rollins enrolled in the University of
Tennessee in 1961. He was one of the first dozen African American undergraduates to do so.
On campus, he experienced discrimination from white students. To combat this hostile

20

“2 Charged in Attempt to Eat at Byerley’s,” Knoxville News Sentinel, October 23, 1962.

21

“Negro Goes to Jail in Restaurant Case,” Knoxville News Sentinel, October 27, 1962.

22

“Avon Rollins,” Metro Pulse, September 17, 2009.

86

environment he joined many student groups, including Americans for Liberty and Equal Racial
Treatment (ALERT) and Students for Equal Treatment (SET).
While a student at Austin High School, Rollins’s activism earned him an invitation to the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee’s founding meeting at Shaw University in 1960.
From there, he remained active in both the Knoxville and national civil rights movements. He
attended the March on Washington in 1963 on his way to civil rights activism in Danville,
Virginia, and Alabama. Activism came with a price. Rollins was arrested over thirty times. In
1965, he began work at the Tennessee Valley Administration. There he used vacation time to
serve a brief stint in a Danville prison.3 Other student leaders in this group of organizations
included Robert Booker, Harry Weirsma, Jr., and Marion Barry, who would become the national
chairman of SNCC and then the charismatic and often troubled mayor of Washington, D.C.
Rollins proved to be Knoxville’s most well known and militant activist. Through his
work with SNCC, Rollins developed an uncompromising desire for racial equality. Never
satisfied, he led the attack against segregation and then the remaining structural problems, using
a number of strategies from pickets to electoral politics. While doing so, he clashed with a
number of the city’s major figures and spent time in jail. Even jail could not stop Rollins’
activism.
By January 1963, picketing resumed at Byerley’s. Picketers from SET marched daily
during lunch hours for several weeks. They successfully impeded business. However, they failed
to convince owner Luther Byerley who refused “to serve anyone who comes in my place to
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cause trouble.”23 During one picketing session, a driver arrived with a truckload of food intended
for Byerley’s. After observing the demonstrations, the driver announced his intention to leave.
Demonstrators told the driver they would not interfere with his delivery because they did not
wish him to get fired. The driver replied, “I don’t care. A picket’s a picket. We’re not going to
cross the picket line.” He drove off.24 The effective demonstrations led Luther Byerley to use the
legal system to stop demonstrations.
Demonstrations proved so effective that Byerley filed a petition for injunctive relief
against members of SET to force them to stop. The petition contained several common
segregationist arguments. Byerley maintained that he had a legal right to discriminate. The
protesters blocked entrance to the restaurant, dissuaded would-be patrons, and carried signs
ridiculing the establishment’s discriminatory policy, all of which exposed potential customers to
harm and prevented commerce. To further his case, Byerely pointed out that the UT student
government’s refusal to sponsor activism demonstrated that “there is no problem.” The petition
used three justifications for segregation: financial, legal, and indifference. In combination, these
arguments provided a solid defense of the status quo. However, activists responded by reframing
the debate.
The SET members’ response asserted that they did not violate any law. Instead, their
protests followed American principles. Protests occurred with guidance from the Knoxville
Police Department to avoid violating city laws. Ridiculing patrons for eating in segregated
restaurants was constitutional and part of the American free enterprise system, which allowed
Byerley to discriminate. They did not seek to intimidate patrons; “they seek, not by force or
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coercion, but good old American persuasion to induce complainants to abandon unlawful racial
segregation.” They further argued that the “privilege of holding complainants up to ridicule for
their anti-Americanism is a constitutional privilege of the defendants.” In addition, the
restaurant’s need for a license through the city government made it a public facility and not a
private club as the owner claimed.25 Aligning protests with widely accepted institutions, such as
the Constitution or capitalist system, cast them as morally justifiable and encouraged the support
of liberal and moderate whites. While protests did not force Byerley’s to change its policy, other
restaurants began negotiations.
Activism continued into April. On the 5th, a group of seven interracial demonstrators
were arrested for violating an injunction against protesting at the Tennessean.26 The white
activist used American history to cast their efforts in a positive light. During the demonstration,
white members of SET passed out flyers revealing their motivation for participation. It read, in
part, that the students were white southerners “who felt compelled to recognize our past
shortcomings, who recognize the senselessness in false pride, and who hope to assist in
correcting the shameful situation for which we must shoulder the blame.” It urged fellow
southerners to stop resisting change to protect tradition.27
Near the end of the month, the seven activists arrested on April 5 came to trial. At the
hearing, it became clear that injunctions did not deter activism. Two defendants, Marion Barry
and Mary Nevius, were acquitted. The other five received a suspended $25 fine and a week in
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jail. They included Stephen Wagner, a Knoxville college math teacher and UT graduate student,
Everett War, Harry Wiersema Jr., Phillip Bacon, and Bonnie Todd, all UT students. Chancellor
Charles Dawson used the case to highlight the need for a Supreme Court ruling on the right of
business owners to discriminate. He had grown tired of the “childish and infantile” singing and
clapping of university students who arranged demonstrations to “revolutionize private
enterprise,” as well as issuing injunctions against demonstrations, which resulted in minor arrests
while activists continued. Instead, “social changes must be made in an orderly and lawful way.”
The activists’ determination made injunctions ineffective. Instead, a decisive federal ruling was
needed to determine the legality of segregation. Dawson did not have to wait long, as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 would soon outlaw discrimination in public places. Until that point middleclass activists continued their assault on segregation.
The Associated Council for Full Citizenship (ACFC), a local civil rights organization
composed of interracial, middle-class activists, also continued its activism during the second
phase. The group’s efforts uncovered the sometimes-complicated relationship among civil rights
organizations. Their July 1962 meeting revealed disagreement between organizations over an
upcoming protest of the Knoxville Transit Line (KTL), a local bus company. After a summary of
the profit KTL garnered from Black riders, members learned the Knoxville Civic Improvement
Committee (KCIC), a local civil rights organization comprised mainly of high school and college
students, planned to begin demonstrations in hopes of provoking KTL into hiring African
American drivers. However, the ACFC membership favored a previous agreement with KTL to
promote Black bus washers to drivers starting in September. The group also rejected the idea of
attending a workshop at the Highlander Folk School aimed at increasing communication and
decreasing conflict among the city’s civic organizations. Although the reason for the group’s
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lack of interest remains unclear, it is probable that the state government’s propensity to
investigate the school worried the ACFC membership. They probably feared charges of
associating with communists, however false. The organizations’ differing plans did not stop
KCIC from protesting.
During August 1962, KCIC members launched a four-day picket of the headquarters of
the Knoxville Transit Line. They appealed to the community at large for support.
Demonstrations publicized their lack of Black drivers in spite of the bus line’s agreement with
ACFC. Several days later, KCIC president Avon Rollins ended the protest because “public
sentiment” sufficiently supported their quest for Black drivers. By August 4, the bus company
agreed to hire Black drivers.28 Segregation was quickly falling out of favor with Knoxvillians.
This success led KCIC to challenge the segregation of the Catholic, Baptist, and Presbyterian
Hospitals.
In March 1961, the City-Wide Committee for Equal Services, a group aimed at
desegregating local hospitals, formed. They used a religious argument as the basis of their attack
on segregation. The committee was comprised of twenty-five members from different civic
organizations including religious and civil rights groups. As a basis for its actions, the committee
cited the minutes of the 94th General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States,
which reported “that enforced segregation of the races is discrimination which is out of harmony
with Christian theology and ethics and that the Church, in its relationship to cultural patterns
should lead rather than follow.” The group began by conducting informal discussions between
group members and individual hospital administrators. One discussion revealed that an unnamed
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hospital was willing to desegregate after staffing issues had been resolved.29 This conflict would
later be exploited by demonstrators to highlight the hypocrisy of church-based hospitals, whose
policies seemed to contradict Christianity.30
The efforts to desegregate hospitals proved to be a particularly important undertaking.
They sought to remedy an important structural issue, healthcare inequality, which had potentially
deadly ramifications for the Black community. As the discourse unfolded, the campaign led to a
debate over Christianity’s relationship to race. This discussion resonated with Knoxvillians of
all races who wrestled with the issue during the turbulent 1960s.
With theater demonstrations in full swing, the City Wide Committee for Equal Services
held another meeting, which resulted in the use of three new tactics. Knoxville College President
James Colston and Mayor John Duncan were among several guests at its January 24th meeting.
During the proceedings, it was announced that the three segregated hospitals declined any further
meetings with the committee. Committee members then asked Mayor Duncan to “continue his
efforts to bring about a change in the attitude of the Church-Related hospitals.” (The mayor had
previously tried to broker a meeting between ministers and the committee. The meeting did not
occur because Duncan’s father fell ill.) It was also announced that the organization planned to
place an advertisement promoting hospital desegregation in the city’s newspapers on February
10th. It received widespread attention.31 In addition, committee members kicked off a letterwriting campaign to increase community pressure. They suggested that letters should be
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addressed to the hospitals, ministers, and members of the city government.32 Asking the mayor to
speak with the hospital offered a new strategy. Instead of protests providing the pressure that
allowed the mayor to negotiate, the committee used Mayor Duncan to force segregated hospitals
to negotiate. The committee adapted its strategies to immediate circumstances.
The hospital pickets of 1962 were not the first. In June 1960, Jack Leflore had conducted
a one-man sit-in at the University of Tennessee hospital to protest its segregated facilities.33 The
events of August 1962 picked up where Leflore left off, when members of the Knoxville Civic
Improvement Committee began picketing both St. Mary’s Hospital and the Church of
Immaculate Conception (the church affiliated with St. Mary’s Hospital). The group declared, “It
is disgraceful for a seemingly progressive community, such as ours, to deny its Negro citizens
the services of three out of four hospitals even in cases of life or death.” The hospitals’
segregation seemed especially egregious because it was antithetical to the Christian principle of
working to end human suffering.34 KCIC members carried signs and placards highlighting the
hypocrisy of the churches’ teachings and segregation. One sign read, “How can you say you love
me and keep me out of God’s hospitals?” Hospitals proved to be a particularly important target
for African Americans because only the UT hospital accepted Black patients. Many in the Black
community worried about the health consequences of getting transported farther than necessary
to receive medical care. The protesters used multiple interpretations to frame the hospitals’
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segregationist stance as antithetical to Christianity and therefore in conflict with many
Knoxvillians’ religious beliefs.
As the afternoon progressed, a white priest invited some of the protesters into the church
to discuss the demonstrations. The priest used the financial defense of segregation. He claimed to
harbor no prejudice towards African Americans but worried that desegregation would force the
hospital to close because white doctors would remove their patients. He also argued that the
protest drew resentment from church members. The priest then informed the protesters that the
nun in charge of the hospital was sympathetic to their cause. However, her refusal to meet with a
KCIC committee for the previous eighteen months left the nun’s sympathies in question.35 These
church-based hospitals felt that their bottom line trumped their “sympathy” for the plight of
African Americans. The next demonstration met with harsher backlash.
On August 14, a group that had participated in sit-ins in both Knoxville and Nashville led
the picketing. No longer willing to negotiate, hospital officials resorted to force against
protesters. Several KCIC members attempted to enter the hospital, only to be forcefully expelled
by security guards and “some thugs.” After initially ordering demonstrators to leave, one nun
threatened to call the police. She then told the demonstrators “to sit there until they rot.” During
the demonstration Avon Rollins remembers:
And a nun got a hold of my tie, in her clerical garb. And she just squatted and fell
backwards with my tie. I was outside the door and she was inside the door. People who
were outside and just looking thought that I was just kneeling and praying. Until they got
closer and saw that I was changing colors. And I had a sign ‘We Are All Brothers in
Christ,’ but she was still choking me.36
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African American activists were “no longer willing to abide a situation that could
drastically alter their lives to the extent that might mean death.”37 This picketing successfully
cast segregation as anti-Christian. The hypocrisy eventually led to negotiations among hospital
administrators, the mayor’s office, and the Chamber of Commerce, resulting in desegregation.
The demonstrators’ tactics resonated with liberal and moderate whites because they
appealed to widely held values. A News Sentinel editorial urged residents to desegregate, making
the city worthy of its All-America City designation. It pointed to the violence in Little Rock,
New Orleans, Albany, Greenwood, Birmingham, and Nashville, which surely deterred new
businesses from settling in those cities. Merchants retained the right to discriminate. However,
the myth that they would lose white customers by serving African Americans clearly did not
apply in Knoxville. Desegregation offered Knoxville the opportunity to “prove that she is not
only an All-American city, but a southern one. The true southerner was a gentleman.”38 The
appeal combined the responsibility that came with the All-America City award with a feeling
that Knoxville could handle desegregation. Support grew quickly.
Two days later a widely read News Sentinel editorial asked readers, “What are we waiting
for?” It argued the current circumstances offered Knoxville the opportunity to become the first
integrated community in the south. The city had interested and capable white leadership in both
the private sector and local government, along with “responsible” Black leadership. Together
they could bring about desegregation. Whites could help end segregation by shopping at open
businesses, showing that desegregation would not decrease profits.39 The initial editorial
received a large, mostly favorable response. Henry Sutherland praised the city as an example of
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racial tolerance for the north and south; the city’s “magnanimous civic attitudes” would surely
attract businesses and tourists. Mr. and Mrs. Duncan Bennett of nearby Maryville reminded
readers that segregation put property rights before people’s rights, while Reverend Percy Smith
of the Clinton AME Zion Church praised the newspaper’s support for desegregation as historic.40
The outpouring of support signaled the success of Knoxville’s handling of the civil rights
movement. The combination of activism and negotiated created a widely accepted way. They
struck a balance between creating sustainable social change and keeping the status quo intact. At
the same time, desegregation made Knoxville a progressive city, in the eyes of many citizens,
because it avoided race-related violence. At this time, moderate whites may have viewed this as
an ideal end to the civil rights movement. For many activists, however, it proved to be the
beginning.
As community-wide support for desegregation grew, the mayor’s committee to negotiate
an end to discrimination in the public places reformed as the Committee for Peaceful and
Orderly Desegregation (CPOD). The committee was primarily comprised of politicians and
officials from the Chamber of Commerce. It included Mayor John Duncan, former liberal mayor
George Dempster, E.B. Copeland, John Hart, and Robert Chapman. CPOD faced resistance from
segregated merchants while civil rights groups remained skeptical about its ability to bring about
desegregation.
As the month came to an end, support for desegregation grew. However, it was not
universally accepted. Segregated institutions used a number of arguments for maintaining the
status quo. Members of the Knoxville Hotel-Motel Association voted for desegregation. Its
announcement reminded readers that each member hotel was individually owned and conducted
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business in its best interest.41 On May 22, Baptist, St. Mary’s, and Presbyterian Hospitals
announced that desegregation would begin in August. However, the process of hiring Black
doctors remained the individual hospital’s prerogative.42 The Knoxville Ministerial Association
also issued a statement supporting the end of discrimination and calling on its members to work
towards opening their congregations. Segregated congregations remained a constant concern for
clergy members who participated in civil rights activism because it undermined their credibility.
The statement was approved over two dissenting votes cast by members who disagreed with the
idea that churches should actively promote desegregated worship and congregations.43 E.B
Copeland, President of the Chamber of Commerce, and several other CPOD members traveled to
Atlanta and met with executives of Wilby-Kincey, the owners of the Tennessean and Bijou
theaters in Knoxville.44 The executives were unwilling to be the first to desegregate and refused
to do so while demonstrations continued. This remaining support for segregation ensured that
efforts to desegregate would meet continued resistance. African American activists responded to
the CPOD in different ways.
African American activists quickly obtained a voice on the CPOD. Doing so pushed the
committee to address the problems that plagued the Black community, not just end segregation.
The Knoxville Flashlight and Herald reported that shortly after the formation of the Committee
for Peaceful and Orderly Desegregation, four African American members of the ACFC met with
committee members “and discussed the needs of the Negro. The needs discussed were
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desegregation of public facilities and job opportunities.” The ACFC then elected their own
committee to negotiate “for Negro demands,” which included two student representatives.45 The
ACFC expanded the discussion around civil rights beyond desegregation by shedding light on
the need to create jobs.
Other civil rights groups expressed concern about the committee’s ability to bring about
prompt desegregation. Their efforts during the first wave had been slow and seemed toothless
without protests. Reverend Robert James offered thanks for city’s leaders’ efforts but stated that
the ACFC planned to continue demonstrations for several days, and maybe longer, because no
agreement yet existed. Dr. Colston expressed optimism about the committee’s work but was
unsure if it would stop Knoxville College students from demonstrating. “You never can tell
about these groups,” he remarked. Avon Rollins planned to continue protesting until the
announcement of dates for desegregation. Safety Director Ray Oglesby denied Reverend Frank
Gordon a permit for a planned march of 2,000 African Americans down Gay Street because it
could be issued only by the City Council.46 Civil rights groups’ hesitancy resulted from previous
broken promises and misinformation. However, segregation began to crumble within a week.
Full-scale legal desegregation began on July 5, 1963. It was the culmination of activism
and the CPOD’s efforts. Forty-three local restaurants and dining rooms, including McDonald’s,
Holiday Inn, and the Quarterback, began serving all customers regardless of race. Thirty-two of
the restaurants undertook a gradual process where a limited number of African Americans could
patronize a restaurant simultaneously for a period from two-to-thirty days. They remained
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banned from curb service at drive-ins.47 The city’s theaters, a number of hotels and motels, and
hospitals desegregated. All city-owned recreational facilities also ended discrimination. As part
of the effort to open the city, the police chief assigned two African American officers to East
Knoxville, the city’s predominately Black area.48 A citywide petition had already garnered
10,000 signatures in support of the desegregation of public facilities.49
Desegregation proved to be a historic moment for activists. They successfully toppled
segregation, an oppressive system that had relegated African Americans to second class
citizenship for over a century. However, the end of segregation did not immediately eliminate
the problems that hampered the Black community. Instead, it merely highlighted the remaining
problems and led activists to a number of difficult questions. How should they attack structural
problems? Could they continue to work with elected officials? Had city leaders limited
activism? Would they act to prevent future activism?
After the announcement of desegregation, CPOD turned its efforts to improving Black
Knoxvillians’ employment opportunities. Their shift in focus can be attributed to the ACFC’s
previous efforts. It acted to empower African Americans to combat unemployment, or
underemployment, by making blue-collar and low-skill government jobs available. They sought
to capitalize on the momentum generated by direct action to end employment discrimination at
retail and chain stores, textile mills, and city and federal government offices. In order to fill these
jobs, African Americans were encouraged to register at the city’s Employment Security Office.
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There officials compiled lists of qualified Black applicants for prospective employers. The city’s
employment efforts offered a major step towards remedying structural problems. The Aurora
now noted that desegregation justified Knoxville’s designation as an All-America City.50 The
city government became involved in job training and placement programs throughout the 1960s.
By 1964, direct action had faded. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 met the primary objective
of the movement. Many of its student leaders left Knoxville. For example, Marion Barry rejoined
SNCC and went to Mississippi during the Freedom Summer of 1964. Avon Rollins became
heavily involved in activism in Danville, Virginia. The last of the sit-ins took place during
November 1963 when several students sat in Mayor John Duncan’s office to encourage him to
create more jobs for African Americans. They demanded promotions for African American fire
and police men, the hiring of African Americans on the clerical staff of city departments, and the
planning of integration for the fire, police, welfare, finance, and service departments. Upon
arrival, protesters were told that the mayor was not in his office that day. After they announced
their intent to sit-in, someone telephoned the mayor. He showed up and said, “Let’s talk about
this. I’ll talk for as much time as you’ve got. I’m concerned about the same things, and let’s try
to figure out how we can do something about this.” He then ordered hamburgers for the group.
After two or three hours, the discussion ended.51
From this point forward, the African American community responded to desegregation in
different ways. Middle-class African Americans focused on the newly integrated job market. In
October 1963, Dr. Colston brought Louis E. Lomax, professor of philosophy at Georgia State
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College, to speak on campus. Lomax’s talk encouraged KC students to embrace the integrated
world by preparing for the job market, studying diligently, and stopping the use of “the term
black as an excuse.”52 Serious preparations for the real world would lead to better lives for
African Americans. More radical Black activists continued to push for social change.
Some Black student activists aimed to address structural issues that prevented racial
equality. While in Danville, Avon Rollins said of desegregation in Knoxville, “These are only a
few crumbs. I can’t afford to stay here, and neither can most Negroes. We are going to have to
do something about jobs.”53 A SNCC press release complained that tokenism hampered racial
equality. If significant steps towards equal opportunity had not been made by October 10, SNCC
would begin a large-scale, direct-action campaign that would “unite the freedom loving citizens
of Knoxville into a mighty river flowing toward the forest fire of segregation; this river will not
cease to flow until the last spark of segregation and discrimination has been extinguished.”54 For
Black student activists, African Americans would not gain full equality until their economic
prospects improved. Other student activists remained in Knoxville.
Members of SET continued their civil rights activism as well. They discovered that the
changing laws did not guarantee desegregation. Given some merchants’ staunch defense of
segregation, unenforced laws did not compel them to change. Marion Barry’s investigation of the
UT hospital revealed that it still segregated patients by race, refused to integrate individual
hospital rooms, and confined Black patients to the third floor’s west side. Once full, Black
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patients were placed on the fourth floor with contagious patrons.55 In August 1963, a group that
included Barry, Rollins, Waite, and Phil Bacon, along with several young women, began the
drive to Washington, D.C., to attend the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. On the
way out of town, they stopped at Weaver’s Cafeteria, because it desegregated earlier in the
summer. When Phil Bacon tried to sit at a table with his African American friends, the owner
pulled a pocket knife to impede Bacon’s move to the table. Bacon refused to back down and an
uncomfortable standoff ensued. The situation ended when Mr. Weaver left to obtain a warrant
against Bacon for assault.56 In early 1964, Waite joined the Knoxville Education Project, an
organization formed to test the implementation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He found out
that it did not immediately influence whites’ behavior. After entering Brownies, a local bar, with
a Black friend, he was denied service. He objected, “‘I’ve eaten here before’ and that was a lie,
but [the bartender] didn’t know. . . . One of the guys behind the bar said, ‘At that time, you didn’t
bring a nigger with you.’” Ending legal segregation did not ensure compliance. Instead, activists
needed to continue their efforts.
To African American activists, both student and established, the direct action protests
showed that activism worked best as a process with constantly changing tactics and strategies.
Change was possible, but required working with the elected officials and businessmen, who had
different agendas. Activists could not overthrow the status quo in Knoxville, but they now
understood the rules, allowing them to take advantage of contemporary circumstances to create
small-scale change. Institutional change would require different tactics, such as advocating for
more community control and participation in electoral politics. The mayor, elected officials, and
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the Chamber of Commerce would have liked to see activism end at this point. For them,
desegregation provided Black Knoxvillians access to all the city’s institutions, which created
equal opportunities for all and would eventually lead to racial equality. They also learned that
activism could be managed and controlled through negotiation and cooperation, which ensured
that large-scale violence would not occur.
The civil rights movement did not end in 1963. Using the momentum from this period,
student activists at both the University of Tennessee and Knoxville College undertook efforts to
change their schools. These students adapted their activism to local circumstances, which
differed drastically at each location. They succeeded in obtaining a voice on campus, even as the
city’s white leaders responded with indifference. Student activists’ fate seemed mild, when
compared with the experience of Highlander Folk School, which came to Knoxville in 1961.
Throughout its time in Knoxville, the school experienced harassment from local whites, city
politicians, and state level elected officials, because of its reputation as a communist
organization. This harassment and Highlander’s refusal to work with city officials kept local
activists away.
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CHAPTER FIVE
“EVERYONE YOU DON’T LIKE IS A COMMUNIST:” THE HIGHLANDER
RESEARCH AND EDUCATION CENTER, 1961-1971

Shortly after the controversial trial of June 1963, Highlander cofounder Myles Horton,
his attorney Ed Lynch, and their wives lunched at Cline’s Grill and Sundries in Maryville. As
they finished eating, the owner, Jim Cline, cursed at and then attacked Myles Horton and hit Ed
Lynch. After the beating, Cline expressed little regret, “I had informed Horton’s lawyer not to
bring him out here. His lawyer has been a customer quite a while. Horton came just to provoke.
I had several customers get up and leave when they came in. When they were slow in leaving I
helped them. Their story is exaggerated.” Horton went unconscious, suffered a cut on the back
of his head, a black eye, and possibly a broken elbow. He could not remember much of the
incident afterward.1
Highlander, and Horton, invoked strong feelings in East Tennessee. These feelings
resulted from the long running dispute over Highlander’s political leanings. For Jim Cline,
Horton was a communist who threatened the American way of life. He scared off customers and
his vilification in the media justified the beating. But, Horton saw himself as a purveyor of
American democracy. Through Highlander, he provided civic education, encouraged African
Americans to vote, and promoted integration, all of which created greater racial equality and
spread democracy. Lynch supported Horton’s ideas and risked harm to ensure that Highlander
continued its efforts. In the larger picture, the two sides disagreed about what it meant to be an
American. For Cline, Americanism meant fighting communism and maintaining the status quo.
Horton felt it was his duty to expand democracy to all Americans. This conflict served as the
foundation of the relationship between Knoxville and Highlander.
1
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Unlike most Knoxville activists, during Highlander’s time in the city from 1961 to 1971,
it drew the ire of elected officials and local whites. Highlander did so because it refused to
engage with local officials and powerful businessmen. Instead, it focused its efforts on civil
rights activism across the country. Given its association with communism Highlander seemed an
unwelcome outsider capable of disrupting the Knoxville’s previously low-key civil rights
movement. To prevent upheaval, white Knoxvillians of all political persuasions conducted a
decade-long harassment campaign. After a controversial initiative by the state legislature and an
important court case, they eventually succeeded in driving Highlander out of Knoxville. Local
activists generally refrained from aligning themselves with Highlander.
Various members of the white community harassed the school through legal and extra
legal means and received unwitting support from extremist groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan.
This harassment taught local activists of all types several lessons. Elected officials resisted
dealing with outside civil rights organizations. Cooperation with elected officials remained the
best way to create social change. Interracial activists generally moved towards less radical forms
of activism, such as War on Poverty programs and electoral politics. Highlander stood outside
the city’s civil rights community- the civil rights movement was conducted by local officials,
local businessmen, and local activists.
*******
The Highlander Research and Education Center (HREC) began as the Highlander Folk
School in 1932. Its successful organizing of labor unions, concern for workers, and integrated
workshops set the stage for scrutiny during the Red Scare of the 1950s. Originally housed in
Monteagle, Tennessee, about 150 miles Southwest of Knoxville, Highlander’s original mission
sought to eliminate Appalachian poverty during the Great Depression. The school’s early
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efforts involved organizing farmers, unskilled laborers, and labor unions. It quickly became one
of the country’s premier activist training centers and perhaps the only integrated one. Much of
the success came from its unique philosophy, made famous by cofounder Myles Horton. Horton,
a radical trained in theology, advocated the participation of grassroots people. Therefore,
Highlander programs had three primary components: popular education, participatory research,
and cultural organizing.2 This agenda brought the Folk School national recognition and, after
World War II, unwanted notoriety.
After the end of World War II, the Cold War brought Highlander into the national
spotlight. The school’s activism made it a prime target for accusations of communism. As the
United States battled the U.S.S.R. for global supremacy, the fear of communism became a very
real concern for civil rights organizations. During this unpredictable time, any threat to the
status quo seemed harmful to American efforts in the ideological aspect of the Cold War.
Criticism of the American system of government helped the U.S.S.R., the reasoning went, and
therefore attempts at change must have been the work of communists. These conditions made
Highlander’s efforts at social change difficult. The controversy surrounding the school increased
when it shifted its focus to school desegregation.
In 1955, the Highlander staff started programs aimed at desegregating schools. Their
plan advocated neighborhood schools, the simultaneous desegregation of all grades, integrated
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staffs, and a standard curriculum.3 It then shifted, in concert with the national civil rights
movement, to sit-ins, desegregation of public spaces, and citizenship schools, which taught
participants to read and encouraged voter registration. Given the effects of the Cold War and
Jim Crow’s powerful hold over the South, Highlander also garnered harassment from politicians
and extremists. For example, in 1954, the Georgia Commission of Education launched a
propaganda campaign across the South that cast Highlander as a communist training ground.
This successful red bating campaign led to further scrutiny.
On February 4, 1959, the Tennessee State House of Representatives introduced (and later
passed) a bill to investigate subversive activity at Highlander. Given the Cold War climate, the
investigation cemented Highlander’s reputation as a communist training ground. During
February, the investigating committee, composed of two state senators and three representatives,
heard testimonies ranging from the school’s neighbors to Ed Friend of the Georgia Commission
of Education, as well as Myles Horton and other more sympathetic witnesses. The hearings
mainly aimed to establish the school’s integration and therefore violation of state segregation
laws. The committee then recommended the school’s charter be revoked in early March. Shortly
after, the Tennessee House and Senate passed a joint resolution authorizing further action against
Highlander.
The investigation led to further harassment. In late July, the Grundy County Sheriff,
Highway Patrolmen, and state Attorney General A.F. Sloan raided Highlander. The raid and
subsequent arrests became further proof of Highlander’s subversive activity. Law enforcement
officials arrested civil rights activist Septima Clark, Education Director and folk singer Guy
Carawan, Perry Sturgis, and Brent Barksdale. All later had their charges dismissed. The results
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of the raid led A.F. Sloan to file an additional motion requesting that the property be shut down
immediately because of illegal beer sales. This charge stemmed from an incident in 1957, at the
end of a program for labor union officials, when Highlander served beer and charged each
participant a small fee to cover costs. In addition, the staff undertook communal shopping trips,
during which money was collected upfront before a white person purchased toiletries, candy,
cigarettes, and other small items, including beer, for African American visitors who could not
shop in the county’s segregated stores.4 The “evidence” uncovered during the raid began the
process of forcing the school out of Monteagle.
The raid’s results provided the state government with the impetus to close down the
school. However, Highlander fought the proceedings, bringing elected officials’ bias to light.
By late 1959, the state of Tennessee began the process of removing the school’s charter, which
classified it as tax exempt “non-profit, general welfare” private school. Attorneys for the state
argued that Highlander violated segregation laws, sold beer, and that founder Myles Horton
profited from running the school. Upon appeal to State Circuit Court, Judge C.C. Chattin ruled
“the segregation laws of the state as applied to private schools are constitutional and valid” and
the selling of beer violated state laws. He upheld the revocation. Highlander’s attorney Cecil
Branstetter seemed unsurprised because many of the jury members reported “it was against their
religion for whites and Negroes to sit in the same classroom.”5 After the ruling, the Highlander
Board of Directors asked the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) for help overturning the
decision while Branstetter worked to obtain a new trial.6 The Circuit Court’s ruling furthered the
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perception of Highlander as a hotbed for subversive activity. It also forced Highlander to
relocate.
The Court’s ruling did not stop Highlander. Staff members continued their interracial
activism. Branstetter’s efforts failed to get a new trial. Horton vowed to appeal to the Supreme
Court if necessary to retain the school’s charter. In the meantime, the school began selling its
assets and looking for a new home. During the process, integrated programs continued. In late
June, HREC conducted a workshop for white Southerners focused on helping African Americans
register to vote. In early July, Reverend Ewell Reagin began a six week program to prepare
Black and white high school students for integrated high schools and colleges.7 By late July, the
Board of Directors announced the move to Knoxville. It also elected Lewis Sinclair, the first
African American to receive a graduate degree from the University of Tennessee and Tennessee
Valley Authority statistician, to the Board of Directors, in an attempt to build connections with
the local Black community.8 As preparations for the relocation to Knoxville continued,
Highlander’s appeal moved through the legal system.
The court ruled in favor of the state. The legal system’s support of segregation portrayed
Highlander as an outlier, which ignored contemporary standards and laws. By March,
Highlander’s appeal reached the State Supreme Court. Tennessee’s highest court concurred with
the lower court’s judgment, allowing the charter to be revoked. The opinion noted, “large stacks
of beer cans, whiskey jugs and bottles were found about the school; many exhibits appearing in
the record show revolting and inexcusable conduct carried on at the school.” It also agreed that
Horton benefited from his involvement with the school because he drew a salary and received
7
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seventy acres of land as payment for previous work.9 Mississippi Senator James Eastland
offered, “I wish we had a United States Supreme Court the same caliber as the Tennessee
Supreme Court.”10 Highlander’s attorney Cecil Branstetter then began the process of appealing
to the United States Supreme Court. The application read, in part, that Highlander’s case stood
“as a warning to any who challenge the segregationist traditions of Tennessee that they will be
subject to harassment by the full power of the state and will be treated as a class apart in the
application of state law.”11
Highlander staff members continued their nationwide activism. The Folk School set up
citizenship schools across the South, which taught students, often poor or illiterate African
Americans, to read and register to vote. Administration of the citizenship schools was then
handed over to a number of civil rights organizations, including SCLC, the Southeastern Georgia
Crusade for Voters, and the Original Fayette County Civic and Welfare League of West
Tennessee. The school trained over 20,000 students during 1961.12 Citizenship schools proved
to be a model of Highlander’s educational philosophy. Initially, Highlander trained the teachers,
who then passed the knowledge on empowering grassroots people to act for themselves. The
spread of citizenship schools made Highlander an important civil rights organization.
Highlander’s closure brought about greater public interest in the school’s ties to
communism. However, Federal Officials knew very little about Highlander’s political leanings.
In March 1961, an anonymous citizen wrote to the Director of the Federal Bureau of
9
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Investigation (FBI), J. Edgar Hoover to inquire about the school’s link to communism. Hoover
did not release the FBI’s information, but left a note in the appropriate file that Highlander had
“been the subject of numerous allegations that it is a communist school and the headquarters of
communism in Eastern Tennessee due primarily to its racial character.”13 Hoover’s
unwillingness to share information was explained in a later FBI memo, which noted that FBI’s
most recent investigation, from 1941 to 1943, could not find any evidence of communism. The
report was not released because the “derogatory information contained therein has been
repudiated by the individuals previously furnishing information.” Therefore it did not “appear
desirable to volunteer information concerning the Highlander Folk School and Horton to outside
agencies.”14 The FBI’s refusal to reveal its findings about Highlander only furthered its
reputation as a communist organization. With its reputation firmly cemented in the minds of
most Knoxvillians, Highlander moved into the city full time.15
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In Knoxville, Highlander conducted programs for local activists and those across the
South. As the Highlander staff waited for the Supreme Court’s decision, Myles Horton
remembered “We moved to Knoxville, where we knew it would be safer than out in the country
and settled into a big house in the Black community, and we had a lot of support and protection
from local labor unions.”16 By April 1961, Highlander resumed a full slate of programs. Staff
members rented a second building on East Main Avenue from the Shiloh Presbyterian Church. It
housed a number of citizenship schools, during which a staff member taught participants, usually
poor African Americans, how to register to vote. This process often led instructors to offer
guidance in other subjects, such as literacy or American history. Highlander also held weekly
discussions for student from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville College, and Maryville
College.17 These programs made up a small portion of HREC’s activism. Most of their programs
occurred in the South. For example, from August through November 1966, Highlander staff
members led a voter education workshop in Fitzgerald, Georgia, an agricultural stabilization and
conservation workshop in Edwards, Mississippi, and an Appalachian cultural revival workshop
in Knoxville.18 Because of HREC’s history it had become a nationally focused organization
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before moving to Knoxville. In August, the Folk school officially rechartered as the Highlander
Research and Education Center (HREC).19
For the majority of whites in Knoxville the arrival of Highlander signaled trouble. In the
Cold War climate of fear, rumors became facts and these facts painted Highlander as communist.
These circumstances made HREC a threat to the city’s safety, widely unpopular, and
fundamentally un-American.
Highlander’s arrival provided a challenge to those involved with civil rights. For elected
officials and powerful businessmen, the Center threatened to disrupt the city’s economic growth
and change the dynamics of the local civil rights movement. Both could be disastrous. Any race
related violence threatened to impede economic growth. Therefore, Highlander could not be
welcomed into the local civil rights movement. Highlander also put local activists in a
precarious position. It had the potential to connect the local and national civil rights movements.
It also had the potential to ruin their relationship with powerful whites. In the end, activists
proved to be unwilling to take the gamble, most stayed away. Instead, local activists put their
efforts into other forms of activism, including War on Poverty programs or electoral politics.
The owners of Highlander’s new location, Thomas and Venna Ludwig, drew scrutiny.
Thomas, an employee of the United Mine Workers Welfare Fund, took the Fifth Amendment to
avoid answering questions about his involvement with the Knoxville communist party during a
1957 U.S. Senate Internal Subcommittee hearing. Ludwig did not have any connection to
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Highlander other than the building rental.20 In early October, the Supreme Court refused to hear
Highlander’s appeal, ensuring the Monteagle location’s permanent closure.21
Local elected officials sought to prevent Highlander from operating. They used a legal
form of harassment. City Law Director T. Mack Blackburn, at the request of Mayor John
Duncan, created an emergency ordinance forcing any school opened after November 7 to submit
parking plans, numbers of students, teachers, staff, and guest, and a schedule of events to the
City Council, who would then decide if the school could open. The ordinance did not apply to
schools already operating. The ordinance did not specifically mention Highlander, but
Blackburn “conceded that it is directed at that school.”22 The Knoxville Journal reported the
ordnance “indicates strongly that the intent is to provide the Council with more than one ground
for refusing to approve the Highlander location on Riverside Drive.”23 On the following
Tuesday, November 7, the City Council passed the emergency ordinance. Council member Max
Friedman abstained from voting, but argued it “might be advisable” to bar Highlander from
Knoxville. Mrs. John Lee also presented a resolution banning Highlander supported by the
American Legion.24
Local elected officials would have liked Highlander to vanish immediately. However,
they would not break the law to force its exit. Obeying the law ensured dealings with Highlander
remained orderly, their primary goal. Instead, local officials waited for Highlander’s staff to
violate the law. They never did.
20
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The Council’s measure did not stop Highlander from carrying out programs. It refused to
be intimidated by or work with Knoxville institutions, including the City Council or Knoxville
Journal. Throughout the month, it hosted a number of informal discussions and held workshops
across the country. The staff also learned to navigate conditions in Knoxville. It banned a
Knoxville Journal reporter and photographer from attending a talk by Robert Blakely, Adult
Education Professor at the University of Iowa.25 The initial interactions between Highlander and
Knoxville’s institutions cemented its reputation as communist.
The move to Knoxville did not change life for Highlander’s staff. Given its mission and
history, the Center had been unpopular, garnered harassment, and investigated. Despite these
unjust acts, staff members carried on because of their unwavering belief in the ability to expand
American democracy. Day in and day out, they risked harm to do so.
By 1962, the Journal’s continued scrutiny led to unforeseen consequences. The
newspaper’s constant red bating drew white supremacists to Knoxville. The publicity
surrounding Highlander led to the formation of a White Citizens’ Council, a segregationist group
originated in Mississippi, which used economic harassment to prevent integration, in late
September. It organized because “Knoxville is especially important as the location of the
Highlander Folk School….this communist-related organization uses its Knoxville headquarters
to promote racial strife throughout the South.”26 The White Citizens’ Council’s arrival brought
another group who sought to run Highlander of town and served as a good example of how the
Highlander disrupted the city’s “good race relations.” Despite the consequences, the Journal
continued its attacks.
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The Knoxville Journal’s red bating continued through June 1963.27 It followed a simple
pattern, accusing anyone associated with Highlander or other leftist group of communism.
Some of its coverage came from The Toscin, an anti-communist weekly published in Berkeley,
California. The culmination of the attacks came in late May when the Journal published a series
of articles examining several aspects of Highlander, including its finances and Myles Horton.
For the last thirty years Horton had “associated with admitted Communists, known Communists,
pinkos, fellow travelers, and subversive organizations.” HREC linked Horton to “secret
subversive meetings, strike trouble, and racial violence.”28 Other articles detailed the school’s
association with well known communists, including cofounder James Dombrowski, or offered
derogatory testimony from Bruce Bennett, Arkansas Attorney General.29
In June 1963, a group of Highlander volunteers and staff members hiked up Rich
Mountain, one of the picturesque Smokey Mountains located about an hour outside of Knoxville.
The group conducted a Highlander-sponsored program teaching the importance of integration,
which was led by Robert Gustafson, a graduate student from the University of Vermont, and his
wife Mary, both white. The Gustafons led the camp to “provide living and working experience
for Negros and whites from the North and the South.” The attendees included an interracial
group of both genders who came from across the United States. During their stay, the Blount
County sheriff received a number of threatening calls demanding the camp’s end. One
anonymous caller threatened, “There will be nigger blood running in these mountains if
27
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something isn’t done.” These calls prompted the sheriff’s office to investigate.

The sheriff’s

department sought to get the program’s participants out of the area. They did so through
extralegal harassment. Upon reaching the camp site, they claimed to have found attendees were
not segregated by gender or race and had two bottles of liquor. Sheriff Roger Trotter witnessed,
“white and Negro males and females were in bed in the same tent, but not together…One Negro
man was sitting on the bed of a white woman…others were up laughing and talking.”30 Deputies
arrested the entire group, garnering charges ranging from disorderly conduct to contributing to
the delinquency of minors. Officers immediately questioned Robert Gustafson about his and
Highlander’s links to communism. He denied any affiliation but was arrested.31
The arrests led to the camp site’s end. It became the target of a suspected arson incident.
The next day Myles Horton arranged bond for the group.32 As group members awaited trial,
Blount County sheriffs received a call about a fire at the camp site. On arrival, they found the
camp site destroyed and gas cans strewn about. After a preliminary glance, Knoxville Fire
Marshall Gene Hartsook suspected arson: “There were two separate fires, and they definitely
were of an incendiary nature.”33 The incident reinforced the real threat of harm that Highlander
staff members faced.
A tense atmosphere engulfed the ensuing trial, because the racial and sexual undertones
inflamed local whites. The Knoxville News Sentinel reported “considerable tension and some
30
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hostility towards the defendants was apparent in the courtroom. More than 200, including a few
Negroes, jammed into the room, lining the walls solidly. Another 100, who could not get in
stood in the large hallways on the second floor.” It was later reported that the Grand Dragon of
the Tennessee Ku Klux Klan attended the trail and that those involved, including the judge,
received threats.34 Several sheriff deputies testified about the camp raid. Curiously, their
recollections seemed more inflammatory than earlier reports. Deputy Bob Kennedy said, “A girl
came out of one of the tents, putting her brassiere on” and that he saw a “colored boy and girl on
a cot together, and a white boy and colored girl on another cot.” He claimed, “most of the girls
had on pajamas. Some of the tops were not buttoned.” Maryville Policeman James Allen told
the court he entered a tent and saw two youths nude from the waist down and one without a
top.35
As Highlander’s attorney questioned the camp participants, hostility continued.
“Constant interruptions of the witnesses’ replies on cross examination of Mrs. Gustafson and
references to race by state’s attorney David Rosier after the defense started to present its case
yesterday bought a sharp rebuke from Judge Shields following an outburst by spectators in the
emotion laden atmosphere of the courtroom.” Rosier also sent a warning to future campers: “we
want them to know what will happen to them when they start this kind of thing in Blount
County…we don’t want them here!”36 The insinuation of interracial sex ensured that the
Highlander group would be judged on their violation of local customs rather than adherence to
the law. They stood little chance of receiving a fair trial.
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The trial ended quickly. It showed the Highlander staff about the willingness of local
officials to use harassment to deter their activities. Seven of the camp attendees were found
guilty and received five or ten dollar fines. The Gustafsons were held until a grand jury could
hear their charges for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Myles Horton paid all the fines
and posted $1,000 bond for the Gustafsons. 37
Mayor John Duncan relied on the criminal justice system to deal with Highlander. In the
midst of the camp site dispute, Walter Gourdin, of Fountain City Central Baptist Church, wrote
to Duncan asking to close the HREC. While lacking the legal authority to do so, Duncan replied
“we have certainly been greatly concerned about the operation of this place since it has been in
Knoxville.” The Mayor also suggested that Attorney General Clarence Blackburn should
investigate because it might spur “individuals who did have information concerning violations of
the law would come forth and divulge this information.” He also implied that the Federal
Bureau of Investigations kept a close watch on Highlander.38 Duncan’s call for an investigation
met with resistance from other city officials.
Not all law enforcement officials seemed eager to close Highlander. They waited for
proof of a crime before taking interest in Highlander. In response to Duncan’s call for an
investigation, Attorney General Clarence Blackburn told the Knoxville Journal that he did not
wish to conduct a witch hunt. However, he would prosecute the school for legitimate violations
of city laws, not hearsay and false information. Talk of an investigation led to a discussion
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among Horton, Police Chief French Harris, and Sheriff Carl Ford. Afterward, Chief Harris
offered, “We will be glad to investigate any legitimate complaints at the school, but I can find
nothing that would indicate any law being violated there. Just because an organization or person
is doing something that doesn’t agree with the feelings of certain other persons, doesn’t mean
that an organization or person is violating a law.” Besides, the FBI and IRS monitored events at
Highlander.39 Blackburn’s response was supported by a memo from FBI Director Hoover to the
Knoxville branch instructing agents to “discreetly obtain the names of all officers, teachers and
students who are currently connected…no active investigation may be conducted. You should
insure that obtaining these names does not become a matter of public information in your
territory.”40 To offer proof of their good intentions, shortly after the camp site trial, Highlander
staff members began their own publicity campaign.
By August 1963, in response to the bad publicity and red baiting, Highlander officials
undertook an educational campaign explaining the school’s purpose and programs. It distanced
itself from communists. They bought space in newspapers to reprint supportive articles, wrote
articles presenting the facts, and encouraged local people to express their support in print.41
Several days later, during a speech at First United Presbyterian Church in nearby Oak Ridge,
Horton declared the school was “unpopular but not subversive.” He then distanced the school
from James Dombrowski and Don West, both unapologetic communists, who had not
participated in Highlander activities since the 1930s. In addition, no labor union programs had
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taken place since the late 1950s. Instead, Highlander promoted brotherhood and democracy.42
Horton took his education campaign to other parts of the South.
An interview with the Charleston News and Courier also provided Horton an opportunity
to educate the public. He blamed the charges of communism on the school’s integration. “One
chief of police said after talking with me ‘the trouble with Horton is he’s been an integrationist
for 30 years.’ I think you know anybody who’s an integrationist is immediately suspect.” 43 In a
Knoxville Flashlight Herald article, Amiee Horton, daughter of Myles Horton, highlighted the
school’s voter education programs and their efforts to increase participation in American
democracy. To combat the Knoxville Journal’s smear campaign, she explained that most local
programs included discussion groups and lectures by prominent people, including University of
Chicago historian Walter Johnson’s talk on “The President and the People.” Her article aligned
Highlander with well established American institutions, such as Christianity and electoral
politics.44
The education campaign did not have immediate effects. In fact, extremist groups went
on the attack. In August 1966, the Ku Klux Klan marched on Highlander. Rather than attempt
to stop it, staff members supported their right to march. As the Klan arrived, Myles Horton
remembered they invited
all the Black neighbors and all white friends of Highlander in Knoxville to come in a
picnic on the Highlander lawn….We had seven or eight hundred people there, and we
had a hundred kids playing right down by the road, and off-duty Black policemen
volunteered to come out to see that none of the Klan people got on our land….The chief
of police had told them to take a vacation that day because he didn’t want them near the
parade. They didn’t wear their uniform, but they had their guns strapped around
them….The Klan was humiliated, because we turned the purpose of their march around
42
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and made fun of it instead of letting them intimidates us. They looked very embarrassed
as they went by, and although they were supposed to march back again, they took another
route to avoid having to deal with that crowd jeering and making fun of them.45
The demonstration was the most visible manifestation of the Klan’s harassment. Since
Highlander’s move to Knoxville, it routinely experienced sinister phone calls, vandalism, breakins, and threats.46 The harassment culminated in early October when two homemade fire bombs
burned part of the building. As a result, HREC had its property and automobile insurance
cancelled, creating a financial crisis, which would not be resolved for over a year.47 As HREC
recovered from the bombing, the Tennessee legislature once again turned its focus to Highlander.
State politicians led the attack against Highlander for several decades. In their view,
HREC provided an immediate threat to the citizens of the state and country. To rid themselves
of this threat, they stretched the law. The process of fighting investigations cost the Center
resources and time, both of which were scarce. Even though the looming investigation never
occurred, the discussion tarnished Highlander and reinforced its association with communism.
The damage was done. Undertaking the process allowed these politicians to cast themselves as
anti-communist, a feather in their cap for upcoming elections.
In 1967, members of the state legislature resumed their harassment, rehashing charges of
subversive activity. In December, State Representative Odell Lane, a Republican from
Knoxville, put forth two resolutions in the State Legislature to investigate Highlander.48 One
called for an investigative committee made up of two state senators and three representatives.
The resolution read in part, “it has been reported that the Highlander Research Center of Knox
45
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County…may be involved in activities subversive to the govern of our State and that it is in
interest of the State and its people that a committee of this General Assembly be constituted for
the purposes of investigating such reports.”49 The other mandated that a number of law
enforcement agencies, including the state attorney general, investigate Highlander to “cut this
cancerous growth from our state and cast it out to die in the richness of Americanism and
loyalty.” Lane also claimed that HREC served as a “front for wild parties, a headquarters for
plots and dark schemes” as well as communist activity.50 The resolution’s vague claims left
Highlander vulnerable to a witch hunt. The claims also drew skepticism from other legislators.
The legislature questioned Lane’s resolution. They worried about the validity of his
claims. During the ensuing debate, Representative Thomas Wiseman asked if Lane knew of any
laws Highlander violated. Lane replied, “only what I’ve heard…Officer Frank Sherwood in
Knoxville told me about a sex orgy in a funeral home. Highlander was having one of their
workshops, members were drunk, girls and boys failing off the tables and talking in unknown
tongues.” Representative Harold Bradley asked about the possibility that nothing illegal
occurred at HREC. Lane responded that he only knew what he had been told and “our mayor
[Leonard Rogers] is upholding the school.” Bradley retorted, “you are putting us (the
Legislature) in a most unusual position if the mayor is upholding the school.” The House
eventually tabled the resolutions.51
Highlander’s officials knew that the vague terms of the resolution could lead to a wide
ranging investigation. HREC chairman Dr. Charles Gomillion responded to Lane’s
investigation, “This sort of investigation is primarily for the purpose of making sensational
49
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charges which seldom, if ever, are proven. These charges pave the way for continued
harassment and intimidation.” It was the last thing the school needed in the wake of recent
harassment.52
Highlander took action to stop the resolution. It argued that the Center had already been
through several investigations, which revealed no wrongdoing. On March 1st, State
Representative Odell Lane’s resolution to investigate Highlander was sent to the Judiciary
Committee. It moved along the legislative process despite the efforts of Scott Bates, a professor
at the University of the South and Highlander Board Member, who sent letters to representatives.
He argued that HREC had been investigated twice by the FBI, was not on the Attorney General’s
list of subversive organizations, and had been granted tax exempt status by the IRS. In addition,
the 1959 investigation failed to uncover any subversive activity.53 Bates’s argument failed to
halt the process. However, several legislators adopted his points.
In early April, the impending vote on the legislation drew continued criticism. The vague
wording of the resolution created disagreement among elected officials. Democratic
Representative Tom Wiseman argued “this is a legislative witch hunt. If they’ve violated any
laws, we’ve got the grand jury process.” Democratic Representative Norvell responded that the
legislation did not make any charges. It only asked for an investigation. Wiseman retorted, “if
you can do it to Highlander Folk School today, you can do it tomorrow to the Presbyterian
Church or any other group.”54 The resolution passed the House vote on April 11 with support
from all of the Knoxville legislators except Robert Booker. Booker told his colleagues “it is not
the function of this Legislature to do the dirty work of local governments….Now Knox County is
52
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back again tossing the controversy [over Highlander] into the lap of the Legislature to satisfy the
petty prejudices and political chicanery of local demagogues.”55 He claimed that Lane pushed
for the investigation because of HREC’s history of labor organizing and its connection to a group
of activists protesting Knoxville City Councilman Cas Walker’s grocery stores, in which Lane
was involved. Booker then proposed a motion to delay the vote. It failed and the resolution
passed in the House 57 to 17.56 It cleared the State Senate in late May.57 However, the vague
claims and potential to generate a witch hunt eventually led to the resolution’s death.
The possibility of a witch hunt garnered a number of reactions. Myles Horton told the
UT Daily Beacon that the pending House investigation was based on bad intentions and lies.
The people who testify were immune from libel laws and therefore free to make unfounded
charges. “The only reason the legislature wants to have another hearing is that ten or twenty
years from now, they can come back and take testimony in publicized records against us as a
fact.” It was also motivated by “the old fashioned ideas that everyone you don’t like is a
communist.”58 On June 20th, US District Court Judge William Miller agreed with Horton’s
claims. Highlander, through the ACLU, successfully obtained an injunction against the
investigation. HREC’s lawyer Cecil Bransetter argued that the investigation “was not enacted in
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good faith and is without basis in fact to justify the assumption that plaintiffs’ activities were
subversive.”59 The successful injunction led to turmoil in the Senate.
State Senators disagreed over how to proceed. They had different ideas about the legality
of the resolution. Senator Clayton Elam, a Democrat from Memphis, claimed that the State
Attorney General George McCanless refused to fight the injunction. Elam reported, “I
personally asked for the attorney general to defend the resolution and we got no cooperation. He
[McCanless] said they wouldn’t defend the lawsuit because it did not have a chance.” The
incredulous Elam offered, “I am a citizen of the state, and the state has an attorney. I expect a
state attorney to be there in court June 30 [the next court date].” He also reminded the press that
the investigation sought to bring facts about Highlander to light rather than harass the school. 60
Republican Senator W.E. Michael also encouraged McCanless to act: “the overriding question
here is whether the sovereign state of Tennessee, through one of its three coordinate branches of
government can exercise the same function in Tennessee, under its constitution and the
Constitution of the United Sates, that the national congress exercises.”61 During the June 30th
hearing, the court considered a brief filed by Martin Luther King, Jr. He proclaimed Highlander
was not subversive and that legislative investigations “result inevitably in inhibiting the free
exercise of rights under the Constitution.” Judge Miller postponed the investigation until another
hearing in August.62 The lack of consensus over the resolution’s legality foreshowed Judge
Miller’s concerns.
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By January 1968, Judge Miller ended any threat of investigation. The vague wording and
threat of a witch hunt overruled any threat that Highlander presented. Miller ruled that “states
have a legitimate concern in this area..[but] such investigations are fraught with constitutional
dangers.” Miller based his ruling on the vagueness of the term subversive, which lacked an exact
definition, and failed to show the need for the investigation. The ruling broke new legal ground,
as well, according to the New York Times, as “legal authorities believe it was the first time a
federal court had enjoined a state legislative investigation.”63 The following month, State
Representative Lane and State Senator Fred Barry began planning another investigation, this
time by looking into welfare corporations chartered by the state of Tennessee. 64 Miller’s ruling
ended one source of harassment. However, by 1968, the city finally found a way to get rid of
HREC.
During Highlander’s time in Knoxville, city officials and local businessmen were focused
on redoing the downtown area and bringing about the growth of business and industry. These
new industries combined with the expansion of Oak Ridge and the University of Tennessee to
create additional jobs at the institutions, as well as related fields, such as construction. These
events began the recovery from the Great Depression.65
To make room for these new businesses, the city undertook several urban renewal
projects simultaneously. The Mountain View area urban renewal proved to be the most germane
to Highlander. The project began in 1964 and wiped out most of the Black community. It
covered an area of over 500 acres. Magnolia Avenue, Bethel Street, and Dandridge Avenue
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made up the project’s northern boundary. On the east side Kyle Street, Surrey Street, and
Morningside Drive made up the border. In the South, Riverside Drive marked the border.66 It
sought to eliminate the housing which the Knoxville Housing Authority described as “obsolete
frame buildings, including ‘shotgun’ [shacks] and similar type structures. Upkeep and
maintenance is lacking due to the futility of trying to upgrade most of the structures.” African
Americans made up a great number of those displaced.67 This urban renewal project also proved
to be Highlander’s downfall.
Urban renewal would bring about the end of Highlander in Knoxville. The prospect of
another investigation seemed more daunting when combined the revelation that the Mountain
View urban renewal project would force Highlander to move out of the city within the next three
years. The staff then began an extensive fundraising campaign.68 Given the difficulties HREC
faced in Knoxville, relocation was probably welcome.
In 1970, with less than a year left in Knoxville, Highlander stepped up its capital
fundraising campaign, which aimed to raise $250,000. The money funded the Center’s move to
and construction of its location in New Market, Tennessee. While urban renewal forced the
move, it benefited the Center because the facilities in Knoxville proved inadequate. The New
Market site housed a number of buildings, including a library and large dormitory, which created
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a better learning environment. 69 By mid July, construction on the New Market property was in
full swing. The first staff house was completed by August 15 with more housing to be built
shortly after.70
In late October, staff member Mike Clark began planning for the move set for the middle
of November. He suggested a Thanksgiving gathering for staff and local supporters to get them
comfortable with the new facilities. However, he worried “there will be some resistance or
uneasiness from some mountain people in that situation and the sooner we can have folks who
know that and deal with it by getting people involved fast the sooner that place will be used to its
full potential.”71 The staff also worried about securing the necessary loans to finance the
property. It was reported that Hamilton National Bank, in Knoxville, denied Highlander a loan
because “we were too controversial.” The staff also received similar news from several other
supporters in the banking industry. However, Wilson York, of Danville, Virginia, pledged to
find a loan by speaking to Black bankers in Tennessee.72
Knoxville Journal had the final word on Highlander’s move. It reported “the interracial
institution which already has left its controversial mark on at least three Tennessee Counties soon
will move its headquarters from Knoxville to rural Jefferson County.” Fittingly, the second half
of the article was dedicated to rehashing past controversies and accusations of communism.73
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Highlander’s time in Knoxville taught local activists elected officials had the ability to
stop activism, but it proved to be difficult because they lacked coordination, and these actions
could open the door to extralegal violence. It also showed student activists the problem’s
resulting from elected officials’ harassment. In response, student activists used different tactics,
which limited activism to creating change on campus.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE “SAFEGUARDED UNCLE TOM SANCTUARY:” KNOXVILLE COLLEGE,
UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, AND CAMPUS ACTIVISM, 1964-1970

During the late 1960s the Afro, or natural, became the hairdo of choice for rebellious
Black college students. The Afro had a number of meanings. As it became popular at Knoxville
College (KC), Starita Smith explained that the natural was “not just a hair style nor is it a more
symbolic gesture of ‘Black Pride.’ For many, with thoughts of a long tradition of shame and
negative self-concepts it is a total rejection of a whole set of attitudes and values that were
imposed on us by WASP Americans.” Johnny Nichols said, “To me, my natural is a freedom
cap. It identifies me with the Black race. Besides it looks good.” Deborah Scudder noted, “I
wear my natural because of the pride I have as a Black person. Furthermore, there is no other
way I can wear it without imitating some other stock or race. It would appear that I am ashamed
of myself.” However, not all students agreed.
Edith Miller did not sport a natural, “because I don’t like them, and I like wearing my
hair the way it is because I feel it is very becoming to me. It enhances my appearance. I believe
in the old saying, ‘a woman’s hair is her crowning glory,’ and I sho’ ain’t wearing it nappy.’”
Sandra Ruff, a sophomore from Chattanooga, offered, “It is a matter of taste which depends upon
the feelings of the individual….I don’t wear one because with my facial features, I don’t think I
would look well.”1
Knoxville College students’ opinions about the Afro reflect some elements of the larger
debate over student activism. For some students, the hairdo challenged Knoxville College’s
philosophy of respectability by expressing Black pride rather than adhering to white middle class
1
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standards. Other students privileged their physical appearance over Black pride. Fundamentally,
Knoxville’s college students were not a monolithic group. They had different expectations for
their college experience. In addition, those students who desired change had divergent goals.
These differences occurred based on local conditions, especially the different circumstances that
Black students faced at the University of Tennessee and Knoxville College.
During this period, activism at Knoxville’s colleges created a space for students’ ideas to
be heard, but students did not speak with one voice. While most students at KC and UT rejected
politics altogether, many students at the all-Black KC campus briefly embraced Black Power
rhetoric to argue for greater control over their college experience, and ideally, the broader racist
society. They sought better instructors, more classes about Black history and culture, greater
inclusion, and a pass/fail system. At UT, however, where Black students were a minority,
African American protesters instead allied with a mixed-race student left, while also pressing for
similar curricular and staffing changes to reflect Black contributions to American society.
Student activists used a variety of aggressive tactics. They forced their administrations to
acknowledge students’ opinions because, for the first time in either schools’ history, they were
expressed loudly and openly. For a brief moment, the failure to acknowledge students’ voice
could have led to violence. School administrators, however, did not accede to all of the
protesters’ demands. They held firm because activists’ demands lacked support from the entire
student body, local activists, elected officials, powerful businessmen, or moderate white
community members, who ignored most student activism because it did not affect the larger
community. College administrators successfully used indifference to manage activism.
At KC, students used a variety of tactics, from direct action to working with the school’s
administration. At UT, Black and liberal white student activists sought greater inclusion into
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campus life and protested the Vietnam War. Both campuses had conservative student bodies;
however, they were conservative in different ways. At Knoxville College, most students
privileged their social lives over activism. At UT, the school’s military tradition combined with
the political conservatism of most students to resist change. These factors, combined with the
lack of support from the other groups involved in the city civil rights movement limited campus
activism.
**************
This period from 1964 to 1970 witnessed an unprecedented level of activism on college
campuses nationwide. Besides the continuing civil rights movement, Black college students
undertook their own efforts to revolutionize higher education. They successfully obtained a
number of changes, including more inclusion on campus and the birth of African American
Studies departments.2 African Americans of all ages and classes participated in the Black Power
Movement in its variety of incarnations.3 White students also became involved in activism
through the rise of New Left organizations, such as Students for a Democratic Society. These
New Left organizations took on a number of pressing issues, including the Vietnam War,
poverty, and educational reform.4 College students in Knoxville took part in these movements,
with limited results.
Since its founding in 1875, Knoxville College had been a pillar of the Black community.
Started by the Presbyterian Church during Reconstruction, the school initially provided
2
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vocational training in subjects such as industrial arts and agriculture through the 1930s, when it
became a higher education institution. Until the 1960s, the school was governed by a philosophy
based on respectability, or preparing students to meet white middle class standards. This
philosophy permeated through all areas of student life, from dress to the academic curriculum.
The campus was, fundamentally, conservative. It produced or employed most of the city’s
middle class African American population.
Students’ attitudes began to change in the early 1960s. Their leadership during direct
action showed that students could successfully challenge the status quo and provided the
confidence to continue activism. They used this momentum to challenge the standards of
respectability on campus, which they saw as restricting their freedom. Their new expectations
ushered in an era of campus activism. By 1964, students began to understand and probe the
limits of the school’s control.
In March 1964, students still felt limited by the school’s rules and atmosphere. They
hesitated to criticize the school, but realized the need for change. In the March edition of the
Aurora, the school’s newspaper, James Craig stated that students felt unable to criticize the
school’s policies or discuss them with administrators. “Everyone is afraid he’ll be branded as a
‘troublemaker’; everyone will be keeping an eye on you waiting to see if you cause any trouble,”
said Dorothea Stewart. When asked why most students failed to speak out against the
administration, Bettye Moore replied, “what fool would?”5 The students needed to speak out
because “of the vast changes accomplished in our present society, it will be quite necessary to
make many changes in the basic attitudes of students and administrative personnel.”
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Student activists divided over how to proceed. Ardia Ward reminded her peers that
“things are not always as bad as we think, if only we will take time to establish understanding.”
She called for better communication between the administration and students because “there
should not be an occasion in modern civilization where two groups entertaining adverse opinions
cannot, intelligently, settle their differences.” After all, the administration had recently taken
suggestions from a delegation of freshmen by relaxing the restrictions in several female dorms
and improving conditions in Elnathan Hall.6 Meanwhile, Gail Marsh urged her peers “to be less
gullible, harder to persuade, and more outspoken. I challenge you, at least, to make an attempt;
you have nothing to lose. Members of administration and faculty, I challenge you to accept the
fact that we the students are no longer willing to sit back and let everything go by. We want to
be heard.”7 Despite these divisions, student activists went ahead with their attack on the school’s
paternalism.
Initially, student activists spoke out against housemothers, who regulated their behavior
inside the dorms. Being constantly monitored impeded the freedom they now expected. Brenda
Harrison remarked that her housemother “treats us as girls. The connotation of girls signifies
someone young and unable to make decisions for herself.” When asked about the housemother
in McCullouch Hall, Abram Henderson asserted, “For the title housemother, she is a poor
representative. At times she is quite arrogant. She has a tendency to make one feel
uncomfortable.” Housemothers severed as constant reminder of how respectability permeated
through students’ lives.
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However, not all students disliked housemothers. Some students thought that they helped
maintain order. Judy Anderson said, “she is a perfect mother image. She is extremely concerned
with the problems and happenings of her daughters.” Grandville Gadson said that housemothers
served as “a symbol of authority….and a stimulus for some students as far as good conduct is
concerned.”8
Student activists’ challenge of respectability became an important moment in the school’s
history. After over a half a century of paternalism, participation in direct action had given
students the courage and intellectual framework to fight for better treatment. Their challenge
had both short and long term ramifications. In the short run, it led to turbulence on campus. In
the long term, it provided students a voice in campus affairs, providing a previously unseen level
of autonomy.
Joe McMillan introduced the Afro, or natural, haircut to campus in 1965. It symbolically
challenged the school administration’s expectations. More than a fresh hairstyle, it “has done
more to change the overall conception of the Negro in regards of self respect than any other
movement. The Negro that wears an ‘Afro’ tells the world that he is a Negro and proud of it.
Consequently, he gets more respect than is demanded from other races of people. Perhaps you
don’t agree but the record speaks for itself. Seventy five percent of the male Negro population
between the ages of fifteen and fifty are ‘Afro’ wearers.”9 The haircut opposed the doctrine of
respectability by privileging race pride over middle class white standards. 10 The Afro and
challenge of respectability foreshadowed Black Power’s arrival on campus.
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Knoxville College officials worried about Afro-wearing students and their desire to
change the school’s culture. They sought to channel students into a different form of activism.
In 1967, Dean Robert Harvey brought NAACP national treasurer Alfred Lewis to campus to
discuss restarting the school’s dormant chapter. Lewis told the audience that the NAACP aimed
to “get the Civil Rights Bill passed; to work with the city councils and boards of education in
making progress in integration; to eliminate de facto segregation in schools; and to unite Negroes
into the existing political parties-not to make new ones.”11 The NAACP’s goals met the standard
of respectability by using the court system and electoral politics, rather than radical activism, to
create social change.
The Knoxville College student body was divided. On one hand, most students remained
uninterested in activism. On the other hand, some students desired reform, challenging the idea
of respectability without incurring severe backlash. Then in 1967, Black Power emerged on
campus, spurred by a visit from Stokley Carmichael.
********
Nationally, Stokely Carmichael became a guide for militant college students. The
Trinadad-born Carmichael moved to New York City in 1952. While in high school, he
encountered Marxism and civil rights activism. He enrolled at Howard University in 1960 and
became a prominent member of Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Between
1960 and 1966, Carmichael participated in many major civil rights events, from the Freedom
Rides to the Meredith March, where he introduced the nation to Black Power. In 1966, he
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became chairman of SNCC and the nation’s most visible Black Power advocate after the death of
Malcolm X in 1965. Carmichael received worldwide media attention.12
Black Power emerged from African Americans’ long struggle for freedom and equality.
It stemmed from the civil rights movement’s failures, which showed young African Americans
that nonviolent protest or desegregation could not create equality or eliminate poverty. Instead,
they needed a more aggressive approach. Black Power encouraged Black people to take control
of their lives; however, it did not offer a singular means to do so. Advocates used a number of
strategies ranging from electoral politics to preparation for revolution. Black Power also
encouraged racial pride, which worked to erase the psychological damage done by Jim Crow.
Their newfound pride was expressed in a number of ways. It came through cultural symbols,
including the Black fist, an increased interest in African and African American history, and, for
some, a pan-African consciousness. However, Black Power took different forms based on local
circumstances and activists’ decisions. University of Tennessee student leader Jimmie Baxter
wrote, “Black people wish to have some degree of control over their lives; and to achieve this
goal, some degree of power that is independent of the white power structure must be acquired.
The persuasive violence which has occurred throughout the Black communities in this country
has not been the result of Black Power, but instead, has been the reflection of a lack of power.”13
At the beginning of April 1967, Stokley Carmichael spoke at Knoxville College. His
visit must have provoked fear among city officials, because he had recently been blamed for
inciting riots in Atlanta and Nashville. Carmichael’s talk addressed a number of topics,
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including whites’ violence, African American history, and the sexual double standard that
plagued the country. Carmichael, in his hybrid Trinidadian-New York accent, challenged and
lampooned KC students. They did not actively work to provide African Americans with the pride
necessary to fight police brutality and oppression. “You don’t pay any attention to it because you
are here on your safeguarded Uncle Tom sanctuary called Knoxville College,” he charged. “The
reason you don’t get involved is because you know the honkey cops and your administration got
a deal going where they aren’t going to come on campus and bother you. And you carry out the
deal because when you go downtown you wear your fraternity sweater or Knoxville College pin,
you want them to know that you aren’t just another nigger, you a college nigger.” He then
chastised the students for being isolated from the Black community. “Black people in this
country must develop a sense to fight back. We have never fought back against white people.
They can bomb our churches anytime they want, they can come into our neighborhood and rape
our women, they can beat us up, take us to jail, we don’t say a word about it. It’s time that we let
them know that the days of free head whippin’ is over. We have tried their conscience for seven
years and they are conscienceless people.”14
Throughout the talk Carmichael cajoled, insulted, and criticized the students and their
inaction. Yet from the beginning, the students roared with delight. With each point, the applause
grew louder. Rather than display hurt feelings, audience members cheered the hour-long lesson
in Black consciousness. His speech served as a primer on Black Power, which influenced how
Knoxville College students viewed their relationship with the school and the Black community.
It pushed them to take control of their lives. For Knoxville College students, this meant using
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their education to benefit the Black community or fighting for a more Afrocenteric curriculum,
with a focus on Black literature and history, rather than the Eurocentric study of dead
“honkeys.”15
Going forward, a group of KC students worked to implement many of Carmichael’s
ideas. They wished to impart their peers with a sense of Black consciousness and pride, spurring
them to become more revolutionary. However, they remained disorganized, lacked support from
most of the student body, and had few allies in the conservative administration. They used Black
Power rhetoric, but they failed to create a “Black” college—where education led to liberation.
Elected officials and powerful whites’ ignored Charmichael’s presence. During the three
months around his visit, from March to May 1967, his talk received almost no media coverage.
The only reference to his speech came in a letter to editor from Thomas Forehand, Jr., a UT
student. He observed, “After he left, local residents were asking each other, ‘Did you know
Stokley Carmichael was here the other day?’” He then contrasted the newspaper coverage
Carmichael received in Knoxville and Nashville. The extensive coverage in Nashville led to a
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riot. In Knoxville, the silence prevented unrest.16 The Knoxville Journal did cover Carmichael’s
visits to other cities, including Birmingham and Nashville.17 This selective coverage
purposefully ignored Black Power in Knoxville.
To the KC administration, student activism had the potential to be disastrous. The school
was looked upon favorably by elected officials and businessmen because of its successful record
preparing students for the middle class. This relationship had tangible benefits, including a lack
of harassment and support from powerful whites. As an example, President Robert Owens (who
took over for Dr. James Colston in early 1967) announced an ambitious fundraising plan, the
Knoxville Journal remarked, “the community and area can note with satisfaction the energy and
vision with satisfaction the energy and vision with which Dr. Robert L. Owens has entered upon
his responsibilities as the new president of Knoxville College….His laudable way of
approaching the duties of his position bespeak a bright future of Knoxville College.”18
After Carmichael’s visit, President Owens faced an agitated student body that openly
challenged the school’s administration. A small group of students demanded more control over
their college experience. For example, Franklin Tate wanted to reform the registration process
and business office. In the school newspaper, he gave the business office several suggestions for
improvement, including firing the business manager, maintaining posted business hours, treating
students courteously, and hiring better employees. He concluded, “Some students have stated,
and this is not meant to be a threat, ‘if some changes aren’t made soon, we are going to make

16

Thomas Forehand, Jr., “Publicity Sparks Rioting,” Knoxville Journal, April 19, 1967.

17

For a sample of the Journal’s coverage see: “Resolution to Denounce Carmichael,” Knoxville Journal,
April 7, 1967, “Civil Rights Impeders,” Knoxville Journal, April 4, 1967, “Carmichael Defies ‘Laws of US’,”
Knoxville Journal, April 5, 1967.
18

“Bright Star on KC’s Horizon,” Knoxville Journal, March 20, 1967.

141

some ourselves.’ So as you can see, the situation is really getting critical.”19 Franklin stiffened
his demands with the threat of radicalism or violence, invoking Black Power.
On March 8, 1968, white cab driver A.J. Boruff was murdered on campus. The details
remain a mystery. While a basic timeline of events is known, the motive remains unclear. The
lack of conclusions left the incident open to a number of interpretations. Most groups, Black and
white, urged calm and decried the murder. Others blamed the night’s events on the oppressive
society in which they lived.
Around 1:45 am, two Black policemen patrolling campus encountered eight youths. One
held a paper bag. When the officers moved to stop the group, the youths ran, leaving behind the
bag, which contained Molotov cocktails. The officers recognized one of the group members as a
Knoxville College student. Twenty minutes later, campus security stopped a car attempting to
enter campus. The occupants, an unnamed Chicago man and KC student Andrew Washington,
were both arrested for public drunkenness. Campus security then called a tow truck to remove
the unoccupied car.
When the tow truck arrived, a group of eight to ten students gathered to stop the action
because the car rested on private property.20 After the car was removed, the small group
retreated into the dorms and returned with fifty to seventy five students. Using a loudspeaker,
leaders “claimed police brutality, and [accused] the Police Department of sending too many
policemen to the campus on one compliant.” Around 3:00 am President Owens received a call
informing him about the arrest of four students and disputes between police and students. He
then “went to the Police Department, was treated cordially and was permitted to talk to the
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students.”21 He asked police not to intervene, fearing violence. Instead, campus security would
quiet the students.22
At 4:00 am authorities received calls about this group shouting Black Power slogans.23 A
neighbor claimed that two leaders extolled the crowd, urging violence: “what was done in
Detroit could be done here… There is no end to our power. We can have anything we
want…We can’t do nothing much about things tonight, because they’ve got us under
surveillance. But we’ll show them later.” He then turned the loudspeaker towards a nearby
female dorm and shouted, “Black sisters, wake up and turn on the lights and show us that you’re
with us. Black brothers unite.”24 A student witness told the News Sentinel that a group leader
announced the police had arrested four students on campus. He also claimed officers pushed and
kicked him during their unwanted visit to campus.25
Shortly after 5:00 am, A.J. Boruff of the Checkered Cab Company arrived on campus to
pick up a passenger. Why Boruff was called to campus and by whom remains unclear. Soon
after, he radioed the cab dispatcher for protection from the group, which threw rocks and shook
his cab.26 Fifteen to twenty minutes later, Boruff attempted to run and was shot in the chest. The
assailant and motive are unknown to this day. The police received a call about a burning taxi on
campus at about 5:45 am. When they arrived, the vehicle had been burned and stoned. Boruff
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lay face down nearby. The police department immediately assigned five detectives to the case. 27
President Owens told authorities he heard rumors that “a group of Knoxville College students
had attended a recent Black Power meeting in Atlanta, but he would not tie this in with the
incidents of the night.”28
As the night turned to morning, a large group of students gathered in the dining hall for
breakfast. As they ate, President Owens announced that they had just witnessed “one of the
blackest days in the history of Knoxville College. All of us must feel that we are murderers
because all of us are a part of Knoxville College.”29 He also asked the students if he should
resign. They encouraged him to stay. The following day, Owens told the press that police had
not entered campus until they received an invitation from campus security.30
Police later identified and arrested Gary Keel, a student from Indianapolis, as the person
who dropped the bag of Molotov cocktails, along with students Joe Scott and Pete Tigner.31
Officers interrogated over 100 students, some repeatedly, during sessions that started at 8:00 am
and ended after midnight.32
Some students blamed Black Power militants for the murder. The Aurora noted, “he was
killed by, it is speculated, those people who shout the loudest of oppression… who preach racism
to its extreme.” Regardless of African Americans’ second class citizenship, Boruff’s death could
not be justified. It came as African Americans had been making progress, “one step forward,
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and two backwards. This time we have no one to blame for those two steps to the rear. No one
but ourselves.”33 For the majority of KC students, Black Power-related violence harmed the
entire race.
Older African Americans also worried about the consequences of Black Power. An
editorial in the Atlanta Daily World suggested, “This and other violent and riotous acts
associated with Black Power advocates suggests that it is time for college officials, along with
the leaders in the student bodies, to take more seriously the Black Power Movement and take
necessary steps to curb those students suspected of advocating disorder and violence.”34 Black
Power on college campuses needed to be stopped before more violence occurred.
The Knoxville News Sentinel urged calm. It focused on the school’s history to assure
readers that campus would not become a hotbed for Black Power. Two days after Boruff’s
murder, an editorial urged Knoxvillians to remain calm. The rumors about outside agitators and
Black Power only inflamed the situation. “One bullhorn used to whip up the students is not a call
for continuing rebellion. And knowing the facts, we should keep things—tragic as they were—
in proportion. In short, we should ALL keep our cool.”35 Boruff’s murder was an aberration in
the history of Knoxville College. “The efforts of what appeared to be a handful of radicals to
incite the college student body to riot, was a matter for even greater concern because it was so
out of character with the tradition of this old and respected institution.” The militants’ failure to
incite a full riot demonstrated that most students remained peaceable and judicious. “Fairminded people in this community will not damn the college as a whole for the actions of a few,
but all have the right to expect Knoxville College’s majority to live up in the future to its fine
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tradition of the past.”36 The editorial cast the murder as a violent Black Power episode, which
lacked widespread support on campus. The lack of support and school’s history ensured it would
avoid future unrest.
Robert Booker, a KC alumnus and now a state representative, portrayed Boruff’s death as
a reflection of society. During a speech on March 25, he supported President Owens’s decision
not to send city police to campus on the night in question because, “rumor that night had it that
city policemen had badly beaten a KC student. If city officers had appeared on campus…I am
convinced there would have been more than one casualty.”37 He blamed the attack on the feeling
of injustice that Blacks received from City Hall and in the courts.38 This anger resulted from the
frustration of African Americans throughout the difficult struggle for racial equality.
Black Power advocates blamed a racist society for Boruff’s death. The racism they
experienced in Knoxville promoted violence. George Curry wrote that “events that happened at
KC recently were the results of student protests of city policemen…coming on campus and
beating and arresting students….This was not the question of Black Power, but rather ‘police
power.’”39 Dee Hunter asked: “Why blame me for the things society has taught me to do, and
the way society has taught me to think[?]”40 For these students, the murder resulted from the
hostility of living in racist circumstances.
While Black Power garnered a number of reactions, Boruff’s murder ended up scaring
liberal and moderate whites, established African Americans, and moderate Knoxville College

36

“Live Up To Fine KC Traditions,” Knoxville News Sentinel, March 11, 1968.

37

“Booker Cites Failure of ‘Power Structure’,” The Aurora, March 25, 1968, 4.

38

“Booker Cites Failure of ‘Power Structure’,” Knoxville Journal, March 26, 1968.

39

George Curry, “Black Power Was Not the Issue at KC,” The Aurora, April 23, 1968, 3.

40

Dee Hunter, “Who’s Guilty?,” The Aurora, April 23, 1968, 3.

146

students. It probably deterred many potential supporters of Black Power in Knoxville.
Negotiation and cooperation, rather than violence, remained the primary avenues to achieve
social change. After the murder, Black Power at Knoxville College was mostly just militant
rhetoric.
A small but vocal group of KC students continued to promote Black Power to
revolutionize campus. They wanted to be part of the worldwide liberation movement. KC
student Lonell Anderson analyzed the three groups of African Americans working against Black
liberation: those who waited for others to lead, “coffee house revolutionaries” who publicly
theorized and spoke about revolution but took no action, and anti-revolutionaries who predicted
the upcoming revolution’s failure. These groups would miss the most important opportunity to
create change in history.41 The Black Unity Party, a newly formed campus organization, rallied
against white instructors’ racism. White instructors’ incompetency and apathy failed to prepare
KC students for their senior exams or leadership in the Black community, and led to
“masturbational scholarasticism[sic].” The Party asked, “Are we going to cripple Black
children’s’ minds the same way that these sterile, white pseudo-instructors would cripple us? If
they answer is no, then they must go. There are Black instructors without jobs while this sorry
lot prevails on a Black college campus.”42
They also expressed concern over the Vietnam War. John Parham said, “In the world
today you have to serve the country if it calls you because it supposedly serves you; but I’m
Black and I don’t think it serves the brothers at all.” He also highlighted American racism,
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racial inequality, and the American government’s proclivity for continuous wars as reason he
could not support the conflict.43
During the final week of November 1970 student activists launched their last challenge to
the Administration. They sought to improve academic procedures. The Student Government
Association met with the Student Action Committee and eventually proposed a pass-fail grading
system instead of traditional letter grades. They argued, “The pass-fail system was an
experiment and an innovation, this system would allow the teachers to be instructors, not so
much a judge, the system would allow students to experiment in subject areas they would
normally fear receiving a poor grade.” The proposal was then passed on to President Brantley.
The pass-fail system would provide more flexibility for students. The administration failed to
see the idea’s value.
The SGA’s proposal garnered no response. Being ignored spurred the students to act. On
December 4th, students blocked all four entrances to the college, forcing faculty and staff to park
off campus. They also boycotted the dining hall. As a result, classes were cancelled. At 1:30
pm, a students-only meeting took place during which SGA president Rudy Copeland read
portions of the proposal. The faculty was then admitted. The students’ unity forced the
administration to respond.
The proposal failed. It lacked support from faculty. President Brantley agreed with the
proposed changes. He also stated “the faculty and administration were only asking the students
to follow some kind of procedure.” After a discussion about when to vote on the pass-fail
system, it was determined that the faculty would vote the next day. The following day students
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sat-in at the administration building. That afternoon the faculty vetoed the pass-fail system.44
The administration and faculty maintained control by voting on the proposal, while the students
had the illusion of having a voice in campus affairs. However, given the conservatism of
campus, it had little chance of passing. The failed proposal ended one of the most turbulent
periods in Knoxville College history.
Despite the failure to implement the pass/fail system, student activists at KC altered the
campus’s dynamic. No longer would students accept the status quo. Instead, they learned that
they had a number of strategies at their disposal to create change. But without a broader base of
support off campus, they also learned that advocating too much change too drastically was
ineffective.
****************
Since its founding in 1794, the University of Tennessee had remained a conservative
place. Its conservatism should be attributed to three major factors: its military tradition, its focus
on agriculture, and its student body, most of whom came from the surrounding area. These
factors combined to ensure that the University had no history of student activism before the
1960s. Those students who did dare to challenge the status quo were few and far between.
Fellow students viewed them as troublemakers or hippies.
At the University of Tennessee, African American students remained largely ignored by
most white students and the administration. Black students worked for greater inclusion, calling
for additional Black students or faculty. Given their small numbers, they had very little chance
of creating change through militancy. Instead, they used preexisting organizations, such as the
Student Government Association, to appeal to the student body as a whole. They also banded
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together to help each other, organizing social events and study sessions. Efforts at greater
inclusion occurred through color-neutral rhetoric meant to appeal to the largest possible number
of students.
Black students’ activism proved to be a major milestone. In the brief period since
integration, from 1959 to 1964, Black students had obtained a voice in campus affairs. This
voice, while small, offered them a role in controlling their campus experience, a means of
fighting racism, and the ability to work with liberal white student activists. When compared with
other large state universities, such as the University of Mississippi, UT had space for Black
students to call for change.
The turbulence of 1968 led Black students to found the Black Student Union (BSU). The
formation of a student organization allowed them an official role on campus. On the October 6th
episode of In Touch Insight, BSU members Marilyn Eldridge, Jimmy Baxter, James Rucker, and
Brenda Lauderback recounted the organization’s founding. It started during the spring of 1968
when the Black students organized themselves into a group capable of presenting their voice to
the administration through official channels. Despite the small African American population, the
group had between seventy five and 100 members. It sought to develop well-rounded Black
students who were involved on campus, aware of Black culture, and hip to current events
pertaining to Black people. The group engaged in a number of programs from tutoring to acting
as marshals during the Poor People’s Campaign. Members also planned to write for several
underground newspapers that circulated around campus, including The Lancing and Chrysalis.
The BSU became the springboard to an improved campus experience because it allowed Black
student activists the space to organize.
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Running for office offered an opportunity to obtain a voice on campus. In late April
1969, Jimmie Baxter and Gloria Parker again appeared on Avon Rollins’s radio show to discuss
their candidacy for Student Government Association offices. Baxter saw a need for leadership
because of students’ apathy, which allowed their exclusion from decision-making on campus.
Baxter ran on a platform of student power that encouraged students to participate in preexisting
decision making organizations, such as the SGA, rather than burn down buildings or kidnap
administrators, since radicalism did not appeal to most UT students. He became student body
president for the 1969-1970 school year. According to the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, this
made Baxter the first Black student government president at a white southern university.45
Baxter’s election made him a major figure on the campus political scene. Through his
position, he led the fight to include all students in the administration’s decision making process.
To do so, he worked with university officials and participated in demonstrations. While these
strategies seemed promising, Black students had a long battle for inclusion on campus. Their
efforts continue to this day.
Black student activists also used direct action tactics to gain inclusion. In May 1969,
around fifty Black Student Union members picketed the Administration building starting at 8:00
am. They held signs that read “We Want Black Action-Soul Satisfaction,” “Uncle Tom is
Dead,” and “Don’t Let Dixie Be Your Death March.” By 5:00 pm, they had secured a meeting
with Dr. Howard Aldmon, vice chancellor of student affairs. The BSU’s demands included a
Black cheerleader, more funding for the BSU, more Black councilors, additional scholarships for
Black students, an employee dedicated to recruiting more Black students and staff, and an
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investigation into classroom discrimination. BSU President Johnny Pierce believed the demands
were “just and the administration should act immediately.”
Whites at the University of Tennessee seemed unmoved by the protest. They defended
the status quo. During the meeting, Aldmon steered BSU members to the proper bureaucratic
channels. For example, he explained that incidents of discrimination should first be brought to
the attention of department heads.46 While the protest occurred peacefully, it drew a backlash.
One white student walked into the demonstration whistling “Dixie” and destroyed two signs.
Demonstrators rushed towards the white student, but were restrained by others. Police then
escorted him away as bystanders applauded.47 A similar demonstration occurred the following
day. It led to meetings with President Holt and several other high-ranking administrators. BSU
members Johnny Pierce and Marilyn Etheridge continued to press their demands but garnered
few short-term results.48 The response of the unnamed white student and administration ensured
the struggle for inclusion would continue into the next decade.
Having a voice on campus provided Black activists with some gains. Efforts at inclusion
were tightly controlled by the administration. During the summer and fall quarters, the school
offered classes focusing on African Americans, including Black literature, politics, history, and
religion.49 While these courses remained housed in established departments, such as History or
English, they elicited support from many white students. An editorial in the Daily Beacon
credited the faculty, students, and administration for “provid[ing] an expanded curriculum-not to
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placate a certain group-the movement toward fulfilling this need has been a constructive one.”50
Greater inclusion was acceptable because it did not shift power to Black student groups.
The formation of the Black Studies Department proved controversial. In September, the
independent department debuted. It drew the ire of both Black and white students. For whites, a
separate department encouraged difference rather than equality. Yet members of the BSU
complained about their lack of representation and the scarcity of Black faculty in the department.
An anonymous BSU member said, “Black students are fed up with the hiring of the Negro for
purposes of tokenism and we will not tolerate inter-department racism disguised as an AfroAmerican program.”51 The groups’ complaints showed their differing ideas about inclusion.
Their continuing quest for inclusion brought Black student activists together with liberal white
student activists. Both groups desired inclusion and detested the Vietnam War.
Liberal white student activists also wanted a voice on campus. They believed that
students had the right to participate in governance of the University. Given the rapidly changing
world, the conservative campus seemed backward because it promoted the older generation’s
values, including patriotism and law and order. This conflict manifested itself in protests over
the Vietnam War, which became a hot button issue for liberal white student activists because
they feared being drafted. Their efforts began with the founding of student organizations.
May 1969 witnessed the formation of a campus Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
chapter, a well-known leftist student organization, and a contested SGA election, which Jimmie
Baxter eventually won. The SGA tentatively voted to join the National Student Association, a
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nationwide congress that condemned the Vietnam War and supported civil rights.52 These events
created an informal coalition between Black and liberal white students based on their desire for
inclusion and opposition to the Vietnam War. Going forward, Black student activists continued
their activism and participated in large on campus demonstrations.
Interracial groups of student activists led the quest for student power. The cursory
selection process spurred the students’ ire. In late 1969, well-respected president Andy Holt
announced his resignation. The administration then created a committee to hire a new president.
Twenty to twenty five faculty members, administrators, along with two students, made up the
committee. One of the students, Jimmie Baxter, remembered that the committee recommended
three candidates. The university then appointed Ed Boling as president. “I believe the committee
specifically found that Boling was not qualified [he lacked experience as a high-level college
administrator]. Well of course, this really upset things because Boling was one of the good old
boys, and one thing about UT, they take care of their own….this search committee was just a
sham.”53 Political Science professor and committee member Lee Greene remembered that U.S.
Senator Herbert Walters, the chairman of the selection committee, recommended an unnamed
outside candidate and Ed Boling. Greene and Jimmie Baxter interviewed the outside candidate,
but neither liked him. “I thought he was the worst possible person that we could get. I can’t help
having the feeling that Walters felt the same way and knew that the faculty would have no
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difficultly in deciding on Boling in preference to this man. I don’t think this was a sincere
attempt to find an outsider.”54 The selection process was set up in favor of Boling. The corrupt
process drew the attention of concerned students.
In January, student activists expressed their voice on campus. They did so through
protest, bringing large-scale campus unrest to UT for the first time. The announcement of the
unqualified Boling’s selection led to a demonstration on January 15, when 2,500 students
gathered in the center of campus. It began with Peter Kami, a UT dropout, reading a letter
challenging Boling “to a duel, [which would] represent the force which was used to place Dr.
Boling in office.”55 Afterward, student activists Gus Hardon encouraged the crowd to enter the
administration building.
The results of Hardon’s proclamation led to a confrontation between students and police.
The differing views of the results illuminate the underlying conflict between student activists and
school officials. As students advanced, the police moved into the crowd, dodging the snowballs,
bottles, and other flying objects thrown by students. The UT Beacon observed that the police
had the tape covering their name plate and badge numbers removed in the mêlée. The result,
which Baxter called a police riot, was twenty two arrests.56 Twenty one of those arrested faced
fines or misdemeanor charges. Peter Kalmi fled the county. Faculty members more sympathetic
to the administration recalled that “the police did use restraint and while there were bruised
feelings and over twenty arrests, the dispersal was reasonably calm and certainly quick.”57
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Baxter, the police served as a means of keeping students voiceless. The faculty members saw the
officers’ response as a perfectly appropriate means of maintaining the status quo. By January
20th, Boling had been installed as president.
Jimmie Baxter warned of continuing campus unrest because the administration remained
unwilling to include students in decision making. In August 1970, citing the administration’s
unwillingness to compromise with student demands, Baxter said, “It’s entirely in the hands of the
Board of Trustees and the Administration…unless they change their policies, confrontation will
be an inevitable result.”58 In May, Baxter’s prediction came true.
Reverend Billy Graham’s Crusade, a traveling revival, arrived at the university from May
22 to 31, 1970. Graham’s enormous popularity forced the revival to be held in Neyland
Stadium, the campus football stadium. Events proceeded with little controversy until the 27th,
when President Richard Nixon announced he would speak the following day. This drew the ire
of a group of mostly liberal white students who vehemently disagreed with Nixon’s handling of
the Vietnam War and the invasion of Cambodia. They also remained saddened by the murder of
four unarmed students at Kent State University the previous month.59 As Vietnam-related
atrocities piled up, the liberal white students’ desire to protest intensified. Nixon’s visit provided
the perfect opportunity.
When word spread of Nixon’s visit, anti-war students began planning demonstrations.60
They aimed to show the university and the nation that Nixon’s Vietnam policy was not supported
throughout the South. They distributed leaflets advertising a rally before Nixon’s speech in front
of the Student Union. It urged students “COME PROTEST! Protest Nixon’s war policy. This is
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the first university campus that Nixon has visited since his Cambodia announcement (which lead
[sic] to the deaths of many of our Black and white brothers). Get together and let him know that
there is dissent here too!”61 Students and Faculty for Peace distributed an open letter to the
people of the South. It stated, “we are deeply disturbed by President Nixon’s coming to UT and
using a religious forum for his own political purposes…. [Nixon] apparently believes that in the
South there is no widespread opposition to his war policies. When, in fact, there are many, many
students and faculty who do not support these policies…. At the Billy Graham crusade, we urge
you to join us in a moment of prayer for peace.”62 The planned protest made Billy Graham’s
crusade a political forum. It also brought UT’s activist community into the national spotlight.
After the rally in front of the Student Union, the group of 300-400 marched to the
stadium. They were seated in small groups in separate sections, foiling any prearranged
demonstration plans. As Graham introduced Nixon, the small pockets of activists chanted
phrases, including “peace now” and “politics, politics.” Some yelled obscenities or held up peace
signs. The protest garnered nine immediate arrests.63 The aftermath led to thirty two arrests and
the issuance of forty seven arrest warrants. The protest successfully allowed activists to express
their objections to Nixon’s handling of the war.
The demonstration had not done any real damage. Nixon asked Mayor Rogers to treat
those arrested leniently, because they were “rude, but not violent or substantially disruptive.”64
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An editorial the following day judged the protest to be “anything but effective. What was
accomplished, instead of displeasure over the President’s policies, was a display of bad
manners.” While protesters had a legitimate right and cause to demonstrate they should not have
disrupted a religious service.65 Chancellor Charles Weaver downplayed the protest: “the strike
hurt the image of the University more than this protest,” because dissenters remained a small part
of the student body.66 For city and university administrators, the demonstration was a minor
disturbance.
Student activism at the University of Tennessee and Knoxville College had a level of
success. At both schools, students obtained a voice on campus. They did so through a variety of
means ranging from protest to working with student government, which forced administrators to
acknowledge their demands. This voice gave them a role in campus decision making, an
important change from their previous exclusion. It proved especially beneficial for Black
students at the University of Tennessee, who quickly received became an important force on
campus. However, their struggle for equality was just beginning. Student activism in Knoxville
connected the city to several larger national movements. However, it failed to connect with local
activists or draw support from powerful whites. This lack of support relegated their activism to
campus. In Knoxville, it was liberal community activists who became the primary drivers of
change during the second half of the 1960s.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
“JOIN US IN OUR STAND FOR OPENING HOUSING, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR
JOBS, AND GOOD EDUCATION:” LIBERAL ACTIVISTS, 1964-1970
In late 1967, Associate Director of the Urban League’s Southern Regional Office J.
Harvey Kerns authored Social and Economic Conditions in Knoxville, Tennessee, as they
[E]ffect [sic] the Negro, a comprehensive report on Knoxville’s Black community. Despite the
end of legal segregation, a number of structural issues remained. Kerns found, “there have been
few changes in recent years in the general economic life of Negroes… The slum conditions
under which more than fifty percent of Negroes live, the mortality and morbid rates, and to a
certain extent the high incidence of juvenile delinquency are but reflective of this low economic
status. The pervasive pattern of segregation which has so long been the pattern in Knoxville,
induces a sort of mental confusion which beclouds the fundamental issue.”1 In 1960, well over
half of the non-white population had “a heavy concentration in marginal jobs.” Even after the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed employment discrimination, Kerns found that “Negro
residents indicate finding reluctance by some of the major industries to give them equal
consideration for employment or job promotion even though their qualifications are equal or
superior to those of white fellow workers.” Many Knoxville College (KC) graduates took
unskilled, semiskilled, or service jobs because they were the best available. Others left for better
employment opportunities. A job recruiter for the Tennessee Valley Administration reported
“many Negroes, because of discouragement, have become too apathetic even to look for jobs.”
This bleak employment picture left over fifty percent of non-whites impoverished.2
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These economic conditions ensured that poor, non-whites remained in downtown
Knoxville while middle-class whites moved to the suburbs. Residential segregation was
buttressed by urban renewal projects that forced African Americans into public housing. “The
overall pattern of residential concentration and segregation has also increased,” Kerns reported. 3
Some structural problems had “been met by the passage of civil rights legislation and the
enlightened interest of local citizens, Negro and white.” However, local organizations, namely
the NAACP and Mayor’s Council on Human Relations, failed to “develop programs with
expertise to deal with them effectively.”4 In the late 1960s, improving these circumstances
became liberal activists’ primary goal.
Despite economic inequality and residential segregation, the surveyed African Americans
maintained an optimistic view of race relations. They also desired improved economic
conditions. A Black cab driver and long-time Knoxville resident said, “since everything was
integrated Knoxville’s one of the best cities in the South. As I see it, our problems are better job
opportunities and decent houses which a person like me could afford to buy.” A retired
government employee offered that “race relations in Knoxville are as good, or better, than in
most Southern cities. What we need now are better training opportunities for Negroes to qualify
for the good jobs that are opening daily.” This belief in the city’s ability to create social change
spurred activism that focused on remedying the city’s remaining inequalities.
Harvey’s report illuminates the challenges facing activists, primarily established
Knoxvillians, Black and white, who believed in cooperating with elected officials and peaceful,
nonviolent activism. On one hand, working with elected officials and businessmen had the
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potential to create change. On the other, it elected officials and powerful businessmen desired a
limited degree of change, done in accordance with their political philosophy. To navigate these
two poles, liberal community activists pushed for measured, sustainable structural changes. In
response, city officials and businessmen attempted to manage and contain their efforts.
During this period, many elected officials and businessmen joined the emerging New
Right movement advocating smaller government, local control, and the free market as the best of
remedying structural problems. Liberal activists, elected officials, and businessmen all sought to
lessen poverty but disagreed over the best means to do so. The importance of cooperation was
reinforced by the Ku Klux Klan’s hostility, which reminded all involved about the ever present
danger that surrounded civil rights activism.
These years are often viewed as Black Power’s zenith. In Knoxville, Black Power never
emerged on a large scale. Instead, liberal community activists became the primary engines of
change. They used different forms of activism to fight against structural issues. Their activism
brought about a complex relationship with elected officials and local businessmen who joined
the emerging New Right. These groups agreed on the need to address structural problems.
However, they differed over the best means. Each side jockeyed for control of negotiations, the
importance of which was reinforced by several outside threats, including Klan violence and the
riots that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. All groups agreed on the need to
maintain calm.
******************
When Lyndon Johnson stepped into the presidency in 1963, it initiated a new phase of the
civil rights movement—federal intervention. Johnson capitalized upon the national civil rights
movement’s momentum and John F. Kennedy’s legacy, to ensure the passage of civil rights
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legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Johnson
also called for ambitious government programs to wage a “War on Poverty.”
Knoxville’s War on Poverty program, the Community Action Committee (CAC), became
a contested vehicle for civil rights activism. Participants brought different agendas to the
organization. This led to disagreements over control. Businessmen and some elected officials
wished to limit federal government intervention, monitor wasteful spending, and promote free
market solutions, which could provide cheaper and more efficient ways to combat poverty and
educate children. Liberal whites participated because federal backing brought stability,
authority, and funding making continued activism less risky and more effective. African
American participants also had different views of the organization’s purpose. William Crutcher
saw it as a continuation of the civil rights movement, while Sara Moore Green jumped at the
chance for political patronage. Given the recent race riots across the nation, the War on Poverty
seemed increasingly important because it offered a means of creating change that did not lead to
large-scale violence. As David Carter shows, in 1965, President Lyndon Johnson’s
commencement speech at Howard University signaled a change in the federal government’s
approach to civil rights. Instead of haphazardly responding to crisis, such as in Selma, the
speech offered “a fundamental reconceptualization of civil rights within the Johnson White
House from a narrow definition guaranteeing equality of opportunity to a broader vision
promising equality of results.”5 In more practical terms, the federal government began its
attempt to ameliorate structural problems. Many of the War on Poverty programs were
administered by the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). Building on the Civil
Rights Movement, the OEO required that local poverty programs include the poor to promote
5
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self help. This plan led to a number of community based solutions to poverty. In Knoxville,
creating a local solution led to conflict between liberal activists and elected officials.
During the 1960s, elected officials and powerful businessmen led Knoxville into an era of
prosperity. Thanks to minimal civil rights-related unrest, the successful courtship of industries,
and job growth, the city had experienced a great deal of progress. Business was the primary
driver of this progress. Local leaders desired local control and a laissez-faire federal
government. The Johnson Administration, through the War on Poverty, offered neither.
Powerful whites feared the federal intervention in civil rights would impede local control and
inflate costs. Promotion of this philosophy made them part of the emerging New Right, as they
sought to control civil rights activism and promote business growth because the economy would
provide the best outcome for all involved.
Knoxville’s War on Poverty began in February 1965. The opening meeting established
its methods. On the 7th, 600 Knoxvillians attended an antipoverty workshop held at Austin High
School. After an opening speech from Richard Boone, acting deputy director of the Community
Action Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity, the attendees broke into several smaller
groups to address local issues. Judge C. Howard Bozeman, head of the Community Action
Committee, reported that his organization would create six subcommittees each to deal with
specific problems: job training, work study, preschool, educational aid, and health and
neighborhood improvement. Other participants called for more drastic steps. Toledo Coppock,
local director of the State Welfare Department, insisted that the problems of poverty were rooted
in economic inequality. A.D. Gaither suggested, “to overcome poverty will require a revolution
in attitudes of the affluent as well as the poor.” The poor could also be helped by urban renewal
and the Community Action Committee. At the day’s end, the workshop participants offered
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three recommendations to fight poverty: expanding the CAC to include poor people, improving
communication between the poor and the CAC to better publicize its programs, and increasing
white involvement in the CAC.6
From its inception, the CAC faced a community divided over the best way to ameliorate
poverty. It quickly became a target for the Knoxville Journal, which philosophically disagreed
with its methods. Several days after the initial meeting, CAC announced it would raise the
wages of Neighborhood Youth Corps members to $1.25 an hour to maintain Federal Labor
Department standards and eligibility for funding.7 This seemingly innocuous decision drew
criticism from The Journal, which decried federal intervention in setting wages. It then worried
about the lack of business representation in CAC: “To the extent that the votes of committee
members have any weight at all in the face of the bureaucratic will, it seems ironic that five
persons who, for whatever reason, do not earn $3,000 a year, will have five times the voting
power of the lone spokesman for business.”8 The Journal’s criticisms were based on the lack of
control. Both the federal government and the organization had minimal conservative input. For
the remainder of the year, the CAC worried about maintaining federal funding, controlling its
budget, and implementing a range of programs from job training programs for high school
dropouts to Head Start to neighborhood-based antipoverty centers.9
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The Journal continued its attacks. 10 The editors worried about the CAC’s wastefulness.
In November 1965, the CAC submitted its annual budget to the federal government. It included
funding for a summer preschool program and Head Start program, which cost $33 per week per
child and $20 per week per child respectively. The cost of the programs drew the ire of the
Knoxville Journal, which determined that the same students could be educated through the Knox
County School System for $10 per week per child.11 A related editorial claimed that local
private schools could educate the children for considerably less. The situation made “clear the
reason why every year the federal deficit runs into the billions, while bureaucracies of all kinds
grow to stupendous portions….It will generally be conceded that no government can do anything
as cheaply as a private company can do it. Economy is simply not the way of politics….Of
course the secret of these inflated costs lies in the establishment of bureaucracies, in either the
fields of welfare or education, which are the principal fruit of federal programs.”12 The
wastefulness would not help the poor and led to unwise use of federal funding.
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In late 1965, conservative whites continued to impugn the CAC. They criticized its
priories, which aided those who did not deserve it. As the CAC waited for its budget to be
approved, the Journal offered, “in all the antipoverty programs the real objective appears to be to
provide employment to plush pay personnel operating these programs so that the actual poor who
are supposed to be the beneficiaries of the programs receive a minimum share of the money or
benefits expended.”13 Helen Mitchell, the mother of a soldier serving in Vietnam, wondered
why servicemen made less than a high school dropout or “law breaker” enrolled in Job Corps.
She asked, “Could it be that the ones who would put us under socialism realize that first they
would have to get rid of these honest American boys who prefer the challenges of life to the
guaranteed existence[?]”14
Besides constant criticism, the CAC dealt with internal strife. For local activists, federal
intervention proved to be both a blessing and a curse. It allowed them a means of fighting
against poverty backed by the funding and structure provided by the federal government.
However, this approach had problems. It caused conflict among Black activists who disagreed
over the organization’s purpose and sometimes used it for personal gain. In addition, it drew
opposition from powerful whites who abhorred federal intervention and used the CAC as a
vehicle to fight against it. Disagreement with these powerful whites altered the relationship
between the groups. Negotiations no longer governed the civil rights movement.
Disagreements plagued the CAC. Some members complained about the lack of
standardized procedure. The September 1966 CAC meeting failed to make quorum, preventing
any decisions from being voted upon. Participants remained to review the group’s business,
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leading to an animated discussion sparked by Mrs. Willie Miles, a member of the administrative
committee. Rev. William T. Crutcher suggested that the administrative committee’s decision be
released to the press immediately, before a vote from the full organization. Mrs. Miles strongly
disagreed, arguing that decisions should not be released until they had been approved by the
entire membership. This led her to protest other practices. Miles complained that board
members who held high profile positions were permitted to miss three meetings before being
expelled, while community members could not miss any. She also grumbled that she could not
be simultaneously employed by the CAC and serve as a board member, as others were. 15 This
infighting hampered the organization going forward.
In late January 1967, the squabbling continued. Some members saw CAC as a vehicle
for political patronage. At the meeting, Board of Education member and Republican stalwart
Sarah Moore Green attempted to nominate her friend, a former local elections official named
Edna Smyre, for a position in one of the organization’s programs. Despite Smyre’s
qualifications, her hiring was referred to the administrative committee, following the
organizational protocol that Green attempted to circumvent.16 Green vocalized her displeasure
with the decision during the February meeting. She complained that she had been unfairly
ousted from the organization after missing a meeting and that the CAC failed to meet the Federal
Office of Economic Opportunity’s guidelines for hiring. In response, according to the Knoxville
Journal, “The committee heard Mrs. Green in complete silence. Her statement received no
acknowledgement from anyone else. After the meeting, Mrs. Green charged that the appointees
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of former County Judge C. Howard Bozeman, a Democrat, are now awarding CAC positions ‘to
pay political debts.’”17
By May, the organization publicly defended its programs. Members touted the
organization’s effectiveness and important mission. Executive Director Phillip Rule told the
Journal that “the poor have received six out of every seven dollars in programs administered
directly by the CAC.” He then provided a detailed breakdown of the budget.18 Rev. William
Crutcher put forth a more pointed rebuttal. After reviewing the recent riots in Detroit and
Cambridge, Maryland, he argued, “such outbursts were the result of a ‘disease’—a disease
caused by years of neglect. The CAC is in the process of trying to do something about it.” It
remained “the only agency in the city that is integrated and working on these problems. I hope
those who have criticized the Community Action Committees and Federal Programs will
reconsider.”19 The organization worked to fix the underlying problems that caused race riots in
other cities.
Impoverished Knoxvillians also disparaged the CAC. They felt the organization’s
programs failed to reach the poor. Members of the Moses Avenue Neighborhood Organization
(MANO), an organization that represented an area of largely poor African Americans, pleaded
for more help. A report presented to the CAC by MANO argued that “the obstacles facing the
poor, such as slums, the need for quality education, better housing….are far greater than the legal
victories already won. Let us remember also that it is the non white members of the middle class
who have benefited from the progress of recent years. The lower class is still disadvantaged.”
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Poor people remained skeptical about newly introduced programs or services “because the basic
conditions of life and living have not changed for so many of the disadvantaged.”20 MANO’s
report highlighted the limits of CAC’s ability to create change, which was set by the local and
federal government’s previous failures to better the lives of poor people.
At the end of October 1967, criticism of CAC continued. It furthered the debate over the
organization’s effectiveness. U.S. Congressman and former Knoxville Mayor John Duncan
announced he would vote to end the Community Action Committee. Duncan argued, “Those
who need help haven’t gotten it under the so-called War on Poverty. It hasn’t provided one job
for anyone or trained one person who needed a job.” In response, CAC executive director Phillip
Rule cited the 2,443 jobs that had gone to welfare recipients, single mothers, first time
employees “to be self-supporting and to achieve individual dignity.”21 The two sides held
widely divergent views stifling the organization’s growth. The criticism from Duncan, who had
found common ground with a previous generation of civil rights activists now aligned him with
the emerging conservative movement.
********************
During this period extremist whites did not disappear. Rather, they continued the fight
against integration.22 Mainstream conservatives and violent segregationists had a complex
relationship. Kevin Kruse these groups had “remarkably similar levels of racial, social, and
political homogeneity to their shared ideologies that stressed individual rights over communal
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responsibility, privatization over public welfare, and ‘free enterprise’ above everything else.”23
However, segregationist violence disturbed conservatives who desired to maintain order. Clive
Webb argues violence “forced Southern whites to choose between uncompromising resistance
and at least token compliance with racial reform.”24 This violence may have also made the
conservative position seem more reasonable to liberal and moderate whites and African
American activists. In Knoxville, extremism reminded African Americans that the city had not
become a utopia of racial peace.
In February 1966, the Ku Klux Klan unleashed its wrath. It sought to prevent interracial
dating at Knoxville College. Late one evening, Sandra Harrison, a resident of Colston Hall,
picked up the fourth floor telephone. She heard a male voice demand “spread the word in your
dorm that there is a cross being burned over by the football field.” Harrison responded, ‘is this
Dwight?,” assuming the call was a prank. The male voice replied, “No, this is a member of the
College Klux Klan.” Police found the remains of a wooden cross wrapped with newspapers and
towels and doused with kerosene. Around 12:45 am, the police arrived on campus to investigate.
They informed dorm residents about several bomb threats directed towards the fourth floor. The
caller reported to police that the bomb would detonate around 1:30 am. Police told the shaken
fourth floor residents “that if the call came again to call the sergeant and have the caller traced.
The officers then left the dorm without making any attempt to follow up on the [bomb] threat.”
The residents of Colston Hall quickly evacuated themselves. It was later reported that around
11:30 p.m. that evening, eleven cars had been seen circling campus. The administration had
previously received several threatening phone calls concerning interracial dating on campus.25
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The incident reminded both activists and elected officials of the dangers associated with civil
rights activism. It also reinforced the importance of acting within the city’s progressive
dynamic, which condoned extremism. But the cross-burning incident was minor compared to
the threat of race riots.
During the summer of 1967, racial tensions turned to violence in major cities, including
Newark, Detroit, and Milwaukee. African American rioters lashed out in their local
communities as a result of longstanding poverty and racism. These problems were put into sharp
relief by civil rights activism, which brought the shortcomings of American democracy and
capitalism to the national stage. The resulting investigation produced a widely-read report by an
eleven member National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder at the request of President
Johnson. Commonly called the Kerner Report, after its chairman Illinois Governor Otto Kerner,
it found that “to continue the present policies is to make the permanent division of our country
into two societies; one largely Negro and poor, located in central cities; the other predominantly
white and affluent located in the suburbs and in outlying areas.”26
Despite their differences, liberal activists worked together to prevent unrest from
occurring in Knoxville. The News Sentinel suggested a top down approach to deter riots in
Knoxville. The unnamed writer focused on the city’s attitude and preparing law enforcement
officials. An editorial argued that once the investigation into the causes of the riots ended “there
will be no single place to fix blame…The problem will have to be faced in a variety of ways.” It
suggested the formation of a youth council, as well as training special anti-riot National Guard
units, increasing recreational activities for African American youth, and “rounding up the
criminals and professional agitators” who helped spur riots. However, the community’s attitude
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stood out as the most important cause of riots. The riot-ravaged cities failed to improve the
conditions that agitated young African Americans, which combined with rioters’ lawlessness.
Both attitudes needed to be reversed.27
Liberal activists also sought to prevent riots. They created the youth council suggested
by the News Sentinel. However, the exclusion of Black teenagers and young adults limited the
group’s potential effectiveness. The youth council formed in August. It was based on three
fundamental premises. First, youth had been responsible for most of the rioting in other cities.
Second, the success of Knoxville’s civil rights efforts remained unknown to most of the Black
community. Third, Black youth had problems that should be expressed to “responsible adults.”
Mr. Little, of the Mayor’s Human Relations Council, acknowledged that a board of “mostly
business and professional men and church leaders, cannot communicate effectively with all
segments of the Negro community, because it does not know all the problems of individual
neighborhoods.”

These premises offered the youth little say in improving their lives.

The youth council’s initial meeting discussed the problems facing the Black community.
They highlight the intersecting structural issues that prevented equality. B.A. Ward complained
that Austin, the city’s Black high school, did not prepare students for the real world. Instead, it
focused on vocational training, including horseshoeing and cooking. Emmert Lloyd reported
that many fields would not hire Blacks who lacked experience, but provided inexperienced
whites on-the-job training.28 The group also decided a full youth council would form shortly.
These structural issues greatly affected the lives of young African Americans making riots a real

27

“Knoxville Faces the Problem,” Knoxville News Sentinel, August 7, 1967.

28

Albert Rogers, “Interracial Effort for Peace Launched,” Knoxville News Sentinel, August 6, 1967.

172

possibility. Thanks to the city’s small black population, historical background, and moderate
tenor riots, never occurred.29
***********
A larger political conflict brewed over the issue of urban renewal. As part of a larger
effort to modernize Knoxville the city aimed to clear rundown sections of the city to attract
additional businesses. However, it had unintended consequences. The Mountain View urban
renewal project had serious ramifications for the residents, mostly Black, poor, and/or working
class Knoxvillians. Initially, a report by the Metropolitan Planning Commission explained that
they had consulted with local Black leadership, including attorney Carl Cowan who foresaw no
problems.30 In the 1980s, the Knoxville News Sentinel reported its aftermath, the Mountain View
project forced the relocation of most of the city’s independent Black businesses including
restaurants, funeral parlors, and insurance agencies. Some of these businesses moved to the area
near Main and Church avenues. The second phase of urban renewal forced them to the Five
Points neighborhood in East Knoxville. Unfortunately, the residents of Five Points proved
unable to support the newly-transplanted businesses, leading to their closure.31
While some activists sought to prevent riots, the residents of the Fort Sanders area fought
against urban renewal starting in the late 1960s. They began by taking control of the discussion
around the project. The Fort Sanders area was located on the west side of UT and housed a
mixture of students and working class Knoxvillians. A survey rendered over twenty percent of
29
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the neighborhood’s homes substandard and in need of demolition. It also suffered from a
number of “environmental deficiencies,” including lack of maintenance, air pollution, and poor
recreational facilities. However, according to the survey, the neighborhood had some positive
aspects, such as its location near the University of Tennessee and “a degree of vitality.”32 The
residents of Fort Sanders understood the area’s problems and supported a degree of
improvement. Most blamed the problems on the local government, which failed to provide
adequate municipal services or regulate the expansion of neighborhood institutions, including
UT and the Fort Sanders Hospital. They also faulted landlords who refused to maintain their
properties. Blaming city agencies steered the discussion away from implementation. Despite
these issues, they enjoyed the area and did not wish to be part of an urban renewal project, which
had the potential to destroy their homes. 33
In December 1968, the discussion over urban renewal flared up. Housing officials
experienced resistance from grassroots activists. On the evening of the 9th, the city held a public
hearing as part of the application process for federal funding earmarked to pay for large parts of
redevelopment in the Fort Sanders, Summit Hill, Mountain View, and Morningside areas.
Almost 1,000 residents attended. Most were worried about losing their homes. Knoxville
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Housing Authority (KHA) executive director Robert Hembree reassured the concerned
homeowners that few properties would be torn down. Demolition would not begin until 1970,
giving residents plenty of time to find new homes.
Some attendees feared the unjust outcome of urban renewal. They felt it would ruin
residents’ lives. Martin Southern declared that areas other than Fort Sanders needed to be
considered for urban renewal. Civil rights activists Robert Booker worried that the attraction of
federal funding “has blinded us to the humanitarian injustice it creates.” During previous
redevelopment in Mountain View, “more than 1,100 families were evicted from their homes, and
at a time when there was a shortage of housing. Some who had been proud homeowners were
forced into housing projects because they could not afford to buy another home. Some died from
worry and heart break.” Urban renewal in Mountain View also destroyed half of the area’s
businesses.34
To avoid a similar fate residents of Fort Sanders organized. Residents formed the
Defenders of Fort Sanders. Immediately after its inception, members wrote letters to
Representative John Duncan and Senators Albert Gore and Howard Baker asking that federal
funding be denied.35 The group continued their fight against urban renewal into the 1970s.
In April 1970, John Ulmer, senior planner for the city’s Metropolitan Commission, gave
a speech at the University of Tennessee. His talk sparked another round of discussion about the
plight of Fort Sanders and who to blame for its condition. He told the audience that the
surrounding area suffered from overcrowding, an out-of-date building tax structure, traffic
problems, rats, and liter. However, because of Knoxville’s “bad reputation with urban renewal”

34

Frank Jordan, “Residents of 3 Areas get UR Schooling,” Knoxville News Sentinel, December 10, 1968.

35

“Fort Sanders UR Group Organizes,” Knoxville News Sentinel, December 14, 1968.

175

and uncertain funding, residents remained upset.36 Calling the area an “uncontrolled mess,” the
News Sentinel blamed unregulated development and the expansion of the University of
Tennessee. It favored long term, drastic solutions to clean up the area.37 The Journal blamed
conflicts between the Knoxville Housing Authority and Knoxville Utilities Board (KUB) who
could not settle on a plan to clean up the area. It advocated a spot renewal program to avoid the
problems experienced after the Mountain View project.38 Phil Kinzer faulted the City Council,
which allowed the university and Fort Sanders Hospital to expand over the objections of the
Metropolitan Planning Commission. He stated:
The city of Knoxville has been around for a long time. Almost as long as have such
admired cities as Richmond, Va., Atlanta, Ga., and Columbia, S.C. These three cities are
much more modern and well planned than is Knoxville. One fact which no one seems to
think of is that all of these cities have one common advantage over Knoxville. They were
‘lucky’ enough to have been burned to the ground during the Civil War. Therefore, they
had the chance to rebuild with planning and forethought, a modern city.39
The area had become a site of bureaucratic negligence and conflict. Fear of the hardship
that could result from this conflict led residents to take over the discourse surrounding the
potential urban renewal project.
Members of the Defenders of Fort Sanders fought back. Residents E.G. Shelton and
Martin Southern blamed the city’s various agencies, UT, and the hospital. They informed
Knoxville Journal that readers the problems caused by these institutions should not force
residents to lose property or be expelled from the area.40 It also spurred residents of Fort
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Sanders, along with community organizations, to include the CAC in meetings to discuss ways to
improve the area themselves and strategies, such as lawsuits, to stop any attempts at renewal.41
***********
In the midst of the urban renewal debate, Martin Luther King was assassinated on April
4, 1968. The tragedy restarted the discussion about the city’s race relations. The conversation
stressed cooperation and unity. Liberal activists sought to continue King’s work through
nonviolent activism that combated poverty and included a wide range of Knoxvillians. They
also promoted calm. King’s death united liberal activists and elected officials. Despite
disagreements over anti-poverty activism, they worked together to ensure the city remained
calm. Liberal activists’ feared riots would end the possibility of creating change, while elected
officials worried they would impede economic growth. While this period saw increased militant
rhetoric, it merely flared up and faded away.
On the day after King’s death, the Knoxville Journal’s front page featured stories about
the ensuing nationwide riots.42 They encouraged calm in Knoxville.

An editorial praised

King’s accomplishments and summarized the debate over his methods. It argued, “it is
extremists among both the whites and the Negroes that the country has to fear, and it is these
same fire brands who have the most to lose in freedom and opportunity in any breakdown of law
and order.” It ended with a call for law enforcement to catch the killers of King and A.J.
Boruff.43 Rioting and violence would not improve conditions for African Americans. As major
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cities went up in flames, ministers, both Black and white, planned a memorial for King in Market
Square, downtown’s high profile commercial area.44
The following weekend Avon Rollins held a memorial on his radio show composed of
highlights from King’s speeches and community members’ reactions. His death inspired a
discussion of the city’s racial issues. For Rollins, King “traveled across America preaching love
and nonviolence to a seemingly deaf ear of a white racist society.”45 J.R. Rutter, president of the
Knoxville chapter of the Tennessee Council on Human Relations, recalled that he was in a
Council meeting when King was assassinated. The Council decided that speaking openly about
the simmering racial problems in Knoxville offered the best tribute. Meeting attendees then
discussed the denial of bond for the four Knoxville College students held in connection with A.J.
Boruff’s murder, a recent advertisement by local realtors rallying against federal open housing
legislation, and housing discrimination, all which threatened to bring about violence.
Knoxville’s memorial service for Dr. King attracted over 2,000 people. It spurred an
impassioned cry for renewed activism. Led by members of the Knoxville Ministerial Association
(KMA), an integrated, interfaith organization of clergy, it included a public service and silent
march to the Civic Coliseum. After the eulogy, KMA members read a statement declaring their
recommitment to social justice: “As we make this commitment to one another, to you, and to the
life of this community we plead the love and mercy of God that others might join us in our stand
for open housing, equal opportunity for jobs and good education, open membership in religious,
social, civic, organizations and a fair chance to participate in the government of our local
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community.”46 While KMA members sought more participation in local government, other
activists ramped up their militant rhetoric.
King’s death drew the ire of activists with a radical bent, such as Avon Rollins. They had
become frustrated with the slow pace of change in the city and throughout the country. For this
group, King’s death ended any hope for large-scale change.

In other large cities, this frustration

led to riots. In Knoxville, militant activists espoused fiery rhetoric and undertook nonviolent
activism, but did not use violence.
At April’s end, the Knoxville chapter of the National Conference of Christians and Jews
held a round table titled “How to Keep Knoxville Cool this Summer.” Participants expressed
their frustration through militant rhetoric. Panelists Avon Rollins and Knoxville College student
George Curry, “indicted the city of Knoxville for living under what they term the fallacy that
‘everything is all right’ and allowing racism and injustice to continue in an all American city.”
Whites could not understand the Black community’s frustration built up from years of dealing
with American hypocrisy. They offered lip service to African Americans’ problems, but did
nothing to solve them.47 “The primary problem, Mr. Rollins indicated, is jobs for Negroes. He
pointed out that an open housing law would have no relevancy unless he [a Black man] has a
decent job which will enable him to buy a house.”48 George Curry, a native of Tuscaloosa,
Alabama, endorsed self-defense rather than nonviolence, necessitated by police brutality. Curry
encouraged whites to civilize white racists. In the end, he reminded the audience, “we are going
to liberate ourselves by every means that is necessary….We’ll take care of our community. You
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better leave us alone.”49 Curry’s and Rollins’s militancy resulted from frustration with the status
quo in Knoxville. Rollins advocated immediate solutions to structural problems.
In early May the city’s civil rights groups collaborated on a program called “Know your
Rights” held at Lennon Memorial Methodist Church. The militant rhetoric gave way to
nonviolent activism. The attendees, including State Representative Robert Booker, Avon
Rollins, Highlander Center founder Myles Horton, and longtime City Councilmen Cas Walker,
heard speeches from civil rights luminaries, such as activists Carl and Anne Braden and SNCC
Executive Director Stanley Wise. The meeting intensified when Reverend Matthew Jones, Sr.,
suggested an impromptu march from the church to the Taylor Housing Project. Mayor Leonard
Rogers had denied permission for this march several days earlier. Reverend Jones told the
crowd, “I am afraid that the era of nonviolence is over.” Therefore, those marching should be
prepared for violence. He said of any armed audience member: ‘Let their aim be true!’” Jones
closed the meeting with a prayer and attendees filed past the police officers stationed outside.
The officers did not interfere. Protesters marched in orderly fashion. Shortly after arriving at the
housing projects, they dispersed.50 Liberal activists engaged in direct action, but despite their
frustrations, would not resort to violence. Instead, they turned their attention to the Poor
People’s Campaign, which arrived in Knoxville several days later.
The Poor People’s Campaign stopped in Knoxville as part of a journey from various parts
of the South to a campsite in Washington, D.C. between the Washington Monument and Lincoln
Memorial. It proved to be an opportunity to carry out King’s legacy by combining nonviolent
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direct action with the quest for economic justice. It also brought Knoxville into the national
spotlight. However, Mayor Rogers expressed suspicion.
The stop attracted its share of controversy. Mayor Rogers feared losing control. He
thought, instead, that participation in the capitalist system would provide racial equality. Two
days prior, he told the press “these people should stay home and mind their own business and
look for jobs and go to work. I am opposed to the March on Washington.” While he allowed the
park’s use, outsiders were not permitted to join the group and it could not be used for
demonstrations or recruiting. He also warned, “We will deal with any violence promptly,
forcefully, and without hesitation.” Rev. Kenneth MacLean, head of the steering committee,
tried to deflect such hostility, reminding the press that “Knoxville has a very good reputation for
hospitality to visitors all over the world and we are doing everything we can do to keep that
reputation.”51 Rogers’s hostility came from the philosophy behind the Poor People’s Campaign,
which challenged his conservative ideology.
On May 9, approximately 500 participants arrived in Knoxville. It attracted a variety of
activists who wished to carry on the work of King by drawing attention to economic inequality.
The Journal described the group as “a potpourri in which were represented Black Power
advocates, moderates, African nationalist types, white hippies from the University of Tennessee
and more conservatively clad members of both races.”52 This diversity of supporters reflected
the wide range of interests and conflicting philosophies that were shaping civil rights activism
after King’s death. The event occurred peacefully.
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The stop occurred without incident, thanks to Reverend MacLean and a large number of
volunteers and college students, including many whites.53 The Jacob Center in Chilhowee Park
housed the visitors, who spent the evening listening to gospel and civil rights songs, as well as
speeches. They played basketball, held wrestling matches, and attended to grooming and
medical needs. After breakfast, the group departed for Danville, Virginia. At the month’s end,
thirty Knoxvillians, mostly KC students, including Avon Rollins, left for Washington, D.C. to
join the Campaign.54 Their departure ended the back and forth between Mayor Rogers and the
event’s organizers. The march’s stop in Knoxville again revealed a moderate approach to race
relations, even as elected officials and activists disagreed about the best means of improving the
lives of African Americans.
**************
The quest to shut down Mountain View, a predominately Black elementary school, began
during the School Board race, in October 1969. It started with attempts to improve conditions
for residents of Austin Homes, a public housing project. During the month, Avon Rollins,
Barbara Burdine, and Charles Mason presented a list of grievances to the Knoxville Housing
Authority and Board of Education. The grievances centered on the conditions faced by the
residents of Austin Homes, a predominately African American housing project. They included
more sidewalks around Green Hill Elementary School (the neighborhood school), notification of
residents before their water was shut off, and better street cleaning. Neither agency acted
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promptly. The agencies’ slow reaction led Rollins, Barbara Burdine, and Charles Mason, to take
their complaints to a more powerful authority.
Rollins, Burdine, and Mason, along with over twenty supporters, then took their
complaints to the City Council. They pressured the Council to take action. The Council and
Mayor agreed with the complaints and began discussions aimed to fix the problems. During the
meeting, Charles Mason openly criticized the city’s inaction, forcing Mayor Rogers to bang his
gavel furiously to restore order.55 An editorial the following day argued, “The case of the Green
School patrons was presented in the form of abrasive demands… [they] brought home in a new
and forceful manner the pressing need for resolution of the Mountain View situation as a whole.”
It also agreed that students must be able to attend school safely.56 Charles Mason’s vociferous
complaints led to action. It also demonstrated that local politics could provide social change.
These vocal protests led citizens to remedy the conditions at Mountain View Elementary.
Activists sought to have the school closed because of its disrepair and overcrowding. Marshall
Henley, a local resident, reported the school’s third floor had been condemned, dishes had to be
hand washed, and overcrowding led to split classrooms and therefore the merger of grade
levels.57 These conditions seemed worse in light of the failure to transfer the 300 Mountain
View students into Green Elementary, which had a capacity of 600 students but only housed 300
in 1969.58 By December, the campaign to close Mountain View School had begun. A flyer
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declared parents should plan for their children’s future allowing “us to do what we have
permitted white folk to do for 400 years: control our children’s future.” The flyer ended with an
invitation to the Mountain View Christmas program.59 The conditions, combined with the
uneven distribution of students provided a solid case for closure. Protesting on behalf of small
children brought additional urgency to the cause. However, the best way to help the children
remained a subject of debate.
These activists viewed closing Mountain View as a means of establishing community
control. Community control, an idea popularized by the Black Power Movement, offered Black
Knoxvillans a say in their lives and the neighborhood’s resources allowing them ability and
means to solve their problems. In this case, it became urgent because the students’ education
hung in the balance. Coincidently, Avon Rollins touted increased community control as part of
his run for school board, which overlapped with this campaign to close the school.
Sarah Moore Green, the city’s first African American Board of Education member, saw
Rollins’s group as professional agitators who had no business (and no children) in Mountain
View Elementary. Instead, they took advantage of the situation for their own gain. They desired
credit for forcing the School Board to construct a new school when one was already in the works
thanks to a proposal by Green. In addition, a group member “slugged a police officer at the
Christmas Play and caused a stampede of parents and children who ran to escape the building
and the melee that ensued. The play was never resumed and many children were denied the
experience of Christmas Pageant participation.” For the moderate Green, Rollins’s group
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seemed interested in obtaining credit rather than improving the lives of Mountain View students.
She also took issue with their plan for Mountain View students.
Green also disagreed with moving Mountain View students in the middle of the school
year. She feared it would disturb the students’ education. The move would deny students’ some
of the services Mountain View provided, such as music, physical education, and the breakfast
program. Other programs, including special education and teacher training, would have to find
new facilities. It would also expose the students’ to the lack of crosswalk and ongoing
construction around the school. Instead, Green commissioned a study of practical improvements
for the next school year. A resolution could be reached by “official groups like parents, parent
teacher associations (PTA), community, governmental, and civil rights organizations. Unofficial
or ghost organizations present problems because it is not known whether their interest is selfishly
motivated or not.”60 Green favored a bureaucratic means of handling the rundown school. Her
solutions conflicted with the ideas of Rollins’s group.
Rollins’s campaign manager, civil rights activist Jerry Pate, questioned Green’s plan. He
felt that Green sided with conservative white elected officials rather than her predominately
African American constituency. He noted that Green appropriated the language of white
Southern politicians in calling them professional agitators, the same term used to describe Martin
Luther King, Jr. and his SCLC colleagues. Green “aligned herself with the forces of reaction and
against the aspirations of the people of her district and more importantly, against the children of
Mountain View School.” Besides, what were police doing at the Christmas program?61 Green
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failed to act on behalf of the students. With no compromise in sight, efforts to close the school
continued into 1970.
Winter vacation did little to calm the controversy. Instead, activists applied more
pressure. The day students returned, the school noticed over 100 absences (about one third of the
entire student body) as a result of a boycott. The boycott troubled the Board of Education
enough to call an unscheduled meeting, at which it voted to keep Mountain View open. “The
group that has attempted to close the school are only interested in publicity for themselves. They
are not interested in the welfare of your children. The children are their least concern,” said PTA
vice president Mrs. D.R. Deathridge.62 Meanwhile, a flyer produced by the citizens group
reported, “Mountain View has become a rallying point. After victory is attained let us remain
united as Black people. For a united people is [sic] a strong people and people with strong
purpose of mind cannot be defeated.” 63

The following day five parents transferred their

children from Mountain View to Green Elementary Schools. Rex Wyatt, Knoxville City
School’s Supervisor of Child Personnel, said the transfers were granted as a matter of routine not
because of the school’s condition. The increased pressure spurred the school’s PTA to get
involved, adding another voice to the controversy. The boycott continued.64
Disagreement continued at the next Board of Education meeting. The controversy
displayed the Black community’s variety of positions. After announcing the construction of a
new high school in East Knoxville, the Black area of the city, Avon Rollins accused school
officials of failing to be “responsive to the needs of the Black community” and demanded
Mountain View Elementary be immediately closed. If the School Board would not close the
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school, “we the residents of East Knoxville will close it ourselves.” Marshall Henely and Grace
Memorial Baptists Reverend Harold Bell, called for the students to be transferred to Green
Elementary. PTA vice president Mrs. D.R. Deathridge disagreed. She worried that transferring
students would only confuse them. Urban League president Woodrow Z. Wilson suggested a
freedom of choice plan, which would allow parents to transfer students to Green.
The heated meeting led to division among School Board members. The School Board
could not be responsive to the Black Community because of its divergent views. Charles
Burchett took exception to the citizens group’s conduct. Board member Lewis Howard
sympathized, “I wouldn’t want to send my children to that school.” As soon as the discussion
over Mountain View ended, Rollins’ group left.65 Leroy Wiggins, a reporter for The Aurora,
offered a different view of the events. Calling PTA leaders “official niggers,” he surmised
Knoxville’s Black leadership is “intent on abiding by some rules that were laid down ages ago.
These rules call for Blacks to please and appease whites. And progress, though painfully slow,
has been made. However, the policies threaten to nourish future generations of handclapping
and foot stomping and extend into another hundred years the quest for the liberation of
Blacks.”66

While all groups desired control of the students’ fate, their ideas about the fate

differed.
Two days after the School Board meeting, Rollins’ group picked the school to demand its
immediate closure.67 Finally, after months of protests and meetings the School Board decided to
close Mountain View Elementary at the end of the school year. A flyer from Rollins’s group,
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The Concerned Parents and Friends of the Mountain View Students, crowed, “we were opposed
by the power structure including the Board of Education, the administrator at Mountain View
School, and others. But we struggled on because we were and are concerned about the safety of
our children in the community.”68 The school closure served as a victory for liberal activists and
illuminated the division between African American activists.
The skirmish between Green and the Concerned Parents and Friends of the Mountain
View Students revealed that the Black community was composed of a number of viewpoints that
could not be reconciled. Grassroots political activism proved to be effective when it received
widespread support, and it would help provide the city’s activists with a role in city politics.
Activists served as the driving force for social change from 1964 to 1969, often drawing
support from liberal and moderate whites. Because Knoxville did not experience a large Black
Power Movement liberal activists could assume more leadership roles. However, activists’ quest
to remedy the Black community’s structural problems faced opposition, as New Rightists
opposed their activism on philosophical grounds. Liberal activists also lacked unity. This
experience showed that activism alone could not solve the Black community’s problems. Many
turned their attention to participation in local politics, which provided the Black community with
a role in distributing the city’s resources, seemingly the most effective means of remedying
structural problems.

68

The Concerned Parents and Friends of the Mt. View Students, “The Victory,” flyer, 1970, Rollins’
Notebook, Beck Center, Knoxville, Tennessee.

188

CHAPTER EIGHT
“BLACK PEOPLE MIGHT RECEIVE SOME BIT OF POLITICAL POWER:” LOCAL
POLITICS, 1967-1972

In August 1966, Knoxville City Councilman Dwight Kessel announced he would step
down to become County Court clerk on September 1. This unremarkable news left a vacancy on
the City Council. Kessel’s replacement would be decided by a vote of the remaining City
Council members. In the weeks leading up the City Council’s vote, speculation over Kessel’s
replacement focused on finding a qualified African American candidate. This idea originated
from the members of the city’s Human Relations Committee. An unnamed member offered, “the
Negro community is ready for representation on the city’s legislative body.” While patronizing,
this line of reasoning opened the door for African American activists to push for a Black council
member.
City Council members and African American activists offered different criteria for
selecting the next city council member. The white board members relied on a merit-based
argument, while the middle-class African American activists felt that they deserved an African
American representative. Early reports suggested Knoxville College athletic director Julian Bell.
His name surfaced after a meeting between civil rights activist Reverend William Cructher and
Mayor Leonard Rogers. Activist Dr. Walter S.E. Hardy said, “I believe he is qualified and
would be a good representative. We are entitled to a representative.” B.A. Ward concurred,
“The Negro community is ready for it and deserves it.”
By contrast, City Council member Dr. Charles Miller told the Knoxville Journal “the best
qualified man for the job should be appointed.” He did not know Julian Bell, but felt that
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Chamber of Commerce president David Blumberg had excellent qualifications.1 The Human
Relations Council continued its push for a Black City Council member into the next week, but to
no avail. The City Council selected David Blumberg. Despite the outcome, the push for a Black
City Council member proved to be a small but important part of Knoxville’s struggle for civil
rights, because it showed that middle-class African Americans had become a significant force in
local politics.2
During this period, African American activists participated in local politics in two
different ways, electoral and grassroots. These efforts worked in tandem, providing them a
larger influence within the city’s political sphere. Middle-class Black activists turned to electoral
politics because it provided control over the city’s resources and participation in the decision
making process.3 It aligned with their idea that cooperation and negotiation with city officials led
to social change. However, Black politicians used their position for a variety of purposes. They
also ran on different platforms. The successful Black politicians used a race-neutral language,
while those who ran more race-conscious campaigns failed.
Grassroots activists undertook a different form of politics. They used a number of tactics,
ranging from protests to lobbying. Grassroots activists built on the ideas and actions of previous
phases of the civil rights struggle, applying their lessons to city politics. Their efforts forced the
city’s political conversation to cover their issues. However, when grassroots activists pressed
for change too quickly or forcefully, their efforts met a conservative backlash.
1
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Activists’ entry into the political realm complicated their relationship with elected
officials. Based on the issue and immediate circumstances, they sometimes worked together.
Just as often they disagreed. This back and forth suited local officials. Elected officials generally
accepted Black participation in electoral politics because it ensured that the ongoing struggle for
the city’s resources would be conducted through well-established channels. The election of
African American candidates did not dramatically alter the status quo. The electoral system also
successfully eliminated radical candidates, such as Avon Rollins, whose ideas failed to appeal to
a large number of voters. Successful Black, moderate politicians negotiated and cooperated with
other elected officials. This process prevented widespread civil unrest and kept power in the
hands of local politicians, Black or white, who sought gradual change though negotiation and
cooperation.
Participation in city politics meant different things to different groups. To middle-class
Black activists, it served as the next phase of civil rights activism. To city officials, it made
acceptable Black candidates part of the city’s political realm and offered them an opportunity to
control the discourse around social change. To Black activists at the grassroots, it provided a
means of shaping the city’s political discussion, even if elected officials sometimes aroused their
frustrations.
**************
The second half of the 1960s witnessed a dramatic rise in African Americans running for
local office. Their efforts served as continuation of the civil rights movement. Historian Steven
Lawson argues that Black aspirants to office “hoped to build upon the legal rights secured
through the protest struggles and use them to continue their pursuit of first class citizenship.”4
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In Knoxville, the efforts of Black candidates had several unexpected consequences. It led to a
complex relationship with elected officials and an upsurge in grassroots political activism.
The election of Leonard Rogers as mayor in 1965 brought the city government new
priorities. Born in Cordova, Tennessee, in 1913, he grew up on a dairy farm. From a family of
six children, Rogers worked his way through the University of Tennessee by delivering milk and
doing other odd jobs. On campus, he won a number of awards and honors, including president
of the Agriculture Club. After graduating in 1937, he worked for Security Mills and Lashbrook
Farms before becoming the manager of Tennessee Valley Fair in 1958. After a brief stint on the
City Council, Rogers won mayoral elections in 1965, 1967, and 1969. In 1971, he lost to Kyle
Testerman. He then joined the University of Tennessee’s Institute for Public Service for a
decade before retiring.
Rogers’s three terms made him the longest tenured mayor in the city’s history. Much of
his appeal came from his position as a businessman who had remained uninvolved in city
politics. He offered a modern alternative to the city’s longstanding politicians.5 As mayor,
Rogers made the city’s finances his top priority. He aimed to hire an accountant for the finance
department, change the city’s fiscal year, give raises to deserving city employees, distribute
surplus school funding to other areas of the budget, streamline medical care for the indigent,
balance the city’s budget, and stabilize the city’s finances to prevent migration to the county.
Noticeably absent in his platform was any reference to improving race relations. For Rogers,
once the city’s finances stabilized and growth occurred, the plight of marginalized groups would
improve.6 His ability to improve the city’s finances brought him the support of the conservative
5
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white community. However, his narrow focus also provided an opportunity for candidates that
represented other constituencies.
Mayor Rogers’s successful first term made him a heavy favorite to win reelection in
1967. He drew the support of the Knoxville News Sentinel, which praised his accomplishments:
bringing financial stability, fending off a sales tax, upgrading and streamlining the police, fire,
and traffic departments, and building new schools.7 Rogers campaigned on his record of
honesty, nonpartisanship, and accomplishments. For the next term, the first challenge would be
“for our citizens to be more positive in our outlook and less negative. The last three industries in
Knoxville almost went elsewhere…..because of the negativism and controversy they
encountered.”8 However, his success did not deter other candidates.
Civil Rights leader Rev. Matthew Jones, Sr. also ran for mayor in 1967. One of
Knoxville’s most militant activists, Jones combined theology and Black Power. He was born in
1913 in Bethel, North Carolina. After completing his schooling, he became a teacher in
Littleton, NC. a position that he held until being chased out of town by Ku Klux Klan after his
anti-segregation views in a Raleigh newspaper. He then landed in Delaware, where he attended
seminary. After completion in 1957, he moved to Knoxville and took over St. Luke’s Episcopal
Church. Jones participated in the direct action movement and firmly believed that “all things are
possible for those who believe in God.”9
During the late 1960s he became an advocate for Black Power based on his frustration
with the civil rights movement’s shortcomings. He told listeners of Avon Rollins’s radio show
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that “Black Power is in truth the voice of God speaking in our world today. Speaking somehow
trying to have the white man realize that it’s over for him as the great power leadership in this
world. And that it’s over for him because he has abused this power.”10 However, he did not
encourage violent revolution. Instead, he ran for mayor to demonstrate to the Black community
its potential political power.
His campaign sought to remedy structural inequalities. From the start, he doubted his
chances of winning because of the city’s small Black population.11 While Mayor Rogers
supported the Mayor’s Council on Human Relations, Jones advocated “local open housing, fair
employment, and public accommodation laws; and one of my first acts as mayor would be to
press for the enactment of such laws. Rather than a council on human relations, I would support
the creation of a full scale Civil Rights Commission, with investigative and enforcement powers.
This is immediate and essential.”12 His platform made race relations a central campaign issue.
However, Jones failed to appeal to a large number of voters. He lost in the primary, then offered
his support to Rogers.13 In the end, Rogers defeated his closest challenger, Sheriff Archie
Weaver, by roughly 2,000 votes.14
Despite the early exit, Jones’s run for mayor had long-term ramifications. His campaign
signaled a shift in Black voting patterns. Shortly after the election, Jones stated that he
campaigned for mayor because he had tired of African Americans being taken for granted by

10

In Touch, Insight, “Interview with Rev. Matthew A. Jones, Sr. on Employment Problems and Conditions
in Knoxville Pertaining to the Negro” Season 2, Episode 1, July 2013, (originally aired March 31, 1968).
11

Ibid.

12

Matthew Jones, Sr., Campaign Flyer, Rollins’ Notebook, Beck Center, Knoxville, Tennessee, “League of
Women Voters Asks Questions, Candidates Reply,” Knoxville News Sentinel, October 29, 1967, A10.
13

“St. Luke’s Rector Takes Detroit Post,” Knoxville News Sentinel, March 26, 1971, 19.

14

“Rogers Defeats Weaver in Mayor’s Race,” Knoxville Journal, November 17, 1967, 1.

194

politicians. They voted, but received no benefits or attention from the politicians they supported
once elected. He ran so that “Black people might receive some bit of political power a base from
which from which we might be able to negotiate and obtain very definite commitments, which
would mean much to us as a people.”15 One local magazine summed up the importance of his
efforts: “Father Jones ran for [the] office of Mayor of Knoxville in order to gain more political
power for the Black people of Knoxville. Many hundreds of votes were realized and thus the
Black people were placed in a position where they were truly recognized by both major mayoral
candidates.”16 He also hoped that a sizeable turn out of Black voters would force the mayor to
appoint an African American to his staff, creating an opportunity for an African American to
influence city policy.17
Jones’s mayoral bid spurred more middle class African Americans to run for office.
During the elections of 1968, Robert Booker won reelection as a state representative from the
Second District, while Theotis Robinson, Jr. lost his bid to represent the Fourth Congressional
District.18 The experience did not dissuade Robinson from running again. The 1969 city
elections, in particular, proved to be a watershed moment in Knoxville’s race relations,
demonstrating that moderate Black candidates, such as Sarah Moore Green, could win in
Knoxville.
Born in Madisonville, Tennessee, in 1912, Sarah Moore Green experienced a childhood
free from racial strife despite Jim Crow. In the late 1920s, she enrolled in Tennessee State
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University. Afterwards, she taught in a one-room school in Monroe County. In the 1930s, she
moved to Knoxville to work for an insurance agency. She became one of the few Black
Republicans in Knoxville. “My daddy always felt that Black people were traitors if they didn’t
belong to the Republican Party,” she reflected. “Of course, at that time Black people couldn’t
vote in the Democratic primary anyway… So I worked with all the Republicans here, which as I
said made me well known.” She remained a member of the GOP for the rest of her life.
After a decade at the insurance firm, Green opened a daycare at her church, which she ran
for twenty-two years until her election to the School Board in 1969. She was the first African
American to serve on the board. Her platform was based on concern for all children and putting
a kindergarten in every elementary school. Around that time she joined the NAACP, remaining
active for many decades and serving as the local chapter president and on the national board.19
She also participated in many other civic organizations, including the Urban League, Community
Action Committee, and Mayor’s Committee on Human Relations.20 Reverend R.E. James
described her as a “woman of mild manner and great power.”21 She participated in the sit-ins,
but “those tactics are the last resort. We can achieve our goals by working through the proper
channels and by talking over our problems. Most people are pretty reasonable.”22
Green participated in local politics because it offered the best avenue for creating change.
She offered, “if you are not a part of the political process you can’t get anything done.”23 This
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view led her to the Republican Party, where being Black made her a powerful asset. Having a
prominent Black member allowed the local Republican Party to appeal to Black Knoxvillians.
Green used this position for practical reforms, including kindergarten for all city schools. These
successful reforms gave her faith in the ability of the political process to create change.
The campaign of Avon Rollins served different ends. After leaving the University of
Tennessee, Rollins worked at Tennessee Valley Authority in several positions pertaining to the
economic advancement of minorities. 24 An original member of the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and follower of Martin Luther King, he consistently advocated
for issues related to economic justice, such as jobs, better housing, and improved education. His
activism came from an understanding that poverty hampered Black economic mobility. He ran
for the School Board to help improve the lives of poor African Americans.
For Rollins, political participation continued the fight against racial inequality. Gaining
political power offered the Black community the means and resources needed for greater
community control. Green, by contrast, placed her faith in the Board of Education, which sought
to solve problems through negotiation, cooperation, and bureaucratic measures. Their differing
positions divided Black community activists between radical and moderate positions, making it
difficult for other elected officials to speak for the entire Black community.
In September 1969, Rollins launched his campaign for the Board of Education from the
largely Black Sixth District. His efforts demonstrated that the political system could serve as a
vehicle for militant activism. He ran “to represent and work for the Black people of Knoxville
in providing a quality education for Black children that would be apropos to the Black
Community they well serve. By working toward this educational objective for Black students, it
24
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will serve to better the quality of education for the disenfranchised poor whites and the total
school system.”25 Rollins viewed better education for Black children as a key to his larger plan to
combat a racist society. Improved education would lead to better jobs, greater income, more
political and economic power, Black consciousness, and improved conditions for the Black
community. These ideas formed the basis of his platform. His slogan was, “Towards Black
Liberation.”
Rollins opposed consolidating city and county schools “In a time when Black people are
trying to obtain commensurate political power,” he said, “we can ill afford to support a program
which dilutes what little power we have thus far obtained.” He also opposed busing to create a
racial balance in schools because it created mistrust between white teachers and Black students.
Rollins advocated sex education, lowering the student to teacher ratio, increasing teachers’
salaries, and constructing three new elementary schools to replace dilapidated Black schools.
Community control served as an important plank: “People of the district should have more
control over what is entered into the curriculum of our schools in terms of any Black studies
program, which would be proposed….. teachers’ should have more freedom of improvisation in
their classrooms.” Finally, he favored reparations of $10,000,000 towards schools, because
“Black people in this country have been denied quality education for 300 years… Consequently,
these people have been burdened with trying to provide for themselves and their families with
low-paying unskilled labor.”26 Greater community control served as the basis for Rollins’s
campaign.
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Dr. Joseph Hardin, a dentist and civic leader, and NAACP stalwart Sarah Moore Green
opposed Rollins. For Green, being elected to the School Board meant cooperating “with parents
and with city administration and the school board to establish better schools in the entire city.”
She advocated open school board meetings (except for those focused on technical matters),
supported school transfers with a suitable reason, advocated the extension of the school day for
disadvantaged students, and expanded job training and placement. In the case of student
rebellion, Green felt that school officials should take over to restore order.

Dr. Joseph Hardin

favored merging the city and county because “one system for all should work much better than
two separate systems.” He opposed busing. If students rebelled, Hardin encouraged considering
the student grievances and, if legitimate, holding meetings to solve them.27 Both Green and
Harden desired reforms in the educational system, albeit moderate ones in comparison to Rollins.
Rollins failed to attract widespread support from the overwhelmingly Black sixth district.
Instead, moderates Green and Hardin advanced to the general election. The results of the primary
ensured that an African American would represent the sixth district on the school board. On the
City Council, the race came down to Jonnie Davis and Theotis Robinson, Jr., also both African
Americans.28 Robinson and Green emerged as winners and the city’s first Black elected officials
since 1912. Their election made Green and Robinson important political figures going forward.
“I think my election opens up a whole new era for Black people in Knoxville,” stated
Robinson. “Ten years ago, it was not possible for a black person to be elected to the City
Council. Who knows what is ahead?”29 Middle class African Americans now held decision
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making positions in the city government. Meanwhile, Rollins saw a triumph in his defeat. “I
received twenty five percent of the total vote [from the Sixth District]. That means that the poor
people are sick and tired of being forgotten. The people are ready to move, by any means
necessary, to gain those rights, privileges, and amenities that the more affluent people take for
granted….This election has also shown the lengths to which the establishment will go to
maintain the status quo.”30 The election of 1969 showed Black participation in electoral politics
could provide Black activists a voice in city governance. Green used her time in office to set up
kindergartens in all city schools and improve the quality of education for all students, both goals
of the civil rights movement. Green’s success spurred other middle class African Americans to
run for office.
The elections of 1969 proved to be a big moment in the struggle for civil rights. The
election of Black candidates offered a means of seeking control over the city’s resources. It also
served as the final nail in Jim Crow’s coffin by making Black elected officials the new keepers
of American democracy. Going forward, established Black activists ran for office frequently. 31
In October 1971, Robert Booker, civil rights activist and state legislator, began his
campaign for mayor, incorporating many ideas from both Robinson’s and Rollins’s efforts. He
tried to bring the Black community greater control, yet used race-neutral language. In a speech
to the Knoxville College Jaycees, Booker advocated lower property taxes, attracting new
industries, extending the hours beer could be sold, and legalizing (and therefore taxing) the sale
of liquor by the drink. He opposed urban renewal, which benefited landlords or real estate
agents who engaged in block busting or sold undesirable houses to the city government, while
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also leading to white flight. He desired to see working people involved in local government,
including the Civil Service Board.32 Booker’s campaign appealed to working-class Knoxvillians
of both races and took up many of the themes, including wooing industries that made Rogers
popular.
In November, Booker officially declared himself a candidate for mayor from the
Democratic Party. Upon doing so, he unveiled his campaign platform.

There were “too many

boards and committees that directly or indirectly influenced the welfare of the city but are
controlled by the same group of people.” He promised to end the city’s urban renewal projects,
to lower sales and property taxes, and to fix the Third Creek Sewage Treatment Plan. He also
vowed to improve the treatment of college students, as well as end police harassment and
housing discrimination. For Booker, Knoxvillians were not “apathetic or uncivic minded [sic]
but just haven’t been asked to participate in affairs that affect the city.”33 Booker’s candidacy
began a new era in Knoxville politics, one which sought to include grassroots people in electoral
politics.
The City Council elections also featured several candidates who offered voters a voice in
city affairs. James Leintaker, a twenty four year old white UT student, ran to provide the city’s
youth a voice. His platform centered around “rent control, pollution, and encouraging
community residents to use the power they have as voters to get community projects underway.”
He also sought to end the price gouging of UT students who lived on West Cumberland
Avenue.34 Mark Chandler, a twenty four year old Black transportation supervisor, based his
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candidacy on providing more city services and improving the outlook for young people. “I firmly
believe that if a city does not seek to provide services and opportunity for its youth in the way of
jobs, reaction, housing and education, the city will soon die,” said Chandler.35 This call for
greater inclusion appealed to the city’s youth, who desired a role in city government.
Several days later, the local Democratic Party held a rally for their mayoral and city
council candidates. College students made up a large part of the audience. All of the candidates
promised the college students a bigger role in the city government. Booker, along with his
opponents, Council members Kyle Testerman and Bernice O’Connor, openly criticized Mayor
Rogers, who ran for election as a Republican, for his mishandling of the Third Creek Sewage
Treatment Plant, which badly malfunctioned. Booker’s speech received the most enthusiastic
response from the audience. He attacked slum lords, promoted liquor sales, and took aim at
some police officers who thought they had “the right to misuse you…that want to be piggish. If
I got one whiff of this they would going to the unemployment office because I won’t tolerate it.”
O’Connor vowed to set up a committee of students to discuss their problems, lower the minimum
age to run for city council, and end the city government’s wastefulness. Mark Chandler told the
college students to “take some responsibility to see things are done right.” They should use their
energy to make “Knoxville the All-American city it once was.”36 These speeches stood in stark
contrast to Rogers’s platform.
Mayor Rogers campaigned on his streamlining accomplishments from his previous terms,
which included extending sewer lines, improving the city’s credit, reducing the debt, and
building a new high school. He also promised a tax cut if reelected. “I think that’s a good record
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and I’m willing to run on that record,” said Rogers. He also criticized his opponents for
emphasizing the city’s problems rather than good points.37 He focused on municipal
improvements and taxes rather than appealing to the city’s youth.
Robert Booker lost to Kyle Testerman in the Democratic primary. Testerman, a young
brash politician who favored aggressive development, then defeated Rogers in the general
election. In the end, it appeared that voters saw the city’s growth as the important issue in the
campaign. Afterward, Mayor Testerman appointed Robert Booker as an aide, ensuring that he
remained an important figure in Knoxville politics for the next decade. He used his influence to
continue the fight against residential segregation, urban renewal, and employment discrimination
by the city government. Grassroots activists supplemented the efforts of elected official, such as
Green and Booker, by keeping civil rights issues in the political discussion.
Booker’s campaign used a hybridized approach. It combined civil rights-related goals
with the modernizing efforts pushed by elected officials. Trumpeting these ideas through raceneutral language offered Booker a wide range of potential supporters. It also drew the interest of
college students expanding the potential number of voters and theoretically offering a greater
amount of community control. While his campaign failed, it vaulted him into a politically
influential position.
****************
Black Knoxvillians had a foothold in the city government, but did not hold decision
making positions. Obtaining these types of jobs required pressure from grassroots activists.
Knoxville Housing Authority had a mayor-appointed Board of Commissioners but no Black
members. The Relocation Staff, which helped families dislocated by urban renewal find new
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homes, had five (out of eight) African American members. In addition, Black Knoxvillians held
forty one of the 104 positions at the KHA, including as administrators, clerical workers and
maintenance workers in the city’s housing projects. However, stated an Urban League report, “a
frequent concern expressed by Negro leaders in the community is the absence of a Negro on the
Board of Commissioners, since approximately seventy percent of the housing units are occupied
by Negroes.”38
Members of the Triad Club, the city’s only organization for Black professionals and
businessmen, led the push to get a Black member on the KHA board. They persuaded Mayor
Rogers through discussion and lobbying.39 In December 1968, Mayor Rogers appointed Dr. Lee
Williams, a physician, to the KHA Board of Commissioners. The News-Sentinel reported that
Mayor Rogers “had been under pressure from groups who argued that at least one of the five
KHA members [commissioners] should be a Negro since so many Negros live in KHA facilities
and are otherwise involved in KHA urban renewal projects.” The Mayor quickly adopted the
pressure group’s logic. He said, “I think we need the kind of representation that Dr. Williams
can render especially since we are entering into new fields or urban renewal and housing
projects.”40 Their efforts forced Mayor Rogers to acknowledge the racial issues that came along
with urban renewal.
June 1969 witnessed the opening of Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC), a
community center focused on remedial and practical education, such as job interview
preparation, to ready students for the vocational training provided by the public schools. The
Center opened thanks to the efforts of Reverend Matthew Jones and Avon Rollins, who
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replicated a program by Philadelphia civil rights leader Reverend Leon Sullivan. Rollins and
Jones brought the idea to Mayor Rogers, the City Council, and State Representative Robert
Booker, who provided support and guided the program through the proper bureaucratic channel
to obtain funding. After several months of planning the Center opened in an unused school, with
the furniture and supplies provided by the city government.41
The OIC served as a perfect example of how local politics could meet different groups’
goals. For Rollins and Jones, the civil rights-inspired OIC offered a means of remedying
economic inequalities through job training. They also pushed elected officials for different
means to remedy economic inequality. For Rogers, job training would include more poor or
undereducated African Americans in the capitalist system, his preferred means of creating
equality. However, cooperation between grassroots activists and city officials occurred
sporadically. Grassroots activists also made elected officials targets of their activism.
In early May 1970, the University of Tennessee’s Black Student Union (BSU) began
picketing grocery stores owned by long time City Councilman Cas Walker, one of the true
characters in city politics. Caswell “Cas” Walker was born in 1902 in Sevier County, Tennessee.
In 1923, after a stint as a coal miner, he opened a small grocery store in Knoxville. Thanks to a
proclivity for publicity stunts, including throwing live chickens off a store roof, business quickly
grew. He maintained a seat on the Council from 1941 to 1972, with a brief stint as mayor in
1940-1941. According to historian William Wheeler, he claimed to “speak for those working
class whites and Blacks who faced ever more difficult economic prospects in the troubled war
time and post war city…Walker deftly played the card of class politics, creating the impression-
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like so many of his constituents-he was the underdog battling against the rich and well born.”42
His image remained attractive despite his extremely successful grocery store chain. It also drew
the ire of the city’s elite. While popular with African Americans immediately following World
War II, his outspoken anti-communism and claim to represent poor African Americans put him
in conflict with civil rights activists who sought to represent the Black community. Wheeler
describes Walker as “part huckster, part spokesman for Knoxville’s poor and fearful, and part
demagogue.”43
For Walker, grassroots activism served as an unwanted disruption of the status quo. If
the Black community effectively unified its political power, it would have ended its support for
Walker. For the previous thirty years, his combination of class politics, populism, and antielitism made him one of the few politicians that courted Black voters. However, voting for
Walker provided little return for Black Knoxvillians.
The BSU protested Walker’s stores because they treated Black customers poorly.
Walker’s stores were the only groceries located in Black areas of the city. A report from the
Knoxville Council on Human Relations in 1969 determined that the stores’ prices were three
percent higher in Black areas. The day following the report’s release, members of the Council
on Human Relations, Ralph Bean and Lynn Walker, were beaten and arrested while distributing
anti-Walker leaflets in front of the store.44 Picketing began on May 7. These pickets drew
attention to Walker’s discriminatory practices. Walker did not shy away from the attention.
The grocery store campaign was a bold move for student activists. It used direct action
tactics to confront an important structural problem, the cost of food. In doing so, they took on
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one of the most powerful political figures of the last fifty years. Their campaign signaled a shift
in Black voting patterns. No longer would Walker’s populism and class-based rhetoric make
him appealing to poor and working class African Americans. Instead, his refusal to work with
demonstrators cost him Black votes. Black voters now supported elected officials who fought
for civil rights.
Always the controversial figure, Walker used a variety of tactics to combat the protests.
He filed an injunction against the BSU and other participating community members. He sued the
group for $1,000. As protests took place, Walker sought to draw attention to the protesters’
unjust harassment. To do so, he hired a plus-sized Black woman to lead a mule around the
parking lot. While she did so, Walker taunted, “don’t let her ride that mule, she might break it
down” through a loud speaker. He also encouraged exiting customers to run over protesters.
His tactics ensured a lengthy standoff and increased tensions as the protests continued.45
Demonstrations turned hostile on the evening of May 20. Around 10:15 pm police
arrived to disperse a crowd of between 75-150 protesters. Onlookers gathered in front of one
Walker’s stores. The police blocked off the area. Officers then approached the demonstration
only to be met with a hail of rocks and three gun shots. Police wisely “worked to avoid an actual
‘confrontation’ with the demonstrators because of the ugly mood of the crowd.” Instead, they
launched a tear gas canister into the crowd. The parking lot emptied by 11:30. Police Chief
Harry Huskisson claimed, “The confrontation was only a test to see if police would retaliate by
firing back or charging the crowd.”46 The incident spurred Walker to use his political
connections to deter continuing demonstrations.
45

“A History of the Cas Walker Movement,” Cas Walker, Beck Center, Knoxville, Tennessee.

46

“Bullet Barley Missed Officers,” Knoxville Journal, May 22, 1970, “Unruly Crowd at Store Dispersed,”
Knoxville News Sentinel, May 21, 1970.

207

Walker sent a letter to Knoxville Congressman (and former mayor) John Duncan,
expressing concern about Avon Rollins. He claimed that Rollins protested during business hours
at the TVA, Rollins’s employer.47 Walker also claimed “everybody wants a settlement except
Avon. Avon says he wants a settlement, but not now. Of course, his real gripe is because I
supported Sarah Green and didn’t support him for School Board.”48 Walker cast the protest as a
result of electoral politics, cleverly sidestepping the protesters’ grievances. Duncan forwarded
Walker’s complaints to TVA Chairman Aubrey Wagner.49
Shortly after the incident, Walker and the demonstrators reached an accord. The terms
benefited the Black community and seemed to signal Walker’s acknowledgement of his unfair
business practices. Both sides agreed to periodic checks of food quality, the development of a
scholarship program and recreation facilities in the Black community, and an end to the lawsuit
and injunction. Finally, they approved a training program for Black employees, which would
eventually lead to African American managers and assistant managers at the McCalla and
Western Avenue stores, the stores located in predominately Black areas.50 This final item had
been a point of contention between Walker’s stores and member of the Committee for the
Development of the Black Community, a local civil rights organization, for the preceding two
months.51
At the beginning of August, after a mass meeting, pickets resumed to force the start of the
management training program. Meanwhile, Walker resumed his harassment of Avon Rollins.
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He discontinued advertising on WJBE, leading to the cancellation of Rollins’s radio show In
Touch Insight. On August 13, he sent a second letter to Wagner, directly accusing Rollins of
blackmail and inquiring about his attendance record at work.52 In mid-August, Lynn Seeber of
the TVA replied to Walker. He found Rollins’s attendance record satisfactory and reported that
leading protests did not violate any TVA policy. “This is not to say, of course, that we agree
with Mr. Rollins’ objectives or the manner in which he seeks to obtain them.”53 Walker filed
another injunction against Jerry Pate, William Brantley, Avon Rollins, and Harvey Glover to
prevent them from protesting. Two days later, Pate and Glover resumed picketing, leading to
their arrests. The events of August and September 1970 spurred the Tennessee Council on
Human Relations to call for a boycott of Walker’s stores.54
At a City Council meeting on July 21, 1971, grassroots activists continued their quest to
impugn Cas Walker. This time, he faced harassment at the workplace. The activists used the
public spotlight to shift the city’s focus onto Walker’s conduct. Weeks before the meeting,
Councilman Walker had been charged with felonious assault for dragging Mary Tindell from a
building.55 Mayor Rogers then formed a committee, headed by Theotis Robinson, Jr., to
formulate the Council’s response. After crafting the report, the committee forwarded it to City
Law Director Bill Petty, who determined Walker would receive no penalty because the charges
did not interfere with his official duties. Petty’s ruling drew charges of racial discrimination and
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special treatment from a group of “outspoken Negroes” who attended the meeting.56 During the
discussion, Terry Ladd questioned Walker’s fitness to serve: “I don’t know too many fit and
proper people who beat ladies.” Avon Rollins suggested Walker suspend himself until the
charges were resolved in court. Councilmen Milton Roberts’s attempt to end the discussion
“brought loud protest from Negroes in the audience and angry replies from Mr. Roberts that he
was ‘not afraid of any of you.’” Mayor Rogers then restored order.57 The meeting’s turmoil led
Walker to strike back at Rollins.
Cas Walker responded to the incident through The Watchdog, a free tabloid newspaper
that he published. He implied Rollins was a communist or at least a sympathizer. He accused a
nameless employee (clearly Rollins) of being a disruption at the Tennessee Valley Authority and
threatening to burn down Walker’s grocery stores.58 Another article alleged that Rollins attended
a workshop at the Highlander Center while being paid by the TVA. For Walker, Highlander was
“Pinkish-Leftish organization, still very active with the Black and white militants, continuing to
stir up trouble any place they can and promote strife and turmoil.”59 Walker was once the only
long standing politician to appeal to working class and poor African Americans. Now he stood
as the most vocal opponent of civil rights, as witnessed by his back and forth with Rollins.
As Walker and Rollins feuded, the Black community unified around the death of Ethel
Beck. A popular, wealthy philanthropist and civic leader, Beck was involved in a traffic accident
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on the evening of Sunday, August 9, 1970. Upon arriving on the scene, Lt. William Boyd and
Officer Frank Shipley claimed they smelled alcohol coming from Beck, a well-known teetotaler,
and took her to jail around 9:20 pm. She lay unconscious in her cell several hours later. At the
hospital, doctors determined she suffered a stroke before the traffic accident. No alcohol was
found in her system. She died August 12. The following Saturday, Black leaders, including
Robert Booker, Sarah Moore Green, Dr. Walter Hardy, Reverend Matthew Jones, and Avon
Rollins, among a crowd of 200, met at Bethel AME Zion Church to discuss Beck’s death. The
case attracted a great deal of news coverage. It also led the Black community to unify and make
police-community relations an important issue in Knoxville.
The police department denied any wrongdoing. Black community leaders pushed back.
City Safety Director Harry Huskisson told the press that the officers had acted in good faith.
However, he would wait for the results of the pending investigation before taking any
disciplinary action. State Representative Robert Booker said, “the Black community will not
accept an apology in this matter…officers have been suspended for offenses that had less
consequences than the loss of a good woman’s life.”60
The meeting at Bethel AME Zion Church resulted in five resolutions. Meeting attendees
advocated greater civilian oversight of the police, expanding the debate beyond Beck’s death.
Their demands included: a committee of private citizens and police to investigate the case,
Officer Shipley and Lt. Boyd to be suspended during the investigation, the Police Department to
retract its assertion that Beck had consumed alcohol, a public apology, medical attention for any
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person found by police in an altered state of consciousness, and a civilian review board. The
group also contacted asked the Department of Justice to begin an investigation.61
Mayor Rogers supported the police. He suggested Black leaders had ulterior motives for
their concern. KPD’s preliminary report found the involved officers committed no wrong doing.
It also found that during the accident and ensuing arrest, Beck’s home had been burglarized.62
Mayor Leonard Rogers suggested “those who seem unusually interested in Mrs. Beck’s case
could be of help in seeking that justice is carried out when the person or persons involved in
causing Mrs. Beck to leave her home, so as to ransack her home during her absence, are brought
to justice.”63 Rogers’s comments suggest he did not fully appreciate the Black leaders’ concern.
Despite Rogers’s lack of support, Black leaders continued their activism. Their plan
received support from a variety of members of the white community. Two days later Theotis
Robinson, Jr. presented the group’s resolutions to the City Council.64 The City Council adopted
all the resolutions except the first, which called for a committee to investigate Beck’s death.
However, Robert Booker commented, “this is not a racial matter. We have been pleased by the
number of whites who have volunteered their support and services.”65 Safety Director
Huskinson told the press he would fully cooperate with anyone interested in the Beck case.66
Support from the white community was also expressed in an editorial the following day. It
praised Beck’s character and the “responsible leadership within the Black community, [which]
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prevented the incident from touching off a major social crisis.” While granting the police had a
difficult job, the editorial called for changes in police practices, including consulting a physician
when unsure of an incarcerated person’s condition, and “more enlightened leadership,” because
in the previous two years a dozen people had died while in custody or shortly after being
released from the city jail.67 These responses stood in contrast to Mayor Rogers’s view of
Beck’s death.
On the 19th, Mayor Rogers offered the press his thoughts on the mostly complete police
report, which found that the officers had made an honest mistake. He portrayed Black
community members as publicity seekers rather than concerned citizens. Rogers reported, “I
feel some people are trying to make ‘political hay’ out this incident and our white and Black
citizens are not going to be discriminated against.”68 The activists interfered with Rogers’s
priorities, which included touting improved police services.
The evening’s City Council meeting drew an audience of about 300 people, equally
divided between police officers and African American community members. The meeting
served as a confrontation between Black leaders and the recalcitrant mayor. Spectators gathered
to witness how the resolutions would be implemented. Some also sought to push for a citizen
review board. Once the meeting began, several audience members asked Mayor Rogers
questions about Beck’s phantom alcohol consumption. The civilian review board became a point
of dispute. Shiloh Presbyterian Church Pastor Frank Gordon asserted that the board would
protect police officers and community members. Councilman Cas Walker offered, “There is no
question on the review board. I think that is out. It’s been voted down by the Council before and
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I don’t think we have changed our minds.” However, Mayor Rogers and Councilman David
Blumberg remained willing to discuss it further. Theotis Robinson, Jr. reminded the audience
that Beck’s case was not a racial issue: “this is a problem in Knoxville and we don’t want
treatment like this for the citizens here.”69 Robinson’s race neutral language ensured that the
Black community leaders’ ideas remained palatable to all groups.
The City Council never created a civilian review board, but the Black activists’ grassroots
activism did lead to changes. A new policy mandated that officers take arrested persons to the
hospital if they showed signs of injury or illness. A report later determined that since the
policy’s institution, ten arrested citizens had been taken to the hospital for false claims, two of
whom faked unconsciousness and then escaped. One officer claimed they faked injuries to get
free dental work.70 Yet the unified Black community had succeeded in drawing the spotlight to
the relations between the Police and the community as well as creating a policy change.
Activists’ participation altered the city’s political realm. It offered Black politicians a
greater voice in the city’s decision making process and therefore some level of control over the
city’s resources. It also went hand in hand with grassroots politics. Grassroots activists focused
the city’s political discussion on civil rights providing issues for Black candidates to campaign
on. Grassroots activists made tangible gains, such as revising police policy. Grassroots politics
also created a new avenue for participation in city politics. Elected officials welcomed moderate
Black politicians. These groups sometimes worked together to create social change, at other
times they wound up at odds. Electoral politics tempered activism, prevented large scale unrest,
and blocked any dramatic change to the status quo.
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CONCLUSION
“WE HAVE TRIED TO DO WHAT THE PEOPLE WANT”
Well into the 1980s, Knoxville’s elected officials sought to continue the city’s economic
growth. They wrestled with development-related issues such as urban renewal, annexation, and
taxes. Citizens remained divided over these issues. The major exception came when the
World’s Fair arrived in 1982, which forced the development of infrastructure and brought a brief,
but major, infusion of capital. For the most part, race relations remained an afterthought.
In the late 1980s, Black activists, led by the local NAACP chapter, began its fight against
racial discrimination in Knox County schools. In June 1989, two years after the city and county
school systems merged, the Knoxville County NAACP chapter filed a formal complaint against
the school system with the federal Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in Atlanta. The complaint
charged that the school system failed to employ a sufficient number of African Americans.
Knoxville chapter president Charles Clark claimed that African American students made up
sixteen percent of the student population, but only seven percent of the professional staff. To
remedy the problem, Clark and the NAACP attempted to work with school board officials, but
were ignored. “We’re sorry we had to resort to doing this,” said Clark, “but if the community is
really interested in making a more concerned effort to address this problem, we need to move
ahead.” He also claimed that African American students needed Black employees to serve as
role models. The Office of Civil Rights began an investigation that fall.
School officials acknowledged the hiring disparity, but lacked a solution. Hiring
qualified minorities proved to be difficult. Knox County School superintendent Earl Hoffmeister
noted that this problem plagued school districts throughout the country. Assistant director of
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personnel Bob Thomas offered, “There’s no quick resolution to this problem, but we are trying
to resolve it. When minorities are qualified, we make an effort to employ them.”71
Several months later, the Knoxville Journal came out in favor of a federal investigation.
The paper acknowledged that previous attempts failed to bring about complete desegregation. A
September 1989 editorial argued that a majority-to-minority transfer policy (which allowed
racial minorities to transfer to any school) had not integrated the schools. It only succeeded in
preventing court-ordered busing. “Residential patterns continue to determine more than any
other community feature, or activity, or policy, where whites and Blacks go to school.” As a
result, the investigation was not “a bad idea at all. Such a review could point up areas where the
schools could improve their racial sensitivity, if not their racial composition.”72
The investigation began in the middle of October and its conclusions became public by
December. The OCR stated that the school system remained “just a segregated today as it was
decades ago.” As a result, the school system faced the loss of $14,000,000 in federal funding. To
keep the funding, the school board had to submit a plan to integrate the school system by
creating more balanced schools and changing the transfer policy. It had until December 31.73
School officials, in consultation with the OCR, quickly began working on a remedy.
Knox County officials altered the transfer policy to factor in the impact of each transfer on the
school’s racial composition. They also moved Black teachers and administrators out of
predominately Black schools. Superintendent Hoffmeister offered, “We have tried to do what
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the people want. The Black community wanted positive Black role models, and we put them in
those positions. Now we are in violation for doing that.”
Local Black leaders opposed the transfer of Black teachers and staff. Instead, they
demanded more Black employees. They suggested hiring a minority recruiter, who would
recruit at historically Black colleges and universities. However, school board officials claimed
that the proposed minority recruiter would have difficulty attracting candidates because of the
state’s low starting salary and the scarcity of minority candidates across the nation.74 Eventually,
the board hired a minority recruiter, but failed to adequately fund the position.
As plans for the transfer emerged, so did opposition groups. The Committee for the
Development of the African American Community, a local civil rights organization, argued that
moving Black employees out of Black schools would harm the students. Perry Daughery, a
spokesman for the group, told the school board, “the schools in our neighborhood are under
attack….We cannot and will not support any position or strategy that further erodes the historical
significance of our heritage, our neighborhoods, and our individual and collective pride and
dignity.”75
Opposition to the forced transfers led to a reemergence of negotiations. In February, the
school board created a desegregation taskforce composed of a variety of school officials, parents,
community group members, and participants in local civil rights organizations, which aimed to
figure out the best way to meet the OCR’s mandates. Meanwhile, superintendent Hoffmeister,
members of the local NAACP chapter, and representatives from the newly formed United
Neighborhoods Interested in Quality Education (UNIQUE), a local organization formed by Avon
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Rollins, met with OCR officials in Atlanta. The group hoped to convince the OCR to halt the
staff transfers.76 However, the OCR held firm.
The OCR’s plan also drew criticism from the students themselves. They worried that
transferring teachers would decrease the quality of their education. Michael Hayes, a junior at
Farragut High School, wrote in the Journal that moving the teachers would limit the number of
special classes, including honors and advanced placement courses, and hamper extracurricular
clubs. “Transferring teachers…only for the sake of numbers is wrong,” he said. “The OCR
needs to recognize that the domination of different racial groups starts in the community and if
anything is to be done to integrate the groups, it should start there.”77
Once the teacher transfer began, the committee turned its attention to rezoning the
schools. The planning process revealed committee members’ differing philosophies. In order to
comply with the OCR’s order, the school system had to eliminate “racial identifiable schools,”
whose population was more than one-third Black. During the process a number of plans came to
light, often in response to the pressure exerted by outside groups. Essentially, they fell into two
camps: one sought to gerrymander the school district into compliance with OCR’s standards, and
the other aimed to improve the overall quality of education. Tensions spilled over during a
meeting in August 1990. In response to one plan, Denny Littlejohn of the Committee for the
Development of the African American Community offered, “We should instead be talking about
improving the quality of education for all of our students. What’s been said here is almost
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insulting; it’s almost like you’re calling me a nigger.” Instead, he proposed a magnet school,
located in the inner city, which would be attended by Black and white students equally.78
One plan called for the closure of the city’s three “racial identifiable” high schools: Rule,
Holston, and Austin-East. The students would then be rezoned into five predominately white
schools. The plan drew objections from students at the targeted high schools. Fred Kleimola, a
senior at Rule High School, argued that closing the school would damage the community. Tonya
Echols, a senior at Holston High, offered, “I’ve learned a lot from going to a smaller high school.
I’ve had a lot more attention in the classroom than I would have had in a larger school. Besides,
Holston doesn’t have that many Blacks. If a school has 75 or 80 percent Blacks it should be
spread out, but I think 35 percent is a little too close to cut it off.”79
Others used the OCR mandate for their own ends. School Board member Sam Anderson
called the OCR to prevent the construction of a new high school. In October, the process of
getting the necessary funds to build a high school in west Knoxville had begun. Sam Anderson,
the School Board’s lone Black member, cast the only dissenting vote against funding the high
school, which he worried would become all-white, creating further obstacles to desegregation. A
day before the vote, he called the OCR. “I just wanted to find out if we had cleared the Karns
project [the new high school] with the OCR. As a board member, I have that right. It sounds
like people are thinking I told on the school system.” OCR regional official Jesse High ordered
the planned high school halted until a comprehensive desegregation plan was approved.80
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Despite the objections, the city school board forged ahead. In mid-April, it approved a
plan which would close twenty one schools, many located in the inner city, over the next four
years. The plan created further turmoil. It kicked off a struggle between the school board and
county commissioners over funding. A coalition of citizens, including church groups, civic
organizations, and concerned parents, filed suit in federal court. On the day of the vote, seventy
five students from South-Young High School left school to protest the school board’s decision.
However, the plan received approval from the Office of Civil Rights.81
During the debate over school desegregation, interested parties worked together,
disagreed, protested, and sought to influence the final desegregation plan. While no group was
completely satisfied by the plan, it met the OCR’s guidelines, retained federal funding, and
brought greater diversity to the school system. This process, and the civility with which it was
carried out, recalled Knoxville’s civil rights movement of the 1960s.
As a result of civil rights activism, social change had occurred in Knoxville through
negotiation and cooperation between groups-- usually civil rights organizations, elected officials,
business leaders, and activists. During this process, each group used a variety of strategies and
tactics to increase their voice in negotiations, including demonstrations and electoral politics. In
turn, the others responded. This back-and-forth gave all groups a say in the outcome. Those
groups which operated outside of the dynamic, such as Highlander Folk School, failed to create
change in Knoxville.
The necessity for consensus led to long-term sustainable changes, because they were
supported by a variety of groups. However, adherence to this moderate tenor meant eschewing
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the ideas of more radical groups, which might have produced strategies to combat structural
racial inequality. The need for widespread support also limited the scope of acceptable
ideologies, discourse, and, sometimes, justifying the status quo. In the long term, these
circumstances provided the city a framework for limited social change.
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